The rise and fall of income inequality in post-reform China:  an empirical analysis of the development and determinants of income inequality in China in the period 1985-2015 by Syslak, Daniel
 
 
The Rise and Fall of Income 
Inequality in Post-Reform China 
An empirical analysis of the development and determinants of 
income inequality in China in the period 1985-2015 
Daniel Syslak 
Supervisor: Bjortvatn, Kjetil 
Master Thesis in Economics and Business Administration 
International Business 
NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are 
responsible − through the approval of this thesis − for the theories and methods used, or results 
and conclusions drawn in this work. 
Norwegian School of Economics  
Bergen, Fall 2019 
 
 2
Abstract 
Over the last couple of decades, there has been progressive commitment and remarkable 
achievements by the international community in lifting people out of poverty across the world. 
At the same time, elevated levels of inequality in income persists as a global phenomenon – 
threatening long-term social and economic development, but also undermining individuals’ 
self-worth and sense of fulfillment by putting certain people at a persistent disadvantage.  
In this, China is no exception. Following the economic reforms in the late 70s and early 80s, 
the country embarked upon one of the greatest economic expansions in modern history. An 
unprecedented development that has brought the nation to the verge of eradicating poverty. In 
spite of these achievements, the economic gains from the growth miracle has been far from 
equally distributed. Before integrated into the world market, the income distribution in China 
was considered egalitarian in all aspects, with inequality comparable to the Nordic countries. 
This changed dramatically over the following decades with the level of inequality rising at one 
of the fastest rates ever recorded, rendering China among the world’s most unequal nations.  
In the interest of understanding this development, the purpose of this dissertation is to explain 
how the aggregate disparity in income distribution has evolved in China in the period between 
1985 and 2015, but also to shed light on some of the most significant drivers of this evolution. 
From the descriptive analysis pertaining to the former, there is clear consensus among previous 
empirical work in that income inequality increased markedly in the years following the 
economic reforms up until the late 00s. From 1978 to 2010, the top 10% income earners 
increased its share of national income by 16%, while the share assumed by the bottom 40% of 
the distribution decreased by 13% in the period. Around 2010, there is a reversal in the trend, 
as the relative disparity between top and bottom earners declined by 7% up until 2015.   
The findings from the empirical analysis suggest that trade liberalization has had a significant 
positive impact on the level of disparity between the top 10% and bottom 40% income earners 
in post-reform China. At the same time, the regression results find that increased efficiency of 
redistributive policies has significantly contributed to reduce aggregate income inequality in 
the period. The analysis is unable to find evidence to support the hypotheses of Kuznets and 
Milanovic related to determinants of the development. However, given the limitations of the 
study, more data and dynamic models is needed to conclusively validate these findings.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background  
From the outset of the market-oriented economic reforms in 1978 when China started its 
process of ‘opening-up’, it was a poor nation with GDP per capita less than half of the average 
in Asia (Eckart, 2016). Despite the poor economic conditions of the country, it was a relatively 
equal nation in terms of wage distribution. In the time leading up to the economic 
liberalization, China’s wage equality was comparable to the most egalitarian Scandinavian 
countries today and significantly more equal than for example France or United States at the 
time (Piketty et al., 2017). At this time, the share of national income assumed by the top decile 
income earners at around 27% was equivalent to the share assumed by the bottom 50% of the 
distribution. The Asian Development Bank Institute (Shixue, 2003) described the pre-reform 
conditions as follows: “before China implemented reform and open-door policies in 1978, its 
income distribution patterns was characterized as egalitarianism in all aspects”.  
 
Following the first wave of economic reforms in 1978, the country embarked upon one of 
fastest and largest economic expansions in modern history. From 1980 to 2012, per capita 
income rose from 320$ to around 5,500$ (Cevik & Correa-Caro, 2015). Even though the 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a more market-oriented economy raised more 
than 660 million people out of poverty, the economic gains has been far from equally 
distributed. In the same period of time, China experienced one of the most rapid rises in levels 
of income inequality ever recorded (Li, 2016). From 1978 to 2015, the share of national 
income assumed by the 50% lowest income earners fell to around 15%, whereas the top decile 
profoundly increased its share to around 41% (Piketty et al., 2017). Gini coefficient estimates 
based on the same dataset suggests an increase of around 20 Gini points over the whole period, 
from 35 in 1978 to 55 by 2015. A substantial increase equivalent to nearly three times the rise 
in income inequality in United States for the same period, at 6.9 Gini points (World Bank, 
2019). Consequently, China had gone from being a relatively egalitarian nation to being 
ranked one of the most unequal societies in the world in 2015 (Cevik & Correa-Caro, 2015). 
Howbeit, as advocated by Deng Xiaoping in his famous dictum, the paradoxical policy of the 
Communist Party was to “let some people get rich first” to gradually achieve common 
prosperity (Shawki, 1997). A political intention that may come into fruition as recent estimates 
indicates a reversal of the trend towards a more equal income distribution from the late 00s.   
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1.2 Motivation and contribution 
The motivation for this thesis can be seen from two fundamental perspectives. First, from a 
personal perspective, my experiences of living in China motivated me to get a better 
understanding of the development and drivers of income inequality in the country. The second 
perspective pertains to gaps in relevant literature and empirical research related to the 
aggregate development and determinants of change over time.  
 
In 2016, I got the opportunity to live in China as a part of an exchange program during my 
bachelor’s degree. This was a mind-altering experience along a myriad of dimensions, but one 
impression manifested itself; the dramatic contrast between rich and poor. The collectivistic 
nation ruled by a communist party paradoxically felt more like a polarized plutocracy. Seeing 
how university staff cramped up in pocket-sized bunkbeds in the basement ventilation room 
around the corner from the luxury fashion mall occupied by extravagant sportscars inspired 
me to better understand this disparity. These experiences and a prolonged aspiration of towards 
contributing to sustainable development had me reflect on how I could make a difference. I 
realized that by pursuing a greater understanding myself, I could contribute to an enhanced 
understanding for others, which led me to devote my master thesis to the subject. After 
consolidating with my supervisor and reviewing existing empirical work in the case of China, 
I identified gaps in the literature which I could contribute to narrow by shedding more light 
on both development and dynamics of income inequality in the modern post-reform era.   
 
The rapid increase in income inequality in China following the economic reforms in 1978 is a 
well-documented phenomenon (e.g. Shi et al., 2013; Khan & Riskin, 2001; Ravallion & Chen, 
2007; Li et al., 2014). However, existing literature is largely fragmented and limited to certain 
conceptual facets because of data limitations (e.g. regional disparity or impact of policy; 
Gustafson and Li, 2002; Kanbur and Zhang, 1999; Fan et al., 2002; Heerink et al., 2006). 
Through this thesis, I hope to contribute to existing research by providing a more holistic and 
comprehensive account of the long-term evolution and dynamics of within-country income 
inequality in post-reform China. Wan and Zhang (2006) argues that current empirical work 
has primarily been descriptive and underlines the need for more analytical work that attends 
to the causes of the rise in inequality. The limited empirical work that is attending to the 
determinants of change in the income distribution also often focus on endogenous transmission 
channels rather than the exogenous structural drivers. Through this dissertation, I hope to 
contribute to a better understanding of the structural determinants in a long-term perspective.  
 10
1.3 Research question and purpose 
Following the motivation of the research described above, the purpose of this research paper 
is to provide a better understanding and close existing knowledge gaps about the development 
and determinants of aggregate income inequality in the post-reform era in China. I hope to 
shed more light on economic disparity in China by comparing existing empirical research, but 
also adopt an alternative measurement approach that could help mitigate some of the existing 
bias. Additionally, to hopefully provide new insights into the dynamics of income inequality 
in China after the economic reforms by analyzing determinants in light of renowned theories 
and empirical work in a global, regional and country-specific perspective. In accordance with 
this purpose, the research question of this thesis is formulated accordingly:  
 
“How has disparity in the distribution of income evolved in China in the period 1985-2015, 
and what are the most significant determinants of the development?” 
1.4 Scope and limitation 
The scope of this thesis will be limited to the development and determinants of aggregate 
inequality in the income distribution for the period between 1985 to 2015. Accordingly, this 
thesis will not attend to consequences, implications nor solutions to an elevated level of 
inequality beyond a brief discussion related to the importance of such disparity in chapter 2. 
The research paper will further not attempt to make any estimations in terms of forecasting or 
projection of future development. Despite the importance of these conceptual facets, such 
estimations and predictions entail too much complexity and ambiguity for this study to make 
a meaningful contribution to existing empirical work. Marked limitations in terms of data 
availability, quality and measurement alignment have also prevented the empirical analysis 
from address determinants of inequality in the immediate years following the economic 
reforms between 1978 and 1985. Data limitations that has further restricted the study of this 
paper from attending to the most recent development in the period after 2015. 
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1.5 Structure of thesis 
In accordance with the purpose and research question of this study, the dissertation will be 
structured into two main bodies. The first of which will attend to the first part of the research 
question, which will embody a descriptive and explanatory analysis of the development of 
disparity in the income distribution from 1985 to 2015. This part of the thesis will first account 
for fundamental analytical elements in studying income inequality by defining the concept of 
income inequality, discussing the related importance and elaborating on different 
measurement techniques. Thereafter follows a comprehensive review of existing empirical 
research with a descriptive analysis of the related estimates of the development in levels of 
inequality for the period. This will further include new estimates of the changes to the income 
distribution by introducing an alternative measurement technique based on existing secondary 
data. Subsequently, the estimated degree of disparity will be decomposed along critical 
dimensions to shed light on the composition and dynamics of the aggregate income dispersion. 
More specifically, attending to the relative contribution and disparity of groupings based on 
spatial distribution, educational attainment, sectorial employment and income sources. 
 
The second main body of the thesis consist of the exploratory analysis in determining drivers 
of the established development in inequality. In this, I will first present a review of relevant 
theoretical predictions and empirical evidence which will function as the basis for variable 
selections and regression modelling. Chapter 6 will then account for the research design, 
methodological approach and necessary stastical assumptions for the empirical analysis. 
Followingly, chapter 7 presents the employed dataset for the analysis with a description of the 
included predictors, the variable construction technique adopted and relevant historical 
development in each of the processes. This will also include a discussion related to the 
limitations of the employed measurement techniques. In chapter 8, I will present the regression 
analysis and results related to the second part of the research question. This chapter will first 
account for the regression modelling procedure and rationale, before relevant diagnostics and 
adaptations of the data and model specifications is described in accordance with necessary 
assumptions. Thereafter, the final regression results are presented with a related description of 
the hypothesis tests for each of the given model specifications and predictor variables. These 
results will subsequently be summarized, discussed and interpreted in light of the theoretical 
predictions in the following subsection. At last, I will give an account for potential limitations 
and weaknesses of the analysis and methodological approach before the paper is concluded.  
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2. Fundamentals of Income Inequality Analysis 
In this section, I will present an overview of the fundamental theoretical and conceptual 
background for studying income inequality. This include, defining the concept of income 
inequality, discussing why the income dispersion matters and how to measure such disparity 
in a meaningful way. This will also include a discussion related to implications of applying 
different measurement techniques. A background intended to provide a basic conceptual 
understanding of the coming analysis of evolution and configuration of inequality.   
2.1 Defining income inequality 
The Oxford advanced learners dictionary (2019) defines inequality as “the unfair difference 
between groups of people in society, when some have more wealth, status or opportunities 
than others”. A broad definition that has been prone to debate, as the wording leaves much 
room for subjective interpretation and perceptional differences of the concept. A common way 
to distinguish the phenomenon is to differentiate between inequality of rights and obligations 
and inequality based on living conditions, also known as economic inequality (United Nations, 
2015a). Such economic inequality refers to the distribution of economic variables including 
income, consumption and wealth across populations, between subgroups or countries.  
 
Along the dimension of economic inequality, two conceptual perspectives prevail; inequality 
of outcomes or opportunity. The outcome-oriented view focuses on income as proxy for well-
being, while the latter perspective understands the concept of well-being differently, as it 
emphasizes the freedom to choose rather than ensuring equality in outcomes. The relative 
importance of these perspectives is not straightforward and has been subject to strongly 
diverging standpoints in both political and academic spheres. At the same time, Rawls (1971) 
argues that distribution of outcomes and opportunities is of equal importance, but also that 
they equally informative in understanding the extent and nature of inequality.  
 
Income inequality is an aspect of economic inequality that describes a condition in which 
cumulative income is unequally distributed across a population. In other words, income 
inequality exists if certain individuals or a subgroup assumes a disproportionate share of 
national income relative to its size (Dinca-Panauitescu and Walks, 2015). An increase in the 
level of income inequality must consequently be a result of low-income earners becoming 
relatively poorer, high income earners become relatively richer, a relatively smaller share of 
national income assumed by the middle-class or a combination of any of these processes.   
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2.2 Why income inequality matters 
The concept of fairness and equality is a fundamental social value in societies across the world. 
In this, the economic dimension of inequality, specifically in the form of disparity in the 
distribution of income can be considered to be an elemental factor. Even though the 
phenomenon of income inequality directly relates to inequality in outcomes, such disparity 
undoubtedly affects equality and fairness in opportunities through social mobility as well. 
High levels of disparity in the income distribution reflects an economic condition whereas 
certain segments of the population are put at a persistent disadvantage. A condition that could 
entail a myriad of negative implications for long-term economic and social development. In 
line with these consequences, I will account for some of the reasons why income inequality 
matters. In doing so, I hope to share some of my devotedness for the topic with the reader. 
 
In a free-market economy, a certain level of inequality is inevitable. Some degree of inequality 
can even be deemed a desirable economic condition in certain aspects, as there is an 
“important role of income differences in in providing incentives to invest in education, 
physical capital, to work hard, and to take risks” (World Bank, 2006). Correspondingly, 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) argues that inequality incentivizes entrepreneurship and innovation 
which can have a positive effect on growth. Barro (2000) further suggests that inequality can 
be especially positive for growth in developing countries, in that it facilitates conditions for 
some individuals to obtain means for educational or entrepreneurial purposes. At the same 
time, it is important to underline the ambiguity related to these proposed causal mechanisms. 
 
In terms of economic growth stimulus, which seems to be prevalent argument for some degree 
of inequality, recent literature finds that income inequality can impair both the rate and 
sustainability of economic growth (Ostry, Berg, and Tsangarides 2014; Berg and Ostry 2011; 
Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). Galor and Moav (2004) finds that increased inequality leads to 
reduced growth by preventing poor individuals from accumulating either human- or physical 
capital, thus restraining social mobility. A mechanism that again would induce negative 
consequences on labor productivity (Stiglitz, 2012). Widening inequality is further found to 
have a detrimental effect on political, financial and economic stability, which again hampers 
investments and have constraining effects on economic growth (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). 
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This on-going academic and political debate reflects the ambiguity related to economic 
consequences, but also what can be deemed as a beneficial level of income inequality. At the 
same time, there is far less dispute to the notion that an elevated and sustained level of 
inequality over time will have harmful consequences, both socially and economically. In terms 
of inequality in opportunity, high and persistent levels of inequality is found to inflict 
significant social cost and have adverse effects on sustainable development and poverty 
reduction (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; World Bank, 2006). In this, inducing a risk of reduced 
provision of public goods and diminish support for growth-enhancing policies (Claessens and 
Perotti, 2007; Putnam, 2000; Bourguignon and Dessus, 2009). In the perspective of outcomes, 
elevated levels of inequality can undermine both occupational- and educational choices, at an 
individual level. Such conditions can further generate incentives for corruption, nepotism, 
resources misallocation and behavior linked to securing and conserving beneficial treatment 
if these incentives are based on rents (Stiglitz, 2012). Consequences which again could lead 
to undermined institutions, amplification of polarization and stimulation of social unrest. 
 
Finally, returning to the notion of fairness and equality as a boundaryless social value. There 
is a widely accepted ethical premise throughout most societies, cultures, religions and 
ideologies that there ought to be a reasonable degree of equality between individuals (Mckay, 
2002). Accordingly, even though it may be unclear what can be deemed a fair extent of 
equality, high and sustained level of disparity over time should be addressed. Not only because 
of the detrimental economic consequences such a condition may induce, but also because an 
unreasonable level of inequality between individuals matters in its own right.  
2.3 Measuring income inequality 
According to Cowell (1998), we can see the objective of estimating the level of disparity as 
an intention to give meaning to inequality based on selected criterions such as ethical 
principles, basic intuition or mathematical constructs. Following this conceptual 
multifariousness related to the perception of the phenomenon, there is a great variety of 
advocated methods and measurement techniques on how to operationalize income inequality. 
This spectrum of methodologies offers a great assortment of alternative techniques to achieve 
a more nuanced understanding of earnings disparity, but it also implies that different measures 
can be meaningful for certain purposes or facets to inequality. Consequently, finding an 
appropriate estimator that fits the purpose of the analysis is fundamental, but also one of the 
key challenges for appropriate and justifiable research.  
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Sen and Foster (1973) suggested a two-fold categorization of income inequality metrics. The 
first category can be described as normative measures pertaining to social welfare and 
attending to the losses deriving from income dispersion. The second group of measures can be 
described as more objective and does not consider the effect on social welfare. Since the 
methodical approach of this thesis is predominantly descriptive and does not consider potential 
losses in social welfare deriving from income inequality, this section will only attend to 
measures from the latter category, and metrics related to the former will thus not be addressed.  
 
Beyond the second metric categorization by Sen and Foster (1973), the preferred measure 
should embody properties that makes it an objective, unbiased and accurate estimator. 
According the World Bank Institute (2005), there are four criterions that needs to be fulfilled 
for the measurement or index of income inequality to hold the above-mentioned qualities and 
thus represent a satisfactory measure. If we assume that 𝐼(𝑥) represent the inequality metric 
with 𝑥 = 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 … 𝑥𝑛, and 𝑥𝑖 reflects the income level of 𝑥 individuals or households, the 
formal denotation of the property is given below the description of each of the criterions.   
 
• Mean independence or homogeneity  
The mean independence criteria mean that the scale of the economy is irrelevant for the 
income inequality metrics. In other words, that the estimate remains the same despite 
changes in the mean of income, as long as the distribution of income remains unchanged.  
𝐼(𝑎𝑥) = 𝐼(𝑥) (2.1) 
• Population size independence 
The size of the populations is irrelevant for the level of disparity in cumulative income. If 
the population would change dramatically, the metric would not change given that the 
original distribution remains unchanged.  
𝐼(𝑥 ∪ 𝑥) = 𝐼(𝑥) (2.2) 
 
• Symmetry or anonymity 
Which individuals or households that represents high- and low-income earners in a 
population is irrelevant. Accordingly, if two individuals would swap their income, it would 
not impact the level of income inequality.  
𝐼{𝑃(𝑥)} = 𝐼(𝑥) (2.3) 
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• Pigou-Dalton Transfer sensitivity  
Disparity in distribution of cumulative income would be reduced if high-earning individual 
would transfer his or her earnings to a low-earning individual.  
 
In addition to these criterions, there is non-mandatory properties described in economic 
literature which are deemed desirable, but not necessary for an estimate to be denoted as 
satisfactory. These properties include decomposability, which means that the measure can be 
divided up into different subgroups within the population, be broken down by income sources 
or segregated based on other dimensions. In other words, the measure should be additive, in 
that the level of disparity within different populations groups equals the aggregate level of 
inequality. Another condition is that of non-negativity, which suggest that the metric of 
inequality should not have a negative value, thus greater or equal to 0.  
 
Based on the above-mentioned criterions, the purpose of this dissertation and relevant data 
limitations, a set of systematic methods in operationalizing income inequality have been 
selected for the descriptive and empirical analysis. These mathematical constructs of 
measuring disparity in income distribution are described in further detail in the sections below. 
2.3.1 Share and ratio of income 
One of the most basic and intuitive ways to conduct descriptive analyses of income inequality 
is to analyze the share and ratio of income across different groupings of people. For this thesis, 
the share of income would simply describe how much of the cumulative national income that 
is being assumed or acquired by a given segment of the population. The second of these 
conventional measures is a basic ration, which simply represents a comparison of assumed 
income between two subgroups. The common base comparisons in measuring income 
inequality through such ratios consist of percentiles, deciles and quintiles which again 
describes the relevant percent, 10th percent or 20th percent of a distribution spectrum. A 
limitation of these elementary measures of disparity in distribution of income is that they only 
capture parts of the distribution. For this reason, more formal measure of income inequality 
has been developed, which I will now attend to in further detail.  
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2.3.2 Lorenz curve 
In 1905, Max O. Lorenz suggested a graphical representation of disparity in the cumulative 
income or wealth distribution as an improved method to interpret levels and variation in 
inequality. The graphical plot, which is known as the Lorenz curve, illustrates the share of 
total income assumed by individuals or households below a given percentile. The model is 
given by the cumulated proportion of the population from poorest to richest on the horizontal 
axis, and the percent of cumulated income or wealth accruing to these percentiles on the 
vertical axis as illustrated in Figure 1. If there would perfect income equality in a population, 
the Lorenz curve would align with the 45-degree ray from origin, which is denoted as the 
perfect equality line. In the alternative scenario of ultimate inequality, the Lorenz curve would 
align with the horizontal axis known as the line of perfect inequality. By means of this, the 
curvature of the Lorenz curve and its proximity to the perfect inequality line indicates the 
formation and level of disparity in the cumulative income distribution (Clarke, 1992).  
Figure 1: The Lorenz Curve 
 
Illustration by author based on theory proposed by Lorenz (1905) 
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2.3.3 Gini coefficient 
Building on the work of Max Lorenz (1905) and the hypothetical plot of a Lorenz curve, 
Corrado Gini (1913) derived a mathematical index that measures inequality in the distribution 
of income, wealth and expenditures known as the Gini coefficient. Today, this coefficient is 
applied in several other fields of science, but primarily in economics. Since it was introduced 
in the early 20th century, the metric has become the most conventional measures of inequality 
among economist because of its simplicity. Stuart and Ord (1994) defines the measure as the 
mean of absolute differences between all pairs of individuals, whereby reflecting the expected 
gap in income between two randomly selected individuals in a sample (Sen and Foster, 1973). 
The Gini coefficient ranges from a value of 0 to 1, whereas 0 represents complete equality in 
distribution, while a value of 1 reflects ultimate inequality. Accordingly, a comparatively high 
coefficient estimate would indicate a relatively more unequal distribution. In this thesis, the 
Gini coefficient is given as an index, which represents the coefficient value multiplied by 100.   
 
The Gini coefficient is calculated as a ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the 
perfect equality line (𝑎) over the total area below the perfect equality line (𝑎 + 𝑏). 
Accordingly, Gini denoted as 𝐺 is a result of 𝑎
𝑎+𝑏
 . Given that area 𝑎 + 𝑏 has the geometrical 
property of an isosceles triangle, it necessarily equals a value of ½. As such, the Gini 
coefficient could be written as given by equation 2.4:  
𝐺 = 2𝑎 = 1 − 2𝑏 (2.4) 
 
More formally, 𝐺 can be expressed as equation 2.5, if we assume 𝑥𝑖 to be a point on the X-
axis and let 𝑦𝑖 be a point on the Y-axis. If we assume N to equal intervals on the X-axis, the 
equation can be simplified as given in equation 2.6. Further technical properties of Gini 
coefficients are beyond the scope of this paper and will thus not be described in further detail.  
𝐺 = 1 − ∑(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖−1)(𝑦𝑖 + 𝑦(𝑖−1))
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (2.5) 
𝐺 = 1 −
1
𝑁
∑(𝑦𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖−1)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (2.6) 
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As mentioned previously, one of the primary benefits of employing Gini coefficient as a 
measure of income inequality is the comprehensibility of estimation and interpretation, but 
there are also several other advantages to the conventional technique. The properties of Gini 
coefficients satisfy the four necessary criterions portrayed by the World Bank Institute (2005) 
for an estimator to be denoted a satisfactory measure of income inequality. Beyond these four 
parameters, a great advantage of employing a Gini coefficient is the enablement of direct 
comparisons in the cumulative distribution of income between countries and subgroups, but 
also the ability to compare results within and between nations over time.  
 
Despite these technical benefits, the Gini coefficient has also been subject criticism for some 
of its conceptual problems and limitations. First, a Gini coefficient is not easily decomposable 
or additive between subgroups, which means that the desired criteria of decomposability is not 
satisfied. More importantly, Atkinson (1969) claimed that this conventional measure of 
inequality could be directly misleading because of its over-sensitivity to changes in the middle 
of the distribution, and thus insensitivity to changes in the top and the bottom. These properties 
could be problematic in that it could potentially lead to underestimations of inequality, but 
also give misleading indications of change in distribution among to the top and bottom deciles.  
2.3.4 Palma ratio 
Following Atkinson’s argument, José G. Palma (2011; 2016) questioned the effectiveness of 
the Gini as an indicator of income inequality. In his paper from 2011, he investigated 135 
nations with elevated levels of within-nation inequality. From this research, he found that the 
middle and upper-middle income deciles share of distribution, from decile 5 to 9, was 
homogenous and relatively stable over time. The share assumed by this group approximated 
half of gross national income, an observation that was consistent across datasets, countries and 
time periods. A phenomenon which can be identified in China between 1985 and 2015 as well 
(see Appendix A). In the tails of the distribution, Palma observed a completely different 
dynamic. For the very top and bottom of the distribution, he found a high degree of 
heterogeneity and inconsistency over time. According to Palma, the phenomenon of these 
centrifugal and centripetal movements derives from the top income earners ‘catching up’ with 
rich nations in absolute terms, while the bottom 40 percent is falling behind and the middle 
classes normally being able to defend their share of national income.  
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Based on these findings, Palma suggested a new index of the income distribution that would 
be more appropriate for understanding high levels of within-nation inequality. An index that 
Cobham and Sumner (2013) later denoted as the “Palma ratio”. The so-called ‘Palma ratio’ 
indicates the ratio of gross national income shares of the top 10 percent earners divided by the 
share of the bottom 40 percent of the distribution. An indicator that according to José Palma 
(2016) measures inequality in a transparent and intuitive way where disparity in distribution 
is prevailing. This can be written as follows: 
𝑃 =
𝑝0𝑝10
𝑝60𝑝100
 (2.7) 
 
In addition to mitigating the problem of oversensitivity for the middle-income groups that 
arises when employing a Gini coefficient, the Palma ratio satisfies all the necessary criterions 
described earlier by the World Bank Institute (2005) for an estimator to be a satisfactory 
measure of income inequality. Based on findings from Palma and the development in the tails 
of distribution in China, which will be discussed further in Chapter 3 - the Palma ration will 
function as the preferred measure of aggregate income dispersion in the empirical analysis  
 
Even though the Palma ration can be segregated along the dimension of the given percentiles, 
it is not a measure that can be decomposed based on alternative subgroups of the population. 
As such, to analyze the composition of income inequality along other dimensions and 
groupings of the population, we need a supplementary measure which is fully decomposable. 
Technical properties which is offered by general entropy measures, specifically Theil indices.  
2.3.5 General Entropy (GE) measures and Theil index 
In accordance with the limitations of the Gini coefficient and Palma ratio, measures of the 
Generalized Entropy (GE) class offers full decomposability, in addition to satisfying all the 
criterions suggested by the United Nations. Accordingly, GE class measures which originally 
stems from information theory, facilitates analyses of income inequality both within and 
between groupings of the population. Whereas such decomposition offers more detailed 
observations of income composition and changes in the national income distribution over time. 
In this, the value or outcome of GE measures can vary between zero and infinity, whereas a 
value of zero indicates perfect equality (United Nations, 2015b). The general formula for 
generalized entropy measures can be described formally as:  
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𝐺𝐸(𝛼) =
1
𝑛𝛼(𝛼 − 1)
∑ [(
𝑦𝑖
?̅?
)
𝛼
− 1]
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2.8) 
The income of 𝑖 is given by 𝑌𝑖 and the mean income of group 𝑛 is indicated by ?̅?. The parameter 
𝛼 reflects the weight given to the distance in income in various parts of the income distribution. 
In this, a key feature of GE measures of inequality is the opportunity to choose this parameter, 
whereas lower values are more sensitive to changes in the bottom tail of the distribution and 
higher values are more sensitive to change in the upper tail (Atkinson & Bourguignon, 2015). 
The most common value for parameter 𝛼 is 0, 1 and 2, whereas a value of zero is most 
commonly denoted as a ‘Theil’s L’ index or mean logarithmic deviation. For this parameter, 
the contribution to aggregate income disparity by an individual or grouping of the population 
that obtains exactly mean income will be zero. Whilst the contribution to overall income 
inequality will be relatively larger compared to a higher parameter if the sub-population earns 
less than mean income. This dynamic and the ‘Theil’s L’ can be described formally as such:  
𝐸(0) =
1
𝑛
∑ log
?̅?
𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2.9) 
A parameter value of 1 is often called a ‘Theil’s T’ index. In accordance with Theil’s L, the 
contribution to overall inequality by a population segment with income corresponding to the 
mean income will be zero. This dynamic follows the same logic, as the logarithmic value of 1 
will give a value of 0. In a Theil’s T index, the contribution to aggregate income disparity of 
a grouping that earns less than the mean income will be relatively smaller than for Theil’s L. 
The formal notion of the Theil’s T index and the described dynamics can be given as: 
𝐸(1) =
1
𝑛
∑
yi
?̅?
log
?̅?
𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2.9) 
For a parameter value of 2, the produced index is known as ‘coefficient of variation’, but the 
technical properties of this parameter will not be addressed in any further detail for this paper. 
The reason for this is that the index is relatively more sensitive to changes in the top of the 
income distribution than that of Theil’s T indices, which is deemed undesirable for the 
analysis. To ensure consistency in the forthcoming decomposition analyses, I will exclusively 
apply Theil’s T as a standard GE class measure following a pragmatic middle way principle.  
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3. Analysis of evolution and composition of inequality 
In this chapter, I will attend to the first facet of the research question by analyzing the evolution 
and composition of overall income inequality in China from 1978 to 2015. The analysis will 
embody two encompassing subsections in accordance with the purpose of the dissertation.  
The first part of this chapter will provide a descriptive analysis of estimates and findings from 
previous empirical work, in addition to giving an account for relevant official estimates. This 
section will also introduce a new perspective of the development by describing the changes to 
aggregate income dispersion in China by means of a Palma ratio estimate of inequality. 
Thereby, addressing some of the methodological criticism described in the previous chapter, 
but also shed more light on the greatly significant development in the tails of the distribution.  
 
The second body of the analysis will attend to the composition of cumulative income 
inequality along dimensions of substance to understanding dynamics of inequality in China. 
This will include a deep dive into the evolution and contribution of spatial disparity. 
Specifically looking at the prevalent earnings gap between residents in urban and rural areas, 
but also the relevant divide between and among the different regions and provinces. Beyond 
the spatial dimension, the analysis will also give an account for the development, composition 
and contribution of income dispersal based on differences in educational attainment, 
employment structure and income source. In decomposing aggregate income disparity to 
address these facets of cumulative inequality discretely, I hope to contribute to existing 
research by providing the reader with a greater understanding of the nature, dynamics and 
manifestation of national inequality in post-reform China.  
3.1 Development of aggregate income inequality  
3.1.1 Development by estimates from existing empirical research  
As mentioned previously, the considerable rise in income inequality that followed the 
economic reforms and market liberalization in China is a well-documented phenomenon.  
Accordingly, to ensure a holistic and comprehensive understanding of the historical 
development, this section will attempt to give an account of some of these estimations and 
most relevant findings from existing research. An overview of 21 estimates for the level of 
inequality in the period is illustrated graphically in Figure 2 on the next page, with a non-
weighted average of the grouping given by the solid line. These findings will then be discussed 
in further detail below, distinguished by time intervals based on the related observations. 
Figure 2: Gini coefficient estimates from existing literature and previous empirical work 
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1978 – 1984 
In the two years following the first round of economic reforms (gaige kaifang) there is limited 
earnings data available, and therefore also few estimates on overall income disparity. From 
the few estimations that are given for these two years, Chen et al., (2010) and Piketty et al., 
(2017) through the World Inequality Database suggests changes to overall levels of inequality 
were inconsequential. A stagnant offset that change dramatically in the early 1980s. In the 
start of the new decade, there is consensus in that levels of inequality dropped markedly and 
continued to decline up until the mid 80s ((Chen et al. (2010); Ying (1995); Ping (1997); 
Ravallion and Chen (2007); World Development Indicators (WDI) by World Bank (2019)). 
In this period, Chen et al. (2010) estimates a drop in the Gini coefficient from 31,74 to 26,93, 
while Ying (1995) finds a change from 32 to 25,7 Gini. Ravallion and Chen (2007) argues that 
this shift towards greater equality can be explained by rising income among rural households 
following the economic reforms and the introduction of a household responsibility system. 
 
In contrast to the broad consensus of a decline in overall income inequality in the period 
between 1980 to 1985, estimates from Piketty et al. (2017) suggest that national income 
dispersion has actually widened in the same period. In accordance with these estimates, the 
Gini coefficient has increased from 35 points in 1980 to 38 in 1985, with a minor stagnation 
from 1982 to 1984. This is an interesting observation given the distinction in the dataset and 
methodological approach adopted by Piketty et al. (2017). Although the primary source of 
data for all the above-mentioned empirical estimates is given by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (2019), the datasets and methodologies are still widely contrasting. While the 
estimates from Ying’s (1995) is based on income and expenditure surveys, Ravallion and Chen 
(2007) makes use of broader household surveys distinguished by urban and rural areas. Piketty 
et al. (2017) on the other hand, makes use of several different types and sources of data for 
their estimations, including national income, household income surveys and income tax data. 
Another noteworthy distinction in the methodological approach by Piketty at al. (2017) is the 
systematic downward correction of official income growth that follows Young’s (2003) 
careful treatment of overstated growth.  
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1984 – 1994 
In the period between 1984 and 1994, there is a far greater consensus in the empirical estimates 
related to change in the cumulative income distribution. From 1984 to 1989, there seems to be 
a marked increase in accumulated disparity of 5 Gini points from 37 to 42 according to Piketty 
et al. (2017). Chen et al. (2010) on the other hand, estimated a rise of 8,83 Gini points in the 
period, while Ying (1995) found an increased Gini coefficient from 25,7 in 1984 to 36 by 
1989. This steep rise was subsequently followed by a minor break in the trend around 1990, 
given by a dip of 0,86 points according to Chen et al. (2010) or by 0,30 Gini points from 
Ravallion and Chen (2007). In the following period from 1990 to 1994, the rise in disparity 
looks to exceed the growth identified between 1984 and 1989. Piketty et al. (2017) estimates 
the increase in this four-year period to approximate a rise of 6 Gini points. 
 
This staggering rise in aggregate inequality around the late 80s can be seen in light of the 
process of opening-up Hainan island and fourteen other coastal port cities to overseas 
investment by creating so-called “Special Economic Zones”. A process that started in 1984 
and realized 3.49 billion dollars of inward FDI by 1990 (Chang, 2018). Following these 
regional reforms, the relative growth in income for coastal areas exceeded that of the inland 
areas. This contributed to an increase in spatial disparity, and thus overall inequality in the late 
80s and early 90s (Luo and Zhu, 2008). As a response to this growing regional dispersion, the 
‘open-door policies’ were adjusted in the early 90s, which spurred more inclusive nation-wide 
reforms in 1992. A policy adjustment that saw increasing decentralization of state control and 
increased privatization. At the same time, labor mobility was liberalized, and local city 
governments were authorized to accept migrants from rural areas as a share of their non-
agricultural population (Chang, 2018). The sharp increase in income dispersion that followed 
in urban areas is suggested to have accounted for a majority of the increase in overall inequality 
in this period according to Luo and Zhu (2008).  
 
Another aspect that was subject to considerable change from the economic reforms in the mid- 
to late 80s was employment structure. The ‘iron rice bowl’ policy (tie fan wan) was aborted, 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises became the priority and enterprise flexibility was 
significantly liberalized in terms of wage-control and freedom to hire or fire workers. This 
liberalization lead to a tendency of increasing the salary of skilled workers, while reducing the 
number of unskilled workers at the same time. A trend that lead to a marked increase in the 
absolute number of workers being laid-off, particularly unskilled workers (Luo & Zhu, 2008).     
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1994 – 1998 
As illustrated in Figure 2, overall income inequality remained relatively stable in the period 
between 1994 and 1998, with a moderate decrease across all relevant estimations. Specifically, 
Piketty et al. (2017) estimated a minor decrease of around 1 Gini point from a coefficient of 
47 in 1994 to a stable level around 46 in the three subsequent years. Ravallion and Chen (2007) 
estimates a more distinct decrease in the period from 43,31 Gini in 1994 to 40,33 in 1998. 
Correspondingly, Chen et al. (2010) estimates a drop of 1,26 Gini points in the same period. 
A noteworthy observation in this period, similar to that of the early 1980s, is that relative 
income growth in rural areas exceeded that of urban income in the mid 90s. While the 
relatively stronger growth for rural income in the early 80s was driven primarily by the 
introduction of a household responsibility system, the growth in the mid 90s is suggested to 
be a result of an increase in the purchasing prices of grain (Luo and Zhu, 2008). A process that 
further aligns with the one of the primary objectives stipulated in the 5th plenary session of the 
14th CPC Central Committee in 1995, whereas the objective of eliminating poverty was 
integrated in the 9th five-year plan on national economic and social development (Peng, 1996).  
1998 – 2010  
In the following period from the late 90s to the early 00s, there is a steep rise in overall 
inequality up until 2005. After that, the levels of disparity stagnate, with a moderate increase 
up until 2010. Based on estimations from Piketty et al. (2017), national income inequality rose 
considerably from 1998 to 2005, with an increase in the Gini coefficient from 46 to 55. From 
2005 to 2010, the same dataset suggests a minor increase from 55 to 56 Gini. Chen et al. (2010) 
similarly finds an increase of 5,47 Gini points in the period between 1998 and 2005. The World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2019) suggest a far less significant development from 
39,2 in 1999 to 42,5 in 2005m followed by a decrease of 0,4 points up until 2010.  
 
Zhang and Wan (2006) finds that rural poverty increased in the late 90s following adverse 
distributional changes which led to an increase in rural inequality, and thus overall disparity. 
The period between 1995 and 2007 was further subject to significant technological changes 
and rapid accumulation of capital that spurred a marked increase in demand for skilled workers 
and consequently the skill premium (Dollar, 2007; Zhang & Kanbur, 2005; Liu, 2009). 
Chuliang et al. (2018) suggests that changes in household income structure was an important 
factor for the widening income gap from 2000 onwards. Particularly, a considerable and 
unequal growth in property income that could be regarded as negligible in the 80s and 90s.   
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From 2007 onwards, estimates from the National Bureau of Statistics (2019) suggests that 
spatial disparity in the form of urban-rural inequality narrowed. In this, Huang and Luo (2008) 
and Zhuang and Shi (2016) suggests that the accelerated process of urbanization in the period 
induced a negative effect on inequality by reducing the rural surplus labor. Jain-Chandra et al. 
(2018) further emphasizes the importance of several government policies in the turnaround of 
regional disparity since 2000. Specifically, a series of pro-farmers policies, which included 
direct subsidies, general-purpose grants, abolishment of agricultural tax and the ‘Western 
Development Strategy’. Another important observation from Jain-Chandra et al. (2018) is a 
decline in the skill premium from 2008 onwards, which is suggested to be driven by an 
increase in the supply of highly skilled and educated workers (Chan, 2015; Knight et al., 2016).  
2010 – 2015 
For the period 2010 to 2015, there seems to be an empirical consensus for a stagnant and even 
progressively more equal income distribution. Official estimates by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (2019) suggests a continuous decline from a Gini coefficient of 48,1 in 2010 to 46,2 
in 2015. Piketty et al. (2017) on the other hand, finds a relatively more moderate decline over 
the period with a drop of 1 Gini point from 56 in 2011 to 55 in 2012. In light of this 
discrepancy, Shi (2016) argues that official estimates of income inequality tend to be 
underestimated due to omittance of top income earners in the household surveys of the 
National Bureau of Statistics. At the same time, we have already established that most of the 
above-mentioned empirical works employs data from the National Bureau of Statistics. In 
addition to that, it would be unreasonable to assume that other macrodata or microdata from 
various independent surveys is excepted from such an omittance bias. The relevant 
discrepancy is also fairly modest and indicates the same trend over the five-year period.  
 
The estimated shift towards a more equal income distribution in the period between 2010 and 
2015 is lent further support from the findings of Zhuang and Shi (2016). Since the late 00s, 
they found that regional income disparity had declined, the skill premium had been reduced 
and the share of labor income relative to that of capital income had increased. Observations 
that all support to the premise of a reduced level of income dispersion as identified by the 
above-mentioned estimates. This is a highly interesting finding and estimation alignment 
considering the development over the previous decades and political agenda of the Twelfth 
Five Year Plan in 2011. In this, the State Council of the PRC (2011) expressed a commitment 
to: “speeding up the formation of a reasonable pattern of income distribution… and reversing 
the widening income gap as soon as possible”.  
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3.1.2 Development by the tails of distribution  
As discussed in section 2.3, the Gini coefficient has received criticism in the academic sphere 
since the late 1960s for some of its technical properties and appropriateness as the predominant 
measure of income inequality (Atkinson, 1969; Alison, 1978; De Maio, 2007; Cobham & 
Sumner, 2013; Schmid & Stein, 2013; Thewissen et al., 2015). In this, Palma (2011; 2016) 
argues that the Gini coefficient is too sensitive to changes in distribution for middle and upper-
middle deciles. Consequently, underemphasizing changes in the tail of the distribution. In fact, 
changes to the income distribution between rich and poor is also arguably what ought to be 
the focal point, both normatively and instrumentally. As a response to this criticism and 
absence of empirical attention to this perspective in China, I have estimated an aggregate 
Palma ratio based on data from Piketty et al. (2017) in the period 1978 to 2015 (See Figure 3). 
The purpose of this estimation and related analysis is to shed more light on the development 
in the tails of the distribution, and hopefully provide a greater understanding of the divide 
between rich and poor in post-reform China. Further, to control for potential dissonance with 
existing estimates, which is almost exclusively measured by the conventional Gini coefficient.  
 
Figure 3: Estimated Palma ratio and comparison to Gini coefficient estimates 
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In Figure 4 presented above, the estimated Palma ratio is indicated by the solid line and 
measured along the left-hand axis. The dashed line gives an estimated Gini coefficient based 
on the same data measured along the right-hand axis. Whilst the dotted lines represent the non-
weighted average of available Gini coefficient estimates from empirical work and official 
channels as given in Figure 3. From this graphical illustration of the comparative income 
inequality trend and development estimated by different measurement techniques and data, 
there is several highly interesting observations that needs to be addressed and discussed.  
 
Similar pattern in progressive rise until 1994 and subsequent drop up until 1998 
From the introduction of the ‘open-door’ policies in 1978 until to first significant peak in 
income inequality in 1994, the development, trend and fluctuations in levels of disparity is 
rather similar between the measures. The only significant misalignment stems from the marked 
decline in the non-weighted average from 1979 to 1985. Given the coinciding pattern between 
the estimated Palma ratio and Gini coefficient based on data from Piketty et al. (2017) this 
dissonance could be explained by conflicting data.  
 
Steeper rise from 1998 to 2010 amounting to relatively higher levels of inequality 
After the stagnation and modest reduction in aggregate disparity between 1994 to 1998, the 
development resumes an upward trajectory among all three specifications of measurement. In 
this, a significant rise in overall inequality that seems to peak simultaneously around 2010. 
However, the growth rate and apex of the estimated Palma ration, Gini coefficient and the 
average of empirical estimates between 1998 to 2010 is widely diverging. The estimated 
Palma ratio had an average growth rate of approximately 7,4% annually in this period and the 
related level of inequality in 2010 represented an 89% increase from the 1998-levels. The Gini 
coefficient estimates based on the same dataset indicates an average annual growth rate of 
1,8%, amounting to a rise of 22%, equivalent to 10 Gini points from the level in 1998. The 
non-weighted average of estimates from empirical work and official estimates grew by 2,3% 
yearly up until 2010, whereas the peak amounted to an increase of 28% from the 1998-level.   
 
This is a greatly interesting finding, which suggests that the estimates of inequality based on 
Gini underestimates the level of inequality relative to that of the Palma ratio. A discrepancy 
that merely derives from the omittance of changes in dispersion among middle income earners. 
An observation that lends support to Palma’s notion, reflecting the Gini sensitivity to changes 
in middle income groups and inadequacy in reporting changes to the tails of the distributions.  
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Distinct descent in level of disparity from 2010 to 2015 
In accordance with the discussion related to the most recent development in section 3.1.1, 
existing empirical- and official estimates indicates a stagnation or a moderate decrease in 
national income inequality from 2010 to 2015. In view of this, the Palma ratio estimation 
indicates a more distinct reduction in the gap between rich and poor since 2010, thereby 
lending further support to the official notion of reduced national income inequality in recent 
years. From 2010 to 2015, the Palma ratio indicates a reduction from 4,72 to 4,37, with minor 
variations in 2013 and 2015. A reduction in the aggregate disparity of income that amounts to 
a 7% decrease between the top decile income earners and the bottom to 4th decile in the period.  
 
The technical properties of the Palma ratio offer another benefit in that it can easily be 
decomposed to study the contribution from each end of the tails in the development. As given 
in Figure 4 below, we can observe the widening gap from the economic reforms and more 
recent decline in income inequality is driven by the development in both tails of distribution. 
In this, the share of national income assumed by the top 10% and bottom 40% income earners 
naturally covaries markedly with synchronized interruptions to the long-term trend. Still, the 
growth in the share acquired by the top decile exceeds the rate of decline in the share assumed 
by the bottom to 4th decile. In this, the former increased its share by 16% from 1978 to 2010, 
whereas the latter experienced a 13% loss in its share for the same period.  
Figure 4: Decomposed Palma ratio 
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3.1.3 Development by ratio and shares of distribution 
Building on the insights drawn from the decomposition of the Palma ratio and the tails of 
distribution, I will now broaden the scope to include the relative share of the complete income 
distribution. The evolution and related changes to the assumed share of national income for 
various percentiles provide critical information in term of achieving a comprehensive 
understanding of the composition and development of aggregate inequality.  
 
In Figure 6 below, a graphical illustration of the evolution in distribution among specified 
percentiles is presented based on data from by Piketty et al. (2017). To account for the entire 
distribution of income earners in a pragmatic manner, I will classify the lowest income earners 
as the bottom 50% of the distribution, the middle and upper-middle income earners as 
percentiles 10 to 50 and finally the highest income earners by the top 10%. In addition to this, 
I will further account for the top income earners of the population by looking at the 
development among the top 1% and top 0,1% of the distribution.  
 
Figure 5: Distribution of pre-tax national disposable income by share (%) 
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Bottom 50% (p50p100) 
As illustrated in Figure 6, the share of national income assumed by the lowest 50% of income 
earners in China has followed a negative trend almost continuously from 1978 up until 2005. 
Herein, the bottom half of the distribution including more than 530 million individuals in 2015, 
has experienced a 12% decline in the share of national income from 27% in 1978 to 15% in 
2005 (Piketty et al., 2017). A trend that has only been disrupted by a slight increase in 1990 
and a modest growth in the period 1994 to 1998. Minor interruptions to the trend that 
corresponds to the development in aggregate inequality measured by both Gini and Palma.  
 
In the same period, the bottom half of the distribution experienced a significant increase in 
average annual income, which by 2005 amounted to 15 times the average measured in 1978. 
A substantial increase from 344RMB (local currency) in 1978 to 5.212RMB by 2005 (Piketty 
et al., 2017). Accordingly, the lowest income earners increased their average earnings 
significantly in the first three decades of following economic liberalization. Still, their relative 
earnings growth lagged far behind the top half of the distribution. From 2005 up until 2015, 
the negative trend stabilizes, and the share assumed by the bottom half of the distribution 
remain stable at around 15% of national income. In this period, the average annual growth rate 
in income for this earnings group was around 32,9%, increasing from 5.212RMB in 2005 to 
17.150RMB in 2015 (Piketty et al., 2017). Even though the growth rate of average earnings 
for this period was relatively lower than between 1978 to 2005, the absolute income in 1978 
was so low that such a comparison is not of much meaningful value. In accordance with these 
findings, the bottom 50% of income earners assume a far lower share of national income then 
previously. Concurrently, the average income of this group has increased dramatically over 
the period with a relative inequality that has stabilized over the past decade.   
Middle 40% (p10p50) 
In line with Palma’s (2011; 2016) postulation, Figure 6 indicates that the middle to upper-
middle earnings group given by p10p50 holds a relatively stable share of national income over 
time. Increasing from an average annual income of 6.853RMB in 1978 to 62.444RMB in 2015 
(Piketty et al., 2017). Given by p10p60, the middle 50% income earners assumed a stable share 
around 50% of national income. A finding which again supports Palma’s notion and 
emphasizes the importance of the tails of the distribution. However, in conjunction with the 
development in the aggregate level of inequality described previously, the income share 
assumed by the middle 40% earners declined moderately in the period from 1998 to 2010. 
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This finding suggests that the steep rise in overall inequality for the above-mentioned period 
was a result of reduced relative income growth in the middle and upper-middle earnings group. 
However, given the relatively diminutive negative shift by around 3% of national pre-tax 
income, the effect on the aggregate level of disparity is comparatively negligible.  
Top 10% (p0p90) 
In contrast to the stable development in average income among the middle-income earners, 
the relative earnings growth among the top 10% of the distribution has changed dramatically 
from 1978 to 2015. This group, including more than 106 million individuals by 2015, 
increased its relative share of national income from 27% in 1978 to 43% in 2010, with a modest 
decline of around 2% by 2015. In terms of average annual income, the top income earners 
(p0p90) progressed from 16.214RMB in 1978 to 236.572RMB in 2015 (Piketty et al., 2017). 
A relative income growth that is 4 times higher than the national average in the relevant period. 
Accordingly, from this finding we can conclude that the major share of the substantial rise in 
overall inequality can be reflected by the relative income growth among top income earners.  
Top 1% (p0p99) and 0,1% (p0p99.9) 
As given by Figure 6, the top 1% of income earners in China assumed around one third of the 
share acquired by top 10%, a ratio that remains relatively stable over the whole period. The 
relative income growth for this group covaries closely with that of p0p10, despite less 
significant fluctuations over time. The top 0,1% on the other hand, assumes around one tenth 
of p0p10’s income share with a stable increase in relative income up until 2005. From 2005 
to 2010, the relative growth seems to stagnate, with a modest decline in a short period after 
2010. This is an interesting finding which indicates that the progressive development towards 
a more equal income distribution in the period between 2010 and 2015 included that of the 
very top income earners in China. That being said, the relevant earnings data for this top 
income group is likely to be both underestimated from underreporting, but also biased 
following omittance of the richest individuals. At the same time, these findings give solid 
indications that the relevant distributional effect also took place in the top earnings group.  
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3.2 Decomposition of aggregate income inequality 
In this subsection, I will investigate the composition of aggregate inequality by earnings 
dispersion among and between relevant population segments, but also the related contribution 
of these dimensions to overall income disparity. This decomposition analysis will specifically 
attend to disparity between groupings distinguished by spatial distribution, educational 
attainment, sectorial employment and the configuration of income sources. In much of the 
existing empirical work, earnings dispersion along spatial, educational and skill dimensions 
are often interpreted as factorial drivers to the development (Ping, 1997; Knight & Song; 1999, 
Sicular et al., 2007; Whyte, 2010). In this paper, I will attend these variations as compositional 
facets and transmission channels rather than as determinants to change in inequality over time.  
3.2.1 By spatial disparity  
Income inequality based on spatial distribution can be reflected along several dimensions, 
depending on what can be deemed a meaningful geographic scope. According to Wan (2008) 
spatial disparity in China should be analyzed along two dimensions; urban-rural dispersion 
and regional disparity through eastern, central and western regions. Jain-Chandra et al. (2018) 
on the other hand, suggest that the focus should be on provincial disparity instead of regional. 
To give a comprehensive account of the relevant dynamics, I will examine the composition 
and contribution of all three dimensions, but primarily focus on the marked urban-rural divide.  
Urban – Rural disparity  
In terms of spatial disparity between the residents in urban and rural areas, there is great 
consensus among existing research that levels of earnings dispersion have been elevated for 
most of the period attended to in this paper (Sicular et al., 2007). Correspondingly, the so-
called ‘urban-rural divide’ is found to have contributed significantly to the overall rise and 
level of disparity. Based on household surveys from the Chinese Academy of Social Science, 
Sicular et al. (2007) estimates the relevant contribution through a decomposition of Theil’s T 
for aggregate inequality. As given by Figure 6 below, they find that the relevant contribution 
to overall dispersion amounted to 37% in 1988, 41% in 1995 and 46% in 2002. Findings which 
suggest that aggregate inequality primarily derives from income dispersion within rural and 
urban areas. At the same time, indicating that the urban-rural divide contributed to nearly half 
the accumulated inequality and that the relevant contribution has increased up until the 00s. 
Estimations which clearly demonstrates that intragroup inequality between the urban and rural 
households has been a significant component to accumulated income dispersion in the period.  
 35 
In more recent years, estimations from Jain-Chandra et al. (2018) based on data from the China 
Household Income Project suggest that the contribution amounted to approximately 47% in 
2007, dropping to 34% in 2013. Findings that indicates a turn in the trend around the late 00s, 
whereas the urban-rural divide started to become a less significant factor of overall inequality.   
Figure 6: Contribution of Urban-Rural disparity to overall inequality (%) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 7 on the next page, urban – rural inequality has increased since the 
mid-1980s, with a considerable uprise from 1997 to 2008 followed by a modest decline in the 
years after the global financial crisis (Li, 2016). In this, the average income ratio between 
urban and rural households increased from 200% to 350% between 1978 and 2015 (Piketty et 
al., 2017). Accordingly, at the offset of the economic reforms in 1978, urban households 
earned on average twice as much as rural households at the time, whilst in 2015 they earned 
3.5 times more on average. At this ration of urban – rural income dispersion, China holds one 
of the largest spatial inequalities in the world along this dimension (Sicular et al., 2007).  
 
Following the reforms in 1978, China has experienced extensive internal migration from rural 
to urban areas. From 1978 to 2015, the urban adult population increased from around 100 
million people to approximately 600 million in 2015 (Piketty et al., 2017). At the same time, 
the rural population increased in the first two post-reform decades to 600 million, before it 
dropped below 500 million in 2015. Still, the significant income dispersion between urban and 
rural households has often been linked to restrictions on labor mobility deriving from policies 
that inhibit spatial mobility, primarily through the hukou system1 (Sicular et al., 2007). Despite 
recent reforms of the hukou system to dampen restrictions on internal migration, and thus labor 
mobility through spatial mobility, significant barriers still prevail (Wang, 2004).  
 
1 A household registrations system restraining migrants from seeking employment and public services in foreign regions to 
protect employment and welfare of urban households. 
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Figure 7: Average income and disparity ratio between Urban and Rural household 
 
In line with the dissonance related to the recent development in aggregate income inequality, 
the latest development in the urban-rural dispersion is also found to deviate considerably from 
official estimates. As given in Figure 7, estimates by the National Bureau of Statistics 
correlates nearly perfectly with data from Piketty et al. (2017) up until 1999. From the 
millennium onwards, estimates are widely diverging, which can suggest that the official urban- 
rural ration also is underestimated given the survey biases. An observation that could help 
shed light on the official underestimation of overall income inequality from 2007 to 2015.   
 
Despite discussions related to the extent of urban-rural income dispersion, there is consensus 
within both academic and political spheres that the urban-rural divide has been elevated and 
needs to be addressed. In attending to this, several policy reforms and initiatives has been 
implemented in recent years to increase and improve public spending in rural areas, for 
example by the campaign to ‘build a socialist new countryside’ 2(Sicular et al., 2007). A 
political intention that has manifested itself through various pro-rural policies and reforms, 
which again could be reflected in the empirical consensus of a decline in the urban-rural 
income gap from the late 00s onwards.    
 
2 A Central Government campaign to promote village modernization through increasing rural investment, agricultural 
subsidies and improving social services for rural households 
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Regional disparity (Eastern, Central & Western) 
The second spatial dimensions of interest according to Wan (2008) relates to regional 
inequality between eastern, central and western regions (See Appendix B). As for the urban-
rural dimension, the economic development within these different regions has been strikingly 
contrasting. However, as given in Figure 8 below, the contribution of inter-regional inequality 
to overall level of income disparity is significantly lower than intergroup contribution for 
urban and rural areas. From the same process of decomposing the Theil index of survey data 
from the China Household Income Project (CHIP), Chuliang et al. (2018) finds that the 
contribution of regional disparity to the overall level of inequality has increase from around 
9% in 1988 to ~15% in 2007. In line with the contributional variation for the urban-rural 
dimension, inter-regional dispersion contribution was found to reverse around the late 00s, 
dropping by more than 7% in the five years following the global financial crisis in 2007.   
Figure 8: Contribution of regional disparity to overall inequality (%) 
 
In accordance with the development in the share of intra-regional contribution to aggregate 
levels of inequality, the Theil’s T for within-group regional disparity rose from 0.2140 to 
0.3467 in the period 1988 to 2007 (Chuliang et al. 2018). In line with the trend identified 
previously, intra-regional income dispersion also experienced a modest decline from 2007 to 
2013, below estimates for within-group regional inequality in both 1995 and 2002. In this, 
estimates of inequality within each of the regions shows that west prevails with the highest 
income dispersion for all observation years, followed by the central region. Interestingly, 
within-group income disparity in both the eastern and western region rose significantly from 
1988 to 1995, from where the estimates peaked. Thereafter the Theil indices dropped and 
remained relatively stable up until the late 00s, before declining again after 2007. Fan, Kanbur 
and Zhang (2011) suggests that this can be partly explained by the ‘Great Western 
Development Strategy’ implemented by the Central Government in 1999.3   
 
3 A development program to invest in infrastructure and ensure exploitation of natural resources in the Western region 
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Provincial disparity  
The last spatial dimension relates to income dispersion within and between China’s 31 
provinces (See Appendix B), which also represents the most intricate perspective. From the 
estimated contribution given in Figure 9, we can see that inter-provincial income inequality 
has been significantly more influential for aggregate income disparity than regional dispersion.  
However, still less significant than the inter-group contribution between urban and rural areas. 
Based on the same data from the CHIP4 study, a Theil index decomposition from Chuliang et 
al. (2018) shows a diverging contribution pattern than for the previous two dimensions. 
Between-group inequality among the 31 provinces show that the contribution to aggregate 
income disparity peaked at almost 33% already in the early 00s, before the contribution of 
both provincial and urban-rural dispersion. From 2002, steadily decreasing to around 13% by 
2013. An interesting observation that indicates that inter-provincial inequality was more a 
significant factor in the composition of overall inequality in the early phase of the transition.  
Figure 9: Contribution of provincial disparity to overall inequality (%) 
 
The development in within-group provincial income dispersion follows a diverging trend. In 
the period 1988 to 1995, the Theil index estimations for this composition increases 
substantially from 0.1709 to 0.2906. Thereafter, the level of intra-provincial remains relatively 
stable with less significant fluctuations until 2013. However, the share of within-group 
inequality to the estimated overall provincial Theil index increases by less than 1% and 
followed a marked upward trajectory from 2002 onwards, which contradicts to the absolute 
change. Consequently, we find that the development of inter-provincial has affected the spatial 
dispersion along the provincial dimension to a greater extent than within-group inequality.  
 
4 China Household Income Project (Household survey) 
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3.2.2 By educational attainment 
As for the urban-rural divide, there is wide empirical consensus in that income dispersion 
deriving from differences in educational attainment has been a significant component in 
cumulated income inequality in post-reform China (Jain-Chandra et al. 2018; Chuliang et al. 
2018; Cevik & Correa-Caro, 2015). An intuitive tendency in the composition of earnings 
dispersion that generally tend to represent a key component in the aggregate level of disparity. 
The importance of educational disparity in China has been particularly significant following 
transformative reforms of the education system, which again has had a marked impact on the 
supply of high-skilled labor, in parallel to socio-economic forces that has shifted demand.  
 
At the offset of China’s economic liberalization process, enrolment in primary- and middle 
schools was remarkably high, while gross enrolment in tertiary education was relatively low 
(Heckman & Yi, 2012). A condition that entailed limited supply of domestic high-skilled labor 
in the early phases of the market-oriented transition. At the same time, the demand for skilled 
workers increased profoundly following accelerated technological progress and national 
capital accumulation. This again led to a considerable rise in the skill premium, which 
bolstered returns to education, and thus earnings dispersion based on educational attainment 
(Zhang & Kanbur, 2005; Dollar, 2007; Liu, 2009). These dynamics changed significantly with 
the educational reforms of the 90s, which lead to an upsurge in the supply of high-skilled labor.  
 
Over the last two decades, there has been an unprecedented educational expansion in terms of 
opportunity and enrolment in higher education following major funding initiatives and policy 
reforms. Among others, the establishment of a formal degree system, abolishment of job 
allocation practice for graduates and funding projects like the ‘211’ and ‘985’ plans5 (Yu et a., 
2012). In this, the participation rate in tertiary education has increased from below 6% in 1998 
to over 50% in 2017 (World Bank, 2019a). A successful transition from ‘elite’- to ‘mass’ 
education, which has made China the largest provider of tertiary education worldwide (Yu et 
a., 2012). In this expansionary process, concerns have been raised in regard to educational 
inequality deriving from the configuration of the education system. Among others, 
introduction of tuitions fees and its subsequent rise following reforms in the 90s, but more 
importantly the admission quota system which discriminates subgroups6 (Wu & Zhang, 2010).  
 
5 Funding projects involving both local and national government to strengthen research and build ‘world-class’ institutions 
6 Favours admission of local and urban students registered in large cities where universities are plentiful and most prestigious 
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In accordance with these conditions, dynamics and shocks altering both supply and demand 
of domestic high-skilled labor dramatically, there has consequently been great changes in the 
contribution of educational disparity to overall income inequality. As given in Figure 10 
below, the contribution of intergroup dispersion based on educational attainment of the head 
of the household was relatively low in the early phases of China’s economic liberalization. 
Through a Theil index decomposition of the CHIP dataset, Chuliang et al. (2018) finds that 
the intergroup contribution to overall inequality increased significantly at the offset of the 
educational reforms, followed by turnaround in the late 00s. From 1988 to 2007, the 
contribution of inter-group disparity between primary and below, junior middle, senior middle 
and higher levels of educationa increased by nearly 18%, to more than 28% of overall income 
inequality. Based on the same dataset from the CHIP surveys, Jain-Chandra et al., (2018) 
differentiates further between primary level and illiterates, whereas these estimates suggest an 
increased relative contribution to a staggering 32% in 2007.  
 
Figure 10: Contribution of educational disparity to overall inequality (%) 
 
From 2007 to 2013, the contribution dropped to 23,6%, below the levels observed in 2002. 
Based on the authors estimations and decomposition of Theil indices using the dataset from 
the China Family Panel Study (Institute of Social Science Survey, Peking University, 2018), 
I find a continued downward trend in intergroup contribution from 2010 to 2016 (See 
Appendix C). This recent development in inequality would suggest a decline in the skill 
premium and returns of education, which can be thought to be a result of increased supply of 
high-skilled labor. In this, Chan (2015) and Knight et al., (2016) finds that recent university-
level graduates struggles to find suitable jobs and that unemployment within this group is 
rising, indicating a surplus supply. Jain-Chandra et al., (2018) further suggest that rising 
minimum wages could have contributed to reduced skill premium, and thereby the 
contribution of intergroup income disparity deriving from educational attainment differences. 
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3.2.3 By sector and industry of employment 
In China’s transition process from a socialist planned-economy to a more market-oriented and 
liberalized economy, changes to employment structure has played a pivotal role in the 
composition of aggregate levels of income inequality (Chang, 2018; Jain-Chandra et al., 
2018). The contribution and composition of income inequality based on employment structure 
can be categorized in terms of both sectorial and industry classifications, whereas this section 
will attend to both. The notion of a direct exogenous impact from shifts in employment 
structure as a factorial determinant of inequality will be covered in-depth in the forthcoming 
empirical analysis. In this section, I will focus on the composition and contribution of earnings 
dispersion based on differences within and between sectors and industries of employment.  
By economic sectors (Non-workers, Agriculture, Secondary & Service) 
The first compositional facet attends to differences in earnings based on employment by 
economic sector. More specifically, segregating employment by agriculture, secondary and 
services sectors, but also between and among non-workers. As illustrated in Figure 12 below, 
Jain-Chandra et al., (2018) finds that contribution of inter-sector disparity between the above-
mentioned economic sectors has declined significantly from 1995 to 2013 (based on data from 
the China Household Income Project). In this, the contribution of between sector earnings 
disparity on aggregate income inequality has declined from more than 32% in 1995 to 7,53% 
in 2013. These finding suggests that earnings dispersion between economic sectors was a more 
significant factor a few decades ago and has since become less prevalent. Observations which 
must be seen in light of the growing importance and increased diversity in the secondary and 
tertiary sector since the late 70s, as industrialization and servicization progressively matured. 
Figure 11: Contribution of sectorial disparity to overall inequality (%) 
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In terms of the related contribution deriving from intra-sector differences, both Chang (2018) 
and Jain-Chandra et al., (2018) finds that the within-sector component has increased 
remarkably since 1988, in both relative and absolute terms. Accounting for a majority of the 
in aggregate income inequality since the economic reforms. By analyzing the CHIP dataset 
through an income variance decomposition method, Chang (2018) finds that intra-sector 
income variance increased by more than 5 times from 1988 to 2013. In the same period, overall 
income disparity had only increased by 4 times. In relative terms, Jain-Chandra et al., (2018) 
finds that within-sector earnings disparity accounted for around 64% of aggregate income 
inequality in 1995, increasing to more than 92% in 2013. 
 
In the same period, intra-sector contribution for individuals employed the agriculture sector 
had decreased the most, from 22,34% in 1995, to 4,55% in 2007 and down to 2,51% by 2013. 
Within-group inequality in secondary sectors has remained relatively stable accounting for 
around 17,5% of aggregate inequality for 1995 and 2007, whereas the share rose slightly by 
2013 to around 21,7%. In terms of inequality within the service sector, there has been a marked 
increase in the same period, whereas both absolute and relative intra-group earnings dispersion 
nearly doubled from Theil’s T of 0.0764 and a share of 21,6% in 1995 to 0.1321 and 38% in 
2013. In terms the working and non-working population, Jain-Chandra et al., (2018) finds that 
inequality among non-working individuals has increased the relatively more. From 1995 to 
2013, the share of aggregate income variance deriving from the non-working segment 
increased by a staggering 23,46%, from 6,81% in 1995, to 29,14% in 2007 up to 30.27% of 
overall inequality in 2013. An observation that could indicate that provision of social transfers, 
insurances and other welfare schemes became more unevenly distributed in the period. 
 
By industry categorization 
Given the relative importance of within-sector income disparity and its contribution to 
aggregate inequality, a more nuanced analysis of earnings dispersion in the industry spectrum 
could provide valuable insights into the intra-sectorial spread. Because of data limitations, it 
has not been possible to derive a direct decomposition of Theil indices based on industries as 
for previous sections. As an alternative, I will attend to the income gap of industry categories 
by examining the relevant income ratios. Figure 12 below gives a visual illustration of the 
related income spread in urban units based on available data on average annual wages among 
all 20 industry categories given by the National Bureau of Statistics (2019) from 2003 to 2017.  
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Figure 12: Average wage by industry categorization (urban units) 
 
Authors illustrations based on data from National Bureau of Statistics (2019) 
Following the remarkable rise in within-sector income disparity and marked contribution to 
both extent and rise of overall inequality, the industry income spread given in Figure 12 
confirms the findings based on economic sectors. In 2003, the income gap and ratio between 
the lowest earning industries including agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery and 
the highest earning industries including information transmission, computer services and 
software amounted to 4.49. In line with the pattern and development in shares of contribution 
identified between and among economic sectors, the relative income ratio among industries 
dropped to around 3.65 in 2017. In absolute terms, the income gap between the top and bottom 
earning industries has increased significantly in the same period. In 2003, the annual average 
wage variance between the former and latter industry amounted to 23.013RMB. Whereas in 
2017, the average income gap had increased to 96.646RMB annually, which amounts to 4.2 
times increase in absolute earnings disparity. A rise in absolute industry inequality which 
reflects some of the structural market conditions. In this, high-tech industries and those of 
monopolistic nature with high entry barriers has benefited relatively more from the economic 
growth than that of labor-intensive industries with high competition and low entry barriers 
(Junqing et al., 2003).  
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3.2.4 By income source 
In this section, we turn to a decomposition based on sources of income among urban and rural 
households discretely. The purpose of this analysis to achieve a better understanding of the 
earnings configuration and related contribution of these income streams on aggregate 
inequality. In doing so, I will first attend to changes in disposable income through 
decomposing the proportional share of each sources based on data from the National Bureau 
of Statistics (2019). As urban and rural areas in China are institutionally segmented with very 
different income configurations, it is reasonable to analyze these spatial populations discretely. 
This will further include an analysis of the contribution of the various sources of income on 
overall inequality to understand their role in the evolution of aggregate income disparity.  
 
Urban households 
Based on data from the National Bureau of Statistics (2019), Figure 13 illustrates disposable 
income and relative share of income sources for urban households from 1997 to 2017. 
Although data limitations prevent an analysis for the whole post-reform period in the urban 
segment, the decomposition offers interesting results. First, wages and salaries prevail as the 
most important source of income, accounting for a stable share of around ¾ of income. 
However, from 2012 to 2013, the income from wages and salaries declined by more than 4%, 
whereas the related share dropped by a staggering 9%, with a continued decrease until 2017. 
At the same time, net income from transfers7 declined by more than 32% in absolute terms, 
with a decreased share of income composition by 10% from 2012 to 2013. Even though the 
share of income deriving from engagement in production and business activities denoted as 
net business income increased steadily over the whole period, it is the share of property income 
that assumed the majority of the above-mentioned shift. In this, returns of financial and non-
financial assets increased steadily until 2012, whereas the share spiked by 7% in 2013. As will 
be described in the next section, the marked drop in net income from transfer for urban 
households coincides with a comparative rise in net transfers for rural households. An 
interesting observation that indicates a significant shift in the allocation of social expenditure.  
 
 
 
 
7 Refers to regular transfer received from country, institutions and social communities such as pensions, disaster relief funds, 
regular donation etc. deducted for transfer expenditure such as for example taxes and expenditure for social security  
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Figure 13: Per capita disposable income and share (%) by source (urban households) 
 
Rural households  
Available data for rural households allows for an extended analysis of the income composition 
all the way back to the introduction of the economic reforms in 1978. From Figure 14 on the 
next page, we can clearly identify the recent upswing in income of net transfer and the related 
increase in relative share that was mentioned previously. The share of property income has 
contrastingly remained relatively stable at less than 1% before it rose to around 3% from 1993 
to 1998, whereas the relative share has been around 2% since. The most extraordinary 
development in the income composition of rural households pertains to net business income 
and income from wages and salaries. As we can see from the graph, wages and salaries 
accounted for nearly 2/3 of income at the offset of the economic reforms. In the immediate 
years after 1978, the share of income from wage earning plunged to around 19%, before a 
turnaround occurred in the mid 80s. Net business income including farming, is nearly perfectly 
negatively correlated with the relative development for income share of wages and salaries. 
This dramatic shift is likely to be a result of the process of agricultural decollectivization in 
China following the decollectivization reforms in the late 1970s onwards. A process that 
dismantled collective production and brought agriculture back to small-scale family farming.  
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In this, almost 300 million farmers went from being wage workers that earned so-called work 
points8 to being small business owners based on contractual arrangements with allocated and 
subsistence farmland (Zhang, 2015). In the early phases of decollectivization, the contractual 
agreements provided rural households with farmland in return for mandatory quotas of grain 
supply to the state. A quota system with tight price regulation that gradually transformed from 
collective to family farming by the implementation of market transaction principles.  
Figure 14: Per capita disposable income and share (%) by source (rural households) 
 
After this considerable shift of the agriculture decollectivization, there is a continuous period 
of rising shares of wages and salaries, with a corresponding decline in business income. 
Although both compositional sources of income have seen a significant rise in absolute terms, 
the relative growth in income from wages and salaries has been far greater from the late 90s 
onwards. In this, the rise has been particularly large in wage employment among non-farming 
activities (Zhang, 2015). The proportion of rural income deriving from wages and salaries rose 
from 19% in 1983 to 41% in 2017, a rise in absolute figures from 58 RMB in 1983 to 5.498 
RMB in 2017. Accordingly, accounting for the largest relative portion of rural household 
income composition by source after 2015, as before 1983. 
 
8 Points that were earned and accumulated daily by farmers which would be given as kind or cash at the end of the year 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
 ¥-
 ¥1,000
 ¥2,000
 ¥3,000
 ¥4,000
 ¥5,000
 ¥6,000
Pe
r 
C
ap
ita
 D
is
po
sa
bl
e 
In
co
m
e
Per capita disposable income of wages and salaries Per capita disposable income of net business
Per capita disposable income of property Per capita disposable income of transfer
Share of income from wages and salaries Share of net income from business
Share of income from property Share of income from transfer
 47 
Zhang (2015) argues that three trends has driven this recovery of rural wage employment; the 
process of rural industrialization, migration flows from rural to urban areas and an increasingly 
market-oriented agriculture sector. Processes that has turned industry, labor-hiring firms and 
household-based side-line production into the main growth engine in rural areas of China.  
Contribution to overall inequality 
We now turn to examine the contribution of these sources of income on aggregate inequality. 
Based on data from CHIP for 1995, 2002 and 2007 and CFPS for 2010, 2012 and 2014, Kanbur 
et al. (2017) estimates the contribution on overall inequality by a similar decomposition of 
Theil’s T indices. In accordance with these estimations, we find that income from wages and 
salaries has had the largest relative contribution to accumulated levels of inequality for all 
years (See Appendix D.1). Accounting for nearly all earnings disparity in 1995, 88,75% in 
2002 and 71,99% in 2007, before the contribution declined to 66,45% in 2010. By 2012, the 
relative contribution increased again and remained stable at around 77% up to 2014. Wages 
and salaries on the other hand, account for more than half of the increase in inequality between 
1995 and 2002 (See Appendix D.2), but also for the period between 2007 and 2010. Kanbur 
et al. (2017) further suggest that wage income contributed to a majority of the decline in 
inequality between 2012 and 2014. Supporting the findings of a narrowing gap in the late 00s.  
 
Operational income, equivalent to what has been previously denoted as net business income, 
contributed negatively to overall inequality by -22,77% in 1995 and -20,02% in 2002. A 
relative contribution that increased in 2007 and eventually turned positive, accounting for 
around 8% of aggregate inequality by 2010. As such, Kanbur et al. (2017) finds that the rise 
in operational income disparity had a significant impact on the rise of overall inequality 
between 2002 and 2010. Contributing to 17% of the rise up until 2007 and almost 14% to 
2010, representing one of the primary components of increased inequality along with property 
income between 2002 and 2007. The only period where property income has contributed 
positively to changes in inequality, accounting for almost 12% of the change in the period, and 
11,26% of total inequality by 2007. Other income, including money and gifts has had a relative 
stable contribution at around 5%. Contrastingly, the contribution of transfer income has been 
relatively high, from 14% in 1995 to more than 23% in 2002. Subsequently, the relative 
contribution decreased steadily until 2012, before rising again to around 3,7% to 2014. As a 
consequence, transfer income had a notable contribution to the rise in inequality between 1995 
and 2002, accounting for almost 40% of the change, but a negligible effect the period after. A 
finding that emphasizes the importance of transfers in inequality dynamics of modern China.  
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4. Theoretical framework 
From this section onwards, we turn to the second part of the research question for this thesis, 
which studies the determinants of aggregate levels of income inequality from 1985 to 2015. 
Accordingly, this chapter will present and review theoretical hypothesis that will function as 
the basis for the forthcoming econometric analysis of inequality drivers and off setters in post-
reform China. The first part of the chapter accounts for one of the most prevalent theories on 
income inequality dynamics for developing countries with increased economic prosperity, 
namely the Kuznets curve by Simon Kuznets (1955). Despite its prevalence as one of the most 
famous theories on inequality dynamics, Kuznets theory has received much criticism for some 
fundamental limitations since the late 1970s. An empirical debate that heated up in the 
following decades as the Kuznets curve theory could not sufficiently account for the new-
found rise in inequality following the second wave of globalization. Attending to some of this 
criticism and fundamental limitations of the Kuznets curve, Milanovic (2016) suggested an 
alternative hypothesis called Kuznets waves or cycles. A theoretical innovation with a more 
holistic approach to modern income inequality dynamics. These two theories will together 
function as instrumental and complementary frameworks for the empirical analysis. 
4.1 Kuznets curve hypothesis 
In his paper “Economic Growth and Income Inequality”, Simon Kuznets (1955) studied the 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality in Germany, United Kingdom 
and United States in the first half of the 20th century. A study on how economic conditions and 
markets forces influences the level of economic inequality in a nation as the economy matures. 
From the findings of this work, Kuznets concluded that each of the countries that was reviewed 
experienced continued economic growth in per capita gross domestic product in the period, 
with exception of the years in military conflict. In the early phase of this economic expansion, 
the level of income inequality tended to increase, before the disparity in distribution levelled 
off at a certain point. As economic growth proceeded, income inequality eventually started to 
decline in all countries, but at different rates. Accordingly, the share of national income 
assumed by the rich decreased, while the share acquired by the poor started to increase.  
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Kuznets argued that the key element of this mechanism was a nation-wide process of 
industrialization or mechanization of agriculture. As industries begin to emerge, labor started 
migrating from agriculture and other low production rate sectors in rural areas to industrial 
sectors and higher production rate sectors in urban areas. The initial phase of this nation-wide 
transition entailed progressively increasing internal migration flows. This again gave rise to 
increased income inequality as the majority of the population remained employed in relatively 
poor sectors, while a minority of the labor force migrated to wealthier cities and industries.  
 
As the economic expansion continued, the sectorial migration flow became so large that high-
productivity sectors became dominant. Consequently, urban areas turned into the center of 
economic activity and occupied the majority of workers. At this turning point in the process 
of industrialization, the disparity in income distribution started to decline as the country 
becomes increasingly democratized, with greater demand for social transfers and reduced skill 
premium following increased educational attainment to the masses of the population. These 
factors contribute to a reduction in the earnings disparity, until the country becomes so 
economically advanced that it settled at a low level of income inequality. Based on these 
findings and the above-mentioned mechanism, Kuznets proposed an inverted-U curve 
hypothesis, also known as the Kuznets curve. A framework that explains the relationship 
between income inequality and economic growth in the process of nation-wide structural 
transformations. A relationship illustrated graphically in Figure 15 below.   
 
Figure 15: Kuznets curve (Inverted-U hypothesis) 
 
Illustration by author based on Kuznets theorem (1955) 
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Since it was introduced, Kuznets hypothesis has become one of the most renowned theories 
on the relationship between economic growth and income inequality, prevailing as a standard 
feature in economic literature and empirical work on income inequality. However, since the 
late 1980s, the hypothesis has been widely contested by critics because of certain conceptual- 
and data limitations in the research. Kuznets himself acknowledged the fragility deriving from 
data limitations, suggesting that the mechanism needed further research and more data to be 
confirmed. According to critics, inadequate data quality in terms of reliability and sufficiency 
constituted one of the primary culprits. Fogel (1987) argued that the paper only attended to a 
few countries in a single point in time which was characterized by wars, depression and 
various other extraordinary events, and that these caveats were overlooked. 
 
Beyond the limitations in terms of data reliability and sufficiency, the validity of the suggested 
mechanism in itself has been subject to further debate in the academic sphere. Deininger and 
Squire (1998) suggested that the rise and fall of inequality derives from historical variation 
between countries rather than from economic progression within a country. Piketty (2014) on 
the other hand argued that the proposed correlation between economic growth and income 
inequality might be circumstantial and thus not evolutionary by nature. Similarly, 
Bourguignon (1995: 47) concluded that: “If there is any parabolic relationship between 
income inequality and GDP per capita across countries... it is probably very weak and 
unstable over time... [and] longitudinal data ... seem to suggest that there is much freedom in 
the way distribution in a given country may change over time”. 
On a more general note, existing empirical research addressing the validity of the hypothesis 
is ambiguous, giving an inconclusive picture that makes it difficult to draw any clear 
conclusion. At the same time, it is important to note that Kuznets did not suggest that levels 
of economic inequality must rise as a consequence of growth in developing countries, but 
rather that inequality tends to rise before it decreases. A discussion related to the above-
referenced empirical works will be further addressed in Chapter 5.  
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4.2 Milanovic’s theorem of Kuznets-waves/cycles 
Building on the work of Kuznets (1955) and his hypothesis of an inverted U-curve in the 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality, Milanovic (2016) suggested an 
alternative theoretical model that attended to some of the criticism of the Kuznets curve. A 
hypothesis that does not refute Kuznets work, but rather builds on his ideas. Milanovic’s 
theoretical innovation construes successive periods of Kuznets curves with rising and falling 
inequality over time, a motion that he denotes as Kuznets waves or Kuznets cycles. From the 
late 1970s onwards, many developed nations embarked upon a new rise in national income 
inequality that Kuznets original hypothesis was unable to fully account for. Attending to this 
reoccurring development, Milanovic suggested that the new upswing in income dispersion 
could be seen as a second Kuznets wave.  
 
The logic of the Kuznets wave hypothesis can be explained as an interplay between economic, 
social and political forces which drives levels of income inequality up and down in long-term 
cyclical motions, as illustrated in Figure 16. In contrast to Kuznets theory of a curvilinear 
relationship between economic growth and levels of within-nation income disparity, 
Milanovic’s hypothesis adopts a more holistic approach that moves beyond the sole focus on 
economic factors in Simon Kuznets work. Milanovic argues that Kuznets approach is both 
naïve and insufficient in accounting for what income inequality actually is, making economic 
factors alone inadequate in explaining the evolution of disparity in income distribution. In this, 
the same logic prevails as a counterargument to Piketty’s theory (2014) in his infamous book; 
‘Capital in the Twenty-First Century’, which focus on political factors as exogenous drivers.   
Figure 16 Expected pattern of changes in inequality versus income per capita 
 
Illustration by Milanovic (2016) 
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As previously mentioned, Milanovic theory (2016) does not reject Kuznets hypothesis, but 
rather acknowledge important facets to his theoretical construct and builds upon it. Herein, 
Milanovic supports the proposed dynamic of a rising income inequality in developing nations 
whereby mean income is increasing with the process of economic growth, substitution of labor 
to capital and transfer of labor from one sector to another. However, he recognizes that these 
structural mechanisms cannot be seen as segregated effects, and thereby cannot be interpreted 
in isolation nor be overgeneralized. The level of income inequality must be seen as a result of 
the interplay between economic, social and political factors that affects inequality trends. An 
interdependence and complexity that moves beyond the original hypothesis of Kuznets. In 
order to attend to these fundamental dynamics of Milanovic’s theoretical construct and apply 
his ideas in the forthcoming empirical analysis, I will now turn to review the specific 
determinants suggested by the theorem in the upward and downward portion respectively. 
4.2.1 Drivers of the upward portion of a Kuznets wave 
In terms of exogenous factors driving the upward potion of a Kuznets wave, Milanovic 
distinguishes between pre-modern and modern societies, which can also be described as pre- 
and post-industrial economies. This is an important distinction, because the fundamental logic 
of the determinants and related dynamics in national inequality is very different. For pre-
modern societies, where mean incomes were stagnant, Milanovic argues that there is no 
relationship between mean income and levels of inequality. Changes in inequality is driven by 
non-economic factors and idiosyncratic events, such as wars and epidemics. Given that this 
thesis only attends to the ‘modern era’ in Milanovic’s wording, the focus will be on the latter. 
 
For modern societies, Milanovic suggests that the upward portion of Kuznets waves is driven 
by technological revolutions and structural transformations under the condition of 
globalization. In this, Milanovic suggest that there have been two Kuznets cycles over the last 
two centuries in a global perspective. Whereas the first wave was triggered by the industrial 
revolution and the transition process of economies from agriculture to industry. These 
proposed dynamics of the rising levels of within-nation income inequality closely aligns with 
the reasoning of the Kuznets original U-curve theory. The distinction is rather the focus on 
technological change as the exogenous trigger for the rising levels of inequality in societies 
that experience rising levels of mean income. In addition to the amplification of these triggers 
through the conditional process of globalization, which accompanied the industrial revolution.   
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The second Kuznets wave in the modern era, builds on the same fundamental logic and 
dynamic as for the first wave among modern societies. This cycle was triggered by the 
information technology revolution and a new wave of globalization, which started around the 
1980s for many post-industrial societies. In accordance with the dynamics of the first wave, 
this entailed migration of labor from homogenous manufacturing jobs to more skill-intensive 
and heterogenous service occupations. A process which rewarded high-skilled labor more in 
both absolute and relative terms, but also bolstering the relative share of and return to capital.  
 
Accordingly, Milanovic argues that the forces driving up the level of inequality in a modern 
society could be explained by ‘TOP elements’ which is an abbreviation for; technology, 
openness/globalization and policy. He further argues that these elements are mutually 
dependent and cannot be disentangled in any meaningful way, whereas policy is considered 
to be exogenous with respect to globalization and economic preconditions. Milanovic suggests 
that by removing only one of the elements, one could discourage almost the whole rise in 
income inequality for either of the two Kuznets waves. At the same time, he argues that the 
three elements combined could explain nearly the whole upward motion of both the first and 
the second Kuznets cycle. I will now attend to the functional mechanism of these elements.  
Technological change 
The principal logic of how technological revolution drives up levels of within-nation 
inequality derives from a process of increased demand and productivity for capital and high-
skilled labor. On the capital income side, creation of various technological rents takes places, 
which is then assumed by the technological leaders and those with political power to ensure 
monopoly power or political protection. On the labor side, the endogenous technological 
change has been skill-biased, meaning that it has rewarded high-skilled labor relatively more. 
The type of inventions has also been an important factor, whereas much of the technology has 
been made to replace relatively more expensive production factors such as labor. More 
specifically, low-skilled labor in agriculture for the first wave and heterogenous manufacturing 
jobs for the second wave. As a consequence, wages and job prospects for individuals employed 
in the relevant economic sectors has been diminished. A process which has augmented the 
skill premium and thus earnings gap between high- and low skilled workers. Still, Milanovic 
suggest that such conditions does not guarantee their ‘victory’, as these factors needs to be 
supported by conditions of globalization and endogenous policy that amplifies inequality.  
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Openness/Globalization 
Accordingly, the condition of globalization or openness has been indispensable for these 
triggers, interplays and complex inequality dynamics leading to the rising motion of the waves. 
Whereas the triggers and effect of technological innovation are amplified by the scope of 
operations, which was brought to a global scale under the first and second Kuznets wave. 
Herein, the emergence of broader production networks and greater access to supply of cheap 
and low-skilled labor augments the effect through reduced production costs. A process that in 
turn weakened the labor’s position further and reduced the importance of trade unions, which 
again allowed capital owners to assume more of the technological rent. Beyond increased 
access to cheap and low-skilled labor, technological rents were further amplified by the global 
scope of operations in terms of greater access to exploitable resources, capital and markets.  
Policy  
As previously described, Milanovic portrays the political forces driving the upward portion of 
a Kuznets wave as being endogenous to globalization and economic preconditions. Factors 
including policies and political forces in a broader economic perspective, whereas parameters 
such as degree of globalization, supply of skilled labor, access to capital and exploitable 
resources is included. Political changes and battles along these dimensions set the context for 
potential growth in levels of national income inequality, a mechanism that gain traction if the 
general market trends also work in favor of some dimensions. In this, Milanovic emphasizes 
the tendencies of reduced marginal tax on high income and capital, but also the increasingly 
free global movement of capital to have been particularly forceful drivers in the second wave. 
As a consequence, he argues that from the 1980s onwards, the redistributive function in most 
modern and developed societies has weakened or stagnated. In rare cases of increasing 
redistribution, Milanovic suggest that the rise has been inferior to the rise in market inequality.  
 
Given the complex interplay between economic and political factors, the size and peak of a 
wave tend to diverge markedly among nations, but the shape of the cycle remain fairly similar. 
In view of this finding, the post-reform development in China is a highly interesting case. By 
Milanovic’s definition, China could be perceived as a pre-modern society up until only a few 
decades ago. Despite its delayed process of industrialization, the latter information technology 
revolution has undoubtedly unfolded in modern China under the condition of globalization. 
Therefore, we could be looking at a scenario whereas the suggested triggers and conditions of 
two technological revolutions take place in the same country simultaneously. Accordingly, the 
forthcoming empirical analysis needs to address the upward portion of both Kuznets cycles.  
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4.2.2 Forces offsetting rising levels of within-nation income inequality 
Beyond the suggested forces driving up the level of within-nation income inequality, 
Milanovic (2016) identifies various economic, social and demographic forces that have 
contributed to the ‘Great Levelling’9 after the first world war. In this, he argues that many of 
the same forces could play an important role in the future, i.e. driving down the second Kuznets 
wave. Following Milanovic’s wording, these forces result in benign and malign mechanisms, 
which reduces national income inequality. In this, benign forces include increased social 
transfers, progressive taxation and more widely accessible education. Malign forces on the 
other hand consist of wars, civil conflict, natural catastrophes and epidemics. According to his 
theory, these are the two ways in which income inequality can be reduced in modern societies. 
The principal differences between these two mechanisms or types of inequality reducing 
forces is that nations with stagnant mean income will not be affected by benign forces. In this, 
Milanovic argues that only growing economies experience increased educational attainment, 
higher political participation and encounter downward pressure deriving from an aging 
population. The same principal does not apply to malign forces, which are more similar, 
because conflicts and wars is influential in both expanding and stagnant economies.  
 
Accordingly, Milanovic does not refute Kuznets’ notion in that the downward slope in 
inequality was a product of economic and demographic forces and structural transitions - such 
as increased supply of more-educated labor, demand for redistribution and return on capital. 
Instead, he emphasizes the importance and neglection of malign forces in Kuznets theory for 
explaining the downward portion of the first Kuznets wave - such as wars, revolutions and 
epidemics. Beyond the neglection of malign forces, Milanovic suggests that the effect of low-
skill-biased technology change has not been adequately studied and could potentially put 
downward pressure on income inequality in the future. Following his argument, history has 
led to a common perception of technological progress as capital-driven, raising demand for 
highly skilled labor and thus wage premium, but also as a factor which has replaced low-
skilled labor through automation. However, Milanovic claims that there is a possibility that 
future technological innovations will be biased towards the poor by bolstering productivity 
levels among low-skilled labor. That being said, the standing lacks a line of empirical support 
and remains speculative postulation, which this paper will not attend to in any further detail.  
 
9 The significant decline in income inequality that occurred in most of the western world in the twentieth century 
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Accordingly, Milanovic’s theorem takes a more holistic approach in that he portrays the 
downward pressure on income inequality to derive from the interplay between political, 
economic, social and demographic factors. In line with his argument, a narrow perspective 
focusing solely on benign economic forces becomes inadequate in accounting for the complex 
and dynamic nature of income inequality. As such, Milanovic recognizes the interdependence 
of these mechanisms as a dynamic system rather than viewing these processes in isolation. A 
summarization of these proposed benign and malign forces for societies with stagnant and 
rising mean income is presented in table 1 below.  
 
Table 1 Malign and benign forces reducing within-nation income inequality 
Type of society Malign forces Benign forces 
Societies with 
stagnant mean 
income  
Idiosyncratic events  
Wars (through destruction)  
Civil conflict (state 
breakdown) 
 
Epidemics  
Societies with a 
rising mean income  
Wars (through destruction 
and higher taxation) 
Social pressure through politics 
(socialism, trade unions) 
Civil conflict (state 
breakdown) 
Widespread education  
Aging population (demand for 
social protection) 
Technological change that favors 
low-skilled workers 
Source: Milanovic (2016) 
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5. Empirical review  
In this chapter, I will present and review empirical research and evidence related to 
determinants and drivers of within-nation income inequality. The purpose of this empirical 
review is to shed light on existing research of structural mechanism and their net effect on 
national levels of disparity in income distribution. Furthermore, to draw insights and 
inspiration from the empirical work in the specification of hypotheses. In that, ensuring a 
holistic and pragmatic approach in the regression modelling by complementing the theoretical 
framework. The empirical support will also have a guiding function in terms of measurement 
technique and specification related to the variable construction for the regression analysis.  
5.1.1 Economic growth 
As previously described, the existing empirical evidence for the Kuznets curve hypothesis is 
inconclusive and ambiguous at best. By examining changes in income distribution in 
industrialized economies, Paukert (1973) found supporting evidence for curvilinear 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality. Londoño (1990) found 
evidence for an inverted-U shape in the long-term development of inequality in Colombia, 
while Williamson and Lindert (1980) found support for the hypothesis in United States and 
Great Britain over several decades. Several other empirical investigations from the likes of 
Oswang (1994), Ali (1998), Milanovic (1994) and Fishlow (1995) has also provided some 
support for Kuznets theorem. Barro (2000) on the other hand, finds that the Kuznets curve is 
an empirical phenomenon, but the theory is unable to explain most of the variation in income 
inequality over time. Anand and Kanbur (1993) found a weak relationship depending in the 
functional form, while Deininger and Squire (1998) found no empirical support for Kuznets 
hypothesis.  Fields (2001) reviewed available empirical evidence on Kuznets hypothesis based 
on large panels of countries and time series. In this, no empirical tendency was found either 
for the rise of inequality in developing countries, the fall of inequality in developed countries, 
nor any significant link to the rate of economic growth. At the same time Dumke (1991) and 
Thomas (1991) could not find evidence for a Kuznets curve in neither Germany nor Australia. 
A notable divergence in findings which again underlines the lack of any empirical consensus.   
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5.1.2 Sectoral transformation 
Sectoral transformation can be described as shifts in domestic employment structure through 
changes in the share of employment in an industry or sector. Specifically, this thesis will attend 
to sectoral shifts related to the transition processes from agriculture to industry, also known as 
industrialization, but also the shift from industry to service, denoted as servitifization. These 
broad sectoral changes are often described as indispensable to the processes of urbanization 
and long-term economic development, which again are all related to Kuznets’ (1955) inverted 
U-curve hypothesis described in the previous chapter. Interestingly, Jain-Chanda et al. (2018) 
finds that sectoral changes had an offsetting effect on income inequality in China over the last 
decades. According to their study, within-sector inequality rose, but this effect was offset by 
the fall in between-sector inequality which is attributed to the general equilibrium effects. Wan 
et al. (2016) specifically investigated the relationship between structural change and income 
inequality in China from 1952 to 2012. According to their research, they found empirical 
evidence that confirms the theoretical prediction of an inverted U-shape relationship. They 
also found that sectoral transformation represented the main driver of regional inequality in 
China from 1978 up until 2004. Another interesting finding in their study is that the agriculture 
sector has had negative effect on inequality, while the service sector has increased inequality.  
5.1.3 Urbanization 
In accordance with Kuznets’ (1955) inverted U-curve theory, the process of urbanization 
referring to population shifts from rural to urban areas will increase income inequality in the 
early phases of structural transformations (e.g. industrialization). Herein, the process of 
urbanization has often been described as one of the primary drivers of widening disparity in 
the income distribution (Behrens and Robert-Nicoud, 2014). As for the impact of sectoral 
transformation, the relationship between urbanization and income inequality is found to follow 
an inverted U-curve (Rauch, 1993). Jain-Chandra et al. (2018) found that the rapid process of 
urbanization in post-reform China has been a significant driver of the rising levels of income 
inequality in recent decades. An impact that is reflected in the considerable spatial disparity 
between urban and rural areas, but also in the rise of within-group inequality in urban areas. 
Another study by Chen et al. (2016) looks specifically at the causal relationship between 
urbanization and income inequality in China from 1978 to 2014. In this, they find that the 
process of urbanization in China has had an immediate reductive on the levels of domestic 
income inequality. However, by lagging the effect by only one period (one year), they find 
that urbanization has a significant aggravating effect on disparity in the income distribution.  
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5.1.4 Technological progress  
In accordance with Milanovic’s theorem of ‘Kuznets cycles’, technological change is found 
to have a significant effect in rising skill premium, which then again results in widening 
disparity in labor income distribution (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015). There is two principal 
mechanisms and transmission channels in which the technological progress affects the level 
of income inequality. First, significant technological advances increase demand for capital and 
skilled labor, which in turn reduces demand for low- or unskilled labor. Secondly, the nature 
of the recent technological revolutions has entailed a high degree of both automation, 
digitization and robotization. These advancements have in many cases eliminated the need for 
labor, job functions that previously were held by low- or unskilled labor (Card and DiNardo, 
2002; Acemoglu, 1998). Accordingly, it is not technological progress itself that widens the 
gap in income share, but rather the nature of the advancements and its skill-bias. Staggeringly, 
OECD (2011) has found that almost a third of the rise in income inequality between the 10th 
and 90th percentile can be attributed to technological progress in the last 25 years among 
OECD countries, making it the most significant driver of income inequality in the same period. 
Jaumotte et al. (2008) at IMF finds that rising inequality in developed and developing countries 
over the past two decades can largely be attributed to the impact of technological change. 
5.1.5 Trade openness 
Following Milanovic’s proposed dynamic of Kuznets waves, liberalization of trade ought to 
make up a significant amplifier for the upward motion of a cycle. Yet, the empirical evidence 
for the causal relationship between trade openness and income inequality seems to be 
ambiguous and inconclusive. Based on household surveys from 18 Latin-American countries 
in the period 1977 to 1998, Behrman et al. (2003) finds that a trade index explains 10-12% of 
earnings disparity between employees with different schooling. Lundberg and Squire (2003) 
finds that inequality is significantly positively correlated to the Sachs-Warner openness 
indicator, suggesting that trade liberalization widens the gap in national income distribution. 
A similar relationship was found by Barro (2000) showing a positive and long-term connection 
between openness for trade and income inequality. Cragg and Epelbaum (1996) found that 
trade give rise to skill intensification which resulted in 0,1% rise in earnings premium in the 
traded manufacturing sector, based on micro-level data from 1 million workers in Mexico 
between 1987 and 1993. For advanced economies, Feenstra and Handson (1996; 1999; 2003) 
finds that companies’ ability to offshore and adopt labor-saving technologies has been an 
important driver for rising skill premiums and the decline in manufacturing.  
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On the other hand, Faustino and Vali (2011) conversely finds that increasing trade openness 
leads to a decline in the disparity in income distribution for 24 OECD countries between 1995 
to 2007. Supporting this premise, Zhou et al. (2011) similarly finds that globalization has 
reduced domestic inequality in 60 countries, while Jaumotte et al. (2008) finds that increased 
trade tends to reduce income disparity. Herein, increased competition, specialization and 
incentives to up-skill has been some of the suggested channels through which increasing levels 
of trade openness can reduce national income dispersion (Birdsall, 1998; Blanchard and 
Giavazzi, 2003; Francois and Nelson, 2003). The lack of empirical consensus for the 
relationship is further accentuated by a myriad of inconclusive and mixed findings. In this, 
Franco and Gerussi (2013) found that trade was not relevant in explaining the variation of 
inequality in 17 transitional economies. Similarly, Edwards (1998) and Roine et al. (2009) 
found no evidence for a distributional effect linking trade liberalization to inequality. On the 
contrary, Wood (1999) found that trade liberalization may increase or decrease domestic 
earnings dispersion by examining surveys from Latin-American and East-Asian countries 
from the 1960s to 1990s. Findings from Munch and Skaksen (2009) lend support to this, saying 
that trade openness could have mixed effects on earnings of unskilled labor in advanced 
economies, whereas skill premium rise, but real wages increase as import prices are lowered.  
5.1.6 Financial openness 
Financial openness or integration pertains to financial flows and foreign direct investment 
which has been extensively researched for its impact on income inequality. A variable that can 
be perceived as a subfunction of Milanovic’s suggested globalization parameter alongside 
trade liberalization. Even though there is a lack of a clear empirical consensus related to the 
effect of increased financial integration on domestic income inequality, the impact seems far 
less dubious than that of trade openness. This is well reflected by the study of Lee (2014) 
which is based on cross-country regressions from 1976 to 2004. In this, he finds that the 
relationship between trade liberalization and inequality is conditional, while financial 
openness generally increases income inequality. Freeman (2010) further finds that increased 
financial flows leads to wider disparity in the income distribution, both for emerging market 
economies and for more advanced economies. Results that further indicated that the effect 
from foreign direct investments and portfolio flows was particularly strong. Dabla-Norris et 
al. (2015) argues that a possible explanation for this effect derives from a concentration of 
foreign assets and liabilities in sectors that can be perceived technology- and skill-intensive.  
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A premise that is supported by Jaumotte et al. (2008), finding that increased stock of inward 
FDI as a ratio of GDP increases income inequality in both developing and developed countries. 
Larrain (2015) further finds that increased capital inflows raise the skill premium, and thereby 
the overall earnings gap. Choi (2006) on the other hand, finds a more detrimental effect of 
outwards FDI stocks in his research of the impact in 119 countries from 1993 to 2002. Findings 
that lend further support to the premise of a significant distributional effect of increased 
foreign direct investment. Based on a UK panel data, Taylor and Driffield (2005) found that 
the skill demand effect deriving from FDI explained around 11% of earnings dispersion in the 
British manufacturing sector from 1983 to 1992. Looking specifically at China and 10 other 
Asian countries from 1980 to 2014, Bukhari and Munir (2016) finds that financial 
globalization had a significant effect in increasing domestic income inequality. That being 
said, Lim and McNelis (2016) still suggest that the impact of financial openness is likely to 
depend on the nature of the production structure and how advanced the economy is.  
5.1.7 Redistributive policies 
The effect of redistributive policies such as government spending, social expenditure and 
progressive taxation on disparity in income distribution seems rather intuitive and straight-
forward. By definition, redistributing policies will naturally benefit the low-income earners 
relatively more than high-income earners, and by purpose it will aim ensure greater equality. 
Howbeit, the predicted theoretical impact is less obvious if we account for indirect second-
round effects or behavioral adjustments by economic agents (Doerrenberg & Peichl, 2012). 
 
Empirical evidence confirms a direct reductive effect of social policies on domestic income 
inequality (Garfinkel et al., 2006; Fuest et al., 2010). Herein, the effect of government 
spending on health, education, infrastructure and other social benefits is found to have a 
negative impact on disparity in income distribution (Gradstein and Justman, 1997; Benabou, 
2000; 2002). Based on panel data from industrialized OECD countries Doerrenberg and Peichl 
(2012) found that a 1% increase in government spending or social expenditure decreases 
income inequality by 0,3%. However, in accordance with their findings, the causal effect of 
tax progressivity remains inconclusive. It is however important to note that the effect of both 
social policies and progressive taxation is highly dependent on both targeting and coverage 
(Alesina, 1998; Davoodi et al., 2003; Rhee et al., 2014).  
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Despite the empirical consensus of direct negative effect of redistributive policies, indirect 
second-round effects could offset and even overcompensate the initial equalizing impact 
(Sinn, 1995; Poterba, 2007; Chu et al., 2000). Doerrenberg and Peichl (2012) argues that 
certain redistributive policies including social benefits and progressive taxes diminish the 
incentives either to work or to make investments. Herein, Roed and Strom (2002) has found 
labor supply to be relatively more elastic among low-income earners, which could give a 
relatively more significant reduction of labor supply among low-income earners. Wage-setting 
behavior of employers could further induce second-round indirect opposing effects, in which 
employers could expect inequality to be a responsibility of the government. In accordance 
with this argument, employers would avoid any social responsibility by adopting lower grow-
wages for employees, which would see higher profits absorbed by employers (Doerrenberg & 
Peichl, 2012). Following these potential second-round effects, the causal relationship between 
redistributive policies and domestic income inequality might not be as clear and intuitive as 
one would expect at first glance. 
5.1.8 Educational attainment 
Educational attainment can generally be seen as important factor for the degree of domestic 
income inequality as it is decisive for individual occupational choices, job eligibility and 
income level from wages, therefore also for the income distribution structure at a macro level. 
Herein, relevant literature suggest that education represents a significant determinant of 
income inequality (Atkinson, 1997; Acemoglu, 1997; Becker and Tomes, 1986; Benabou, 
1994; Durlauf, 1996 i.a.). Despite the intuitive impact, theory suggest that the relationship 
might not be clear. According to the human capital model of income distribution, the effect of 
domestic educational attainment on within-nation income dispersion is determined by the rate 
of return to education or skill premium, which could be both positive and negative (Mincer, 
1958; Becker and Chiswick, 1966). The theoretical relationship and effect of increasing 
domestic educational attainment can be somewhat ambivalent given two opposing forces. 
First, the ‘composition’ effect, which gives the increased share of high-income earners, 
predicts an inverted u-curve relationship of income inequality plotted along the extent of 
educational attainment. Herein, inequality will rise in the early stages and subsequently decline 
after reaching a certain extent of educated individuals. The other effect known as ‘wage 
compression’, giving the relative decline in returns of higher education compared to lower 
education, suggest that income inequality and skill premiums declines following an increase 
in the relative supply of skilled and educated individuals (Knight and Sabot, 1983).  
 63 
In terms of the empirical evidence, there is manifold of studies illustrating a negative 
relationship between increased domestic educational attainment and income inequality (De 
Gregorio and Lee, 2002; and references therein). Gregorio and Lee’s (2002) comprehensive 
study finds that countries with relatively greater educational attainment have relatively greater 
equality in income distribution. Their findings suggest that increased educational attainment 
by one standard deviation, between 2,5 and 2,9 years, gives a reduction in the Gini coefficient 
by approximately 3 percentage points. At the same time, educational inequality is found to 
have a significant positive impact on income dispersion. Other empirical findings seem to 
indicate that the relationship depends on several other factors, including rate of return on 
education and educational investments from both individuals and government (Dabla-Norris 
et al., 2015). A complexity that is supported by cross-country studies showing that increased 
educational attainment decreases income inequality, but that the effect is intricate and 
dependent on both type, quality and distribution of education (Barro, 2000; Checci, 2000). 
5.1.9 Financial deepening 
In the comprehensive IMF study on causes and consequences of income inequality by Dabla-
Norris et al. (2015), they find financial deepening referring to increased provision of financial 
services could be an important factor to consider for the variation of income dispersion. In 
accordance with their study, they argue that financial deepening could induce greater access 
of financial services to both households and companies, which facilitate retirement savings, 
educational investments, capitalization on market opportunities, but also better protection 
against economic shocks. In this, they find that financial deepening could reduce income 
inequality and improve allocation of resources if the provision is accompanied by a more 
inclusive financial system. The theoretical standpoint by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
suggest that such financial development is relatively more beneficial for high-income earners 
in the early phases, whereas it becomes more inclusive as the economy becomes more 
developed. Empirical work from Deng and Su (2012) lend support to the evidence from Dabla-
Norris et al., finding that financial deepening spur income growth among low-income earners 
which contributes to reduced income inequality. Financial services could further expand at the 
extensive margin, broadening the inclusion groups that are marginalized, but also enable these 
groups to invest more in both physical and human capital. This mechanism could in turn 
narrow the gap in income distribution (Becker & Tomes, 1979; Banerjee & Newman, 1993).  
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However, some empirical findings seem to contradict the evidence from Dabla-Norris et al. 
(2015). Claessens and Perotti (2007) finds that financial deepening may transpire at the 
intensive margin, which would enhance the financial services of groups that already have 
access to these services. Seeing as these groups are more likely to be high-income earners, 
higher assets or established companies, this could raise income inequality by increasing skill 
premiums and possibly return to capital. Roine et al (2009) further found that financial 
development measured by the relative share of the banking sector in the economy could 
increase inequality in the early phases as it disproportionally benefits the top income earners. 
The empirical evidence related to the causal relationship between financial deepening and 
income inequality is therefore not without ambiguity. Yet, available findings provide 
appropriate justification for testing the factor against variation in income inequality in China.  
5.1.10 Population aging  
In contrast to the suggested determinants mentioned above, the impact of population aging on 
income inequality has received far less theoretical and empirical attention. Yet, a nation’s age 
structure and composition has long been regarded as an important determinant for the level of 
disparity in income distribution (Jain-Chandra et al., 2018). A premise that makes China’s 
rapidly aging population a highly interesting phenomenon. Existing research has 
predominantly attended to the relationship for economically developed countries, whereas 
most of empirical evidence finds that population aging only accounts for a small share of 
overall income dispersion with little impact on the gap in distribution (Barret et al., 2000; 
Bishop et al., 1997; Jantti, 1997). Conversely, Deaton and Paxson (1994; 1997) has found that 
income inequality increases following a process of population aging in accordance with the 
behavioral predictions of the permanent income hypothesis. Further, Ohtake and Saitho (1998) 
found that nearly half of the dramatic rise of consumption inequality in Japan in the 1980s 
could be attributed to population aging. Cameron (2000), found that 5,8% of the variation in 
income inequality in Java for the period 1984 to 1990 could be explained by the impact of an 
aging population A premise that was supported by Chu and Jiang (1997), finding that 
population aging significantly affected domestic income inequality in Taiwan in the period 
between 1978 and 1993. Empirical evidence from rural China has already established that 
population aging has significantly increased dispersion in the income distribution for rural 
areas in recent years (Zhong, 2011). Further empirical support is given by Jain-Chandra et al. 
(2018) who found that both the fall in fertility and the process of population aging has had a 
significant contribution in widening domestic income inequality in China in recent decades.  
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5.1.11 Privatization 
A central aspect to the transformative economic reforms introduced in the late 70s and early 
80s was the process of increasing marketisation and privatization (Bakkeli, 2017). Herein, the 
former refers to a process in which economic activities and resources allocation that was 
previously controlled by the state becomes directed by market mechanisms (Wu and Xie, 
2000). The ladder describes a process of transferring ownership of enterprises and assets from 
the state to private actors, but also a withdrawal process of public services being replaced by 
private service providers (Bailey, 1987). In this, the process of privatization has often been 
associated with increased disparity in the income distribution (Bandelj and Mahutga, 2010). 
An intuitive perspective would be changes in the income structure of transitional economies, 
whereas the share from wages fall relative to capital and entrepreneurial income (Honkkila, 
1997). Howbeit, existing theoretical literature suggest that there are numerous ways in which 
privatization could impact the distribution of income, which makes the distributional effect 
rather ambiguous. As a consequence, Ceriani et al. (2016) argues that the net effect of 
privatization on income inequality becomes “an empirical matter of relative magnitudes”.  
 
According to the Honkkila (1997), empirical evidence has found that income inequality rises 
in transitional economies, and that the rising share of capital income can account for some of 
the rise in income inequality. At the same time, McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) found that 
privatization has a very limited effect on income inequality in developing countries. Birdsall 
and Nellis (2003) shows that privatization programs widen inequality in the distribution of 
income, at least in the short run. A premise which is supported by Chao et al. (2006), finding 
that partial privatization could lead to increase earning dispersion between unskilled and 
skilled workers, higher unemployment ratio, higher prices of goods and lower social welfare. 
Based on survey data, Bakkeli (2017) established that privatization has had a significant 
impact on income inequality in the Western regions of China. Still, it has been argued that the 
distributional effect of a privatization process depends on various other factors, including the 
regulatory regime and market competition (Florio and Puglisi, 2005; Birdsall and Nellis, 
2005). An argument that is in line with findings from the comprehensive study by Ceriani at 
al. (2016). Based on a panel dataset of 80 developing countries from 1988 to 2008, they found 
that privatization has a contributes significantly to increased income inequality in countries 
where political institutions could be described as ‘unmatured’. At the same time, they find a 
significant positive relationship between privatization and income inequality in countries 
where the so-called democratic institutions are effectively consolidated.   
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6. Methodology 
In this section, I will present the research methodology applied in the empirical analysis of 
this dissertation. A methodological mode that is selected and designed to estimate the 
relationship between disparity in income distribution and the determinants given by the 
predictors presented in chapter 7.1. The first part of this section will describe the relevant 
regression estimation method for time series that is adopted for the empirical analysis. 
Followingly, I will give an account for the necessary statistical assumptions that needs to be 
satisfied in order to obtain a best linear unbiased estimator, but also the relevant diagnostics 
test to control for these assumptions. The last subsection of the chapter will attend to properties 
of time series data that needs to be accounted for in order to avoid spurious regression results.   
6.1 Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis can be described as an analytical technique used to study how the mean 
value of a given variable covaries with one or more independent variables. A technique that 
allows for and enables control for potential disturbing variables that may lead to spurious 
causalities or relationships (Johannesen et al., 2011). Accordingly, the properties of a 
regression analysis make the technique a suitable and appropriate mean for analyzing and 
identifying the relationship between two or more variables. At the same time, Osmundsen et 
al (2002) underlines that a common misinterpretation of the relationship between variables is 
to assume that a correlation, which only indicates the variables covaries, is equivalent to a 
cause-effect relationship. Accordingly, the empirical analysis of this paper will not be able to 
conclusively determine any robust causal mechanisms, but rather identify relationships based 
on coefficient estimates from an ordinary least squares regression, denoted as OLS. The 
simplest and most fundamental OLS estimation method is known as a bivariate linear 
regression or a simple linear regression model. Whereas the purpose is to describe the 
relationship between a dependent and one independent variable, given in equation 6.1 below. 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥 + 𝜇 (6.1) 
In this, 𝑦 expresses the dependent variable or regressand, while 𝑥 represents the independent 
variable or regressor. 𝛽0 gives the relevant intercept parameter, also denotes as the constant 
term. 𝛽1 represents the slope parameter that explains the relationship between the dependent 
variable 𝑦 and the independent variable 𝑥, given that the error term 𝜇 is fixed. Herein, the error 
term reflects the unobserved factors that affect 𝑦 (Woolridge, 2016).  
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6.1.1 Multiple Linear Regression 
In contrast to a bivariate regression, a multiple linear regression model explicitly allows for 
control of two or more independent variables that simultaneously affect the regressand. 
Consequently, a multiple regression analysis enables composition of better and more suitable 
models to draw conclusions and predict the dependent variable. An inherent advantage as most 
regressand is affected by more than one regressors. Therefore, adding additional factors to the 
model helps to explain more of the variation in the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2016). 
The general relationship can be illustrated by equation given below. 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖2+. . . +𝛽2𝑥𝑖2 + 𝜇𝑖 (6.2) 
In this, the vehicle of a multiple regression model prevails as one of the most commonly used 
empirical analysis techniques in both economics and various other social sciences. In the 
application of a multiple regression analyses, OLS estimation similarly prevails as the primary 
method for estimating the parameters in the model. Accordingly, these preeminent 
econometric techniques in studying relationship between variables facilitates a well-suited 
methodological approach for an empirical analysis in the determinants of income inequality. 
In order to justify the predominance of the OLS method over comparable estimators and to 
obtain reliable, valid and unbiased estimation results certain assumptions needs to be satisfied.  
6.2 Classical linear model assumptions for time series  
According to the Gauss-Markov theorem, OLS estimators is considered the best linear 
unbiased estimator (BLUE) given that a standard set of assumption holds (Wooldridge, 2016). 
I will now attend to each of the six assumptions that is relevant for time series regression 
models with related consequences. In this, I will also elaborate on relevant diagnostics 
procedure to test and mitigate potential violations of the necessary assumptions.  
1st Assumption – Linear in parameters 
The first of these assumptions states that the dependent variable must be a linear function of 
the independent variables. In other words, that the stochastic process follows a linear model 
that is linear in parameters 𝛽0, 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑘. If the model does not satisfy this assumption (i.e. 
non-linearity in parameters), the estimation method described above will still estimate a linear 
relationship between the variables. Such a condition will lead to unreliable regression results 
and biased coefficient estimates. A violation of this assumption would need to be addressed 
by transforming the predictor variable to the appropriate functional form (Wooldridge, 2016).   
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2nd Assumption – No perfect collinearity 
The Gauss-Markov theorem further assumes that none of the explanatory variables are 
perfectly correlated with one or more of the other explanatory variables. Even though a high 
degree of multicollinearity does not violate the necessary assumption, elevated levels of 
correlation between regressors entails disruptive effects on regression results as the estimates 
produce unreliable coefficients. This encumbers interpretation of relationships, making it 
difficult to distinguish the distinct effect of each regressor on the dependent variable (Kraha 
et al., 2012). To control for the level of multicollinearity in the dataset employed for this 
analysis, I will make use of both a correlation matrix and a variance inflation factor test (VIF).  
3rd Assumption – Zero conditional mean 
The assumption of a zero conditional mean entails that the value of the error term 𝑢𝑡 for each 
period of time, should have an expected value of 0 given the independent variables value for 
all periods. In other words, the error term for each period is uncorrelated with the regressors 
for all of the time periods (Wooldridge, 2016). This can be given mathematically as follows:  
E(ut|x1t, … , xtk) = E(ut|xt) = 0, t = 1,2, … , n. (6.3) 
If equation 6.3 holds, the explanatory variables in the model can be described as 
contemporaneously exogenous because the regressors and error terms are contemporaneously 
uncorrelated. However, for the assumption of zero conditional mean to be satisfied and for 
OLS to be unbiased, the independent variables need to be strictly exogenous across all time 
periods. Accordingly, the regressors cannot be reactive to previous changes in the dependent 
variable, which poses a typical problem in social sciences because many explanatory variables 
cannot be considered strictly exogenous by nature. This broader issue will followingly be a 
concern for my regression model as well, for example when testing for certain types of 
variables, such as policy. If the assumption is violated, estimations will be both biased and 
inconsistent. Issues of endogeneity can derive from several conditions in the data or the model 
specification, but the most common reason for a violation is either measurement errors, 
misspecification of regressors, omission of central variables or endogenous variables 
(Wooldridge, 2016). Accordingly, any mitigative techniques must be based on the specific 
reason for the violation of the assumption.  
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4th Assumption – Homoskedasticity  
The fourth assumption that needs to be satisfied in order for the OLS estimation to be BLUE 
is that the error terms 𝑢𝑡 are homoscedastic. This means that the variance of the error term 
must remain constant for all time periods, but also that they are independent of the explanatory 
variables (Wooldridge, 2016). A condition illustrated mathematically in equation 6.4 below  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑡|𝑥1𝑡, … , 𝑥𝑡𝑘) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑡) = 𝜎
2, 𝑡 = 1,2, … , n (6.4) 
If the errors violate this assumption, they are denoted as heteroscedastic. Even though the 
properties of the OLS estimators remain unbiased and consistent if this is condition is violated, 
they will no longer be efficient or of minimum variance. Accordingly, they will no longer be 
the best linear unbiased estimators, and OLS will no longer be a good estimator. Furthermore, 
this will induce invalid inference in that standard errors, level of significance and thus related 
F- or t-test will be invalid and unreliable, which again leads to erroneous conclusions 
(Gujarati, 2015). There could be several reasons for unequal variance in the error terms, such 
as outliers in dataset, incorrect functional form or transformation of data. In the forthcoming 
diagnostics procedure, I will test control for the presence of heteroscedasticity in the error term 
by a conventional Breusch-Pagan test, which will be supplemented by a graphical diagnostic 
of analyzing a plot of the residuals against the fitted (predicted) value.  
5th Assumption – No autocorrelation 
Followingly, the theorem assumes that the model does not suffer from autocorrelation. This 
necessary statistical property entails that the errors of two different time periods are 
uncorrelated and equal to zero, conditional on the explanatory variables. In other words, if the 
error terms correlate over time, they can be denoted as autocorrelated (Wooldridge, 2016). 
Accordingly, to satisfy the fifth assumption, the following criterion must not be violated:  
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢𝑡, 𝑢𝑠|𝑋) = 0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠 (6.5) 
Autocorrelation is a common issue when working with time series, which could have 
consequences for the regression results in that the OLS estimators no longer are efficient. In 
this, the standard errors will become unreliable and often underestimated, which again will 
lead to inflated t- or F-values and increase the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null 
hypothesis (Type 1 error) (Gujarati, 2015). There are several reasons why autocorrelation in 
the error term might occur, including omitted variables absorbed in the error terms and 
misspecification of variables.  
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In this, there is several methods to control for the presence of autocorrelation in the model. 
For the regression analysis of this paper, I will make use of as a Durbin-Watson d test, which 
will be supplemented by a graphical analysis of a correlogram. In the presence of 
autocorrelated error terms, the preferred remedial measure depends on both the nature of the 
problem and the size of the sample. Examples of mitigative techniques for autocorrelation 
include first-difference transformation, lagging of the dependent variable, a more generalized 
functional form transformations (Gujarati, 2015).  
6th Assumption – Normality  
The final assumption in the Gauss-Markov theorem attending to time-series regression model 
implies that the error terms are normally distributed with an average value of zero and constant 
variance, but also that they are independent of the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2016).  
𝑢 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎2) (6.6) 
If the assumption of normality in distribution of error terms is violated, this will result in issues 
in the construction of confidence intervals, which directly affects the validity of significance 
in results deriving from t- and F-tests. To test control for normality in the distribution of 
residuals, I will perform a skewness/kurtosis test which will be supplemented by a histogram 
plot of the predicted residuals for each of the models.  
6.3 Stationarity  
The use of time-series data in econometric analyses facilitate research of dynamic effects 
between two or more variables across time. Howbeit, time-series data is often fraught with 
more difficulties than a cross-sectional analysis because it allows for observations to be 
correlated over time. These temporal correlations require certain properties of the data to be 
further attended to when performing a regression analysis. In this, the notion of stationarity is 
critical, reflecting an assumption that statistical properties of processes remain time invariant. 
If the relationship between two variables change from period to period, it becomes difficult to 
estimate any meaningful relationship. The inclusion of one or more non-stationary time-series 
can lead to spurious regressions results, meaning that the regressors seems to explain more of 
the variation in the regressand than it actually does. Herein, t-statistics and R-square values 
becomes inflated as they do not follow a usual distribution (Granger & Newbold, 1974).  
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A time-series can be denoted as weakly stationary if the two first moments given below are 
regarded as time invariant. These include a constant mean (6.7) and variance (6.8) over time, 
but also that the autocovariance function between two time periods only depend on the interval 
(6.9) and not the actual time at which the covariance is computed (Gujarati, 2015). In other 
words, we can generally say that a stationary process represents a series with statistical 
properties that do not change over time. These conditions can be described formally as follows: 
𝐸(𝑥𝑡) = 𝜇 
𝑉(𝑥𝑡) = 𝐸((𝑥𝑡 −  𝜇)
2) = 𝛾0 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑡, 𝑥𝑡−𝑘) = 𝐸(((𝑥𝑡 −  𝜇)(𝑥𝑡−𝑘 −  𝜇)) = 𝛾0   for 𝑘 = 1,2, … 
(6.7) 
(6.8) 
(6.9) 
In order for a stochastic process to be regarded as strictly stationary, all moments of its 
probability distribution must remain constant over time. Accordingly, in a sequence of random 
variables the joint probability distribution must remain unchanged if the sequence is shifted 
ahead of any given time periods. In practical cases, strict stationarity could often be too strict. 
In this, Wooldridge (2016) suggest that for multiple regression models, we assume a certain 
form of stationarity by assuming that the beta coefficient estimates do not change over time.  
 
If a stochastic process does not satisfy all of the above-mentioned conditions, the times series 
is denoted as non-stationary. In other words, the statistical properties are not time-invariant 
and the value at a given time is affected by the value from previous time periods. Accordingly, 
if there is a shock at any point in a non-stationary process, the effect of this shock will influence 
the forthcoming values in time series. There are several ways in which the stationarity 
assumption can be violated, whereas some of the most typical deviations include a 
deterministic trend (trend stationary), unit roots (stochastic trends/difference stationary), level 
shifts (structural breaks) and changing variances. The two ladder examples of non-stationarity 
are rather intuitive, deriving from change in parameters or changes in the variance. If a 
stochastic process is trend stationary, there is fluctuations around a deterministic trend that 
reflects a stationary disturbance term. This leads to a trending mean that continually increases 
or decreases over time which violates the assumption. In the case of a difference stationary 
process, the trend is denoted as stochastic and possess one or more-unit roots. An important 
distinction between unit root processes and trend stationarity is the effects of shocks on the 
long-term behavior of the data. Herein, processes that are trend stationary will be mean 
reverting, implying that shocks will only induce transitory effects on the data series. Whereas 
for unit root processes, shocks will have a permanent effect. (Tabor, 2018).  
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The simplest example of a stochastic time series is a random walk, whereas the value of one 
period is given by the value of the previous period in addition to an unpredictable change of a 
pure random process. An extension to this model is a random walk with drift, which represents 
a random walk with a constant added to the equation. If the process entails a positive constant 
it will have an upward tendency, whereas a negative constant induces a downward tendency. 
Accordingly, a random walk with drift entails a stochastic trend, while a trend stationary 
process alters deterministic in time. Additionally, a process could be non-stationary through a 
combination of these. In this, a random walk could entail both a drift component and a 
deterministic trend. Such a combination would specify a value at one period based on the value 
of the previous period including a drift, a trend and a stochastic component (Gujarati, 2015). 
6.3.1 Test of stationarity 
In accordance with the reasoning mentioned above, it is critical to determine whether the time 
series in the regression model is stationary or not. There are several methods of examining 
whether the stochastic processes are stationary. The most commonly used statistical test for 
stationarity by a unit root analysis is the ‘Dicky-Fuller test’, which Stock & Watson (2015) 
claim to be to most reliable of sorts. In accordance with the reasoning mentioned above, this 
will be the preferred controlling option for stationarity in the forthcoming regression analysis. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
The Dickey-Fuller (DF) test is a unit root test that was first put forward by statisticians David 
Dickey and Wayne Fuller (1979). In this procedure, we run a hypothesis test, whereas the null 
hypothesis or the unit root hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit root. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the stochastic process is generated by a stationary process (Gujarati, 2015). 
An issue with the standard DF-test is that only offers a simple autoregressive model, which is 
unable to capture the dynamic and complex structure of most economic time series. A way to 
mitigate this limitation is to apply an extended version of the DF-test known as an Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF), which allows for higher-order autoregressive process. An extension 
which is based on fitting of the following regression can be described formally as: 
Δ𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜁1Δ𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝜁𝑘Δ𝑦𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜖𝑡 (6.10) 
Herein, 𝛼 indicates the constant term and 𝛿𝑡 gives the time trend, which are optional terms 
that must be included if the process follows a linear or quadratic trend. 𝑘 represents the number 
of specified lags, and the optimal lag order can be identified through information criterions. 
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The augmented version of the Dickey-Fuller test is applicable for four different cases in 
accordance with the various examples of non-stationary processes mentioned previously. In 
this, the null hypothesis for each case will always be that the variable contains a unit root. The 
difference between the four applications is if the null hypothesis includes a drift term and if 
the employed regression includes a constant term and a time trend. For the first, there is a null 
hypothesis that the process follows a random walk without drift, whereas the fit does not 
include a constant nor a time trend. The difference to the second case is merely the inclusion 
of a constant term. For the thirds case, there is a null hypothesis that the process contains a 
unit root with drift, but there is no time trend in the fitting. Lastly, the fourth case gives a null 
hypothesis of a random walk with or without drift, whereas the constant is unrestricted, and 
the fit includes a time trend (Hamilton, 1994). The four cases are summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Application cases of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
Case Process under null hypothesis Regression restrictions Options 
1 Random walk without drift 𝛼 = 0, 𝛿 = 0 No constant 
2 Random walk without drift 𝛿 = 0 Default 
3 Random walk with drift 𝛿 = 0 Drift 
4 Random walk with or without drift None Trend 
 
In order to decide the best fit for the regression diagnostics procedures, the selection needs to 
be based upon a combination of economic theory and a graphical analysis of the time series. 
Still, if there is solid theoretical support or an identification of a distinct patterns in the visual 
inspection that do not contradict each other, that can be seen as sufficient reasoning for 
selecting one of the cases. For instance, if a process that shows a clear upward trend over time 
gives a good indication that the fourth case could be an appropriate choice of mode. 
Alternatively, a process that does not entail a clear trend component and still has a nonzero 
mean would suggest that the second case application should be the preferred option.    
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6.3.2 Stationarization  
In order to conduct regression analyses with non-stationary processes, avoid spurious 
regression results and satisfy the assumption of traditional regression modelling, the time 
series needs to be transformed in order to achieve stationarity. Herein, there is several 
techniques of stationarization which can be adopted, and the best fit will depend on the 
findings from the diagnostics procedure and on related economic theory. Given the type of 
data the empirical analysis of this thesis attends to, I will only account for two relevant 
procedures of stabilization; detrending and differencing. As a first step, it can be reasonable 
to logarithmically transform the time series, which may also stabilize non-constant variance. 
 
Detrending  
If a process is trend stationary and contains a deterministic trend, the time series can be made 
stationary by estimating and subtracting the trend component to work with the deviation from 
the trend. This can easily be done by regressing the time series against time in statistical 
packages such as Stata, whereas the residuals from the regression represent the series without 
a linear trend (Gujarati, 2015). For quadratic detrending, the procedure is similar, but a squared 
time component is added to the regression producing the residuals, which supposes an 
exponential-type behavior. Another option is to decompose the time series nonparametrically 
by making use of filtering techniques and moving averages.   
 
Differencing 
If the time series is found to have a stochastic trend, the process can be differenced one or 
more times to be made stationary, depending on which order the time series is integrated of, 
as shown in equation 6.11 below. Another benefit from differencing the time series is that it 
removes any linear time trend, which means that for series with obvious trends we can take 
the difference of the variable rather than including a time trend (Wooldridge, 2016). 
∆ log(𝑦𝑡) = log(𝑦𝑡) − log (𝑦𝑡−𝑘) (6.11) 
In this, the time series is integrated of order 𝑘 equal to the 𝑘 of unit roots and the term could 
be seen as the inverse of differences, therefore a stationary process is integrated of order zero. 
If the series is integrated of order one, it can be made stationary by differencing it once. For 
time series integrated in order two, it must be differenced two times to become stationary and 
so forth (Gujarati, 2015). In practice, most nonstationary economic and strictly positive time 
series are either integrated of order one or two, with the latter being an exception.  
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7. Data description  
The following chapter will give a description of the dataset that will be employed in the 
forthcoming regression analysis. This will include a presentation of the variable identification, 
related development of the different processes, the sources of data and the measurement 
techniques applied for variable construction. In the final sections of this chapter, the 
preliminary model specifications will be presented, followed by a brief a discussion related to 
limitations of the relevant measurement techniques applied for the variable constructions.  
7.1 Data set and variable construction 
In accordance with the theoretical predictions and comprehensive empirical review of 
structural determinants, the regression models will test for 13 distinct predictors of income 
inequality, including their related polynomial terms based on the predicted relationship. These 
predictors follow an annual periodicity in the period from 1985 to 2015, which gives a small 
sample size of 30 observations, a limitation that will be discussed further in chapter 8.4.2.  
7.1.1 Dependent variable 
In accordance with the findings presented in Chapter 3, the arguments and empirical evidence 
presented by Palma (2011; 2016), there is valid and compelling reasons for selecting an 
alternative measure of income inequality than the conventional Gini coefficient. As such, the 
dependent variable will follow the methodological approach introduced by Palma in 
measuring aggregate national income inequality as the share of national income assume by the 
10th percentile at the top of the distribution over the acquired income of the bottom 40%. The 
data employed for the variable construction is sourced from Piketty et al. (2017) through the 
World Inequality Database, measured as the percentage share of assumed national income. 
These estimations are constructed based on a combination of national accounts, income 
surveys and tax data. From the graphical illustration in Chapter 3 and the relevant ADF-test 
results given in Appendix E.1, we find that process is non-stationarity with a unit root and a 
first order integration. In accordance with these findings, the variable has been logarithmically 
transformed and differenced once to achieve stationarity, giving the following formulation:  
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = '1𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑎 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) = '1𝑙𝑛 (
𝑝0𝑝10
𝑝60𝑝100
) (7.1) 
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7.1.2 Independent variables  
Economic growth  
In order to test for Kuznets’ prediction of an inverted U-curve relationship between economic 
growth and income inequality, I will test for changes to GDP per capita in accordance with 
the original theoretical construct. The time-series is collected from the World Bank Database 
(2019b) and is measured in current local currency unit. To account for the non-linear 
relationship, the variable will be transformed logarithmically. The relevant ADF-test results 
given in Appendix E.2 indicates the presence of a unit root and the variable will accordingly 
be differenced once in line with dependent variable. To control for the parabolic relationship 
as suggested by theory, a quadratic term of the function will be added to the regression models.   
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = '1𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎) (7.2) 
From Figure 17, the development in gross domestic product per capita is plotted against 
variation in inequality by the Palma ratio to give an impression of the covariance over time. 
From this illustration, we can clearly observe the exponential nature of the economic 
expansion following the economic reforms, particularly from the mid- to late-00 onwards. 
Over the whole period, China represented the fastest-growing major economy in the world 
with an increase in GDP per capita from 866¥ in 1985 to 50.251¥ by 2015 (IMF, 2018; World 
Bank 2019b). Even though we cannot draw any conclusions related to correlation or causality 
from the observed illustration, the covariance of the processes over time is greatly interesting 
at first glance - in consideration of Kuznets theoretically predicted relationship.   
 Figure 17: GDP per capita against Palma ratio 
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Industrialization  
A process which is interrelated with the impact of economic growth according to the Kuznets’ 
and Milanovic’s theorem is the effect of the structural transformation following a process of 
industrialization. To control for this effect, I will test for the share of employment in secondary 
industries in China as a percentage of total employment. This data is obtained from the 
databank of the National Bureau of Statistics (2019). In accordance with the theoretical 
prediction, we would expect an inverted to U-curve relationship between the process of 
industrialization and inequality over time, supported by previous empirical research in post-
reform China (Wan et al., 2016). Accordingly, to test for this parabolic relationship, a 
quadratic term for the process will be included in the final regression model. As for the process 
itself, we can identify a trending mean following stochastic trend component from the 
graphical illustration in Figure 18. The presence of a unit root is confirmed by the ADF-test 
given in Appendix E.3. As such, the variable will accordingly be logarithmically transformed 
and differenced once to achieve stationarity, giving the following formulation:  
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = '1 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑
) (7.3) 
Interestingly, figure 18 shows that share of employment in secondary industries remained 
relatively stable between a21 and a24% from 1985 to 2005, before it increased significantly 
until 2012 and then declined. This observation could indicate that a transformative 
industrialization process occurred before 1985 and a new shock took place at around 2005.  
Figure 18: Share of employment in secondary industries 
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Servicization  
Building on Kuznets premise of the impact of nation-wide structural transformations, 
Milanovic suggested that mass transfers of labor from homogenous manufacturing jobs to 
skill-intensive heterogenous service occupations represents one of the key drivers in the 
second ‘Kuznets wave through rising skill premium and increased share and return to capital. 
To account for this effect of servicization, I will test for the share of employment in tertiary 
industries as a percentage of total employment. The data is similarly collected from the 
National Bureau of Statistics (2019), ensuring consistency with the data on industrialization. 
Based on the same reasoning as for the previous variable, the series will be logarithmically 
transformed and difference following the ADF-results given in Appendix E.4. Further, the 
predicted quadratic relationship will be tested for by including a squared term of the variable. 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = '1 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑
) (7.4) 
As given in Figure 19, relative employment in tertiary industries has increased steadily and 
significantly over the whole period from a16,8% in 1985 to more than 42% in 2015. In fact, 
tertiary industries became relatively larger than secondary industries already by 1994 and 
overtook primary industries as the largest sector after 2010, which coincides with the trend 
shift in the development of income inequality. Even though Kuznets original work did not 
attend to servicization specifically, he predicted that once the high-productivity sectors 
occupied the majority of labor, domestic income inequality would turn and start to decline.  
Figure 19: Share of employment in tertiary industry 
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Urbanization 
Urbanization represents another key component of both Kuznets and Milanovic’s hypothesis. 
In this, mass internal migration flows from rural to urban areas following structural transitions 
is predicted to induce an initial rise in domestic income dispersion, which will turn to a 
negative effect at later stages of urbanization. The variable that will be employed to test this 
effect is given by the share of urban population, reflecting people living in urban areas10, as a 
percentage of the total population sourced from the World Bank databank (2019k). A series 
that is collected and smoothed by United Nations Population Division. In accordance with the 
illustration given in Figure 20, we can observe a distinct deterministic trend component. 
However, given the order of integration for the previous processes, we should adhere to the 
highest order of integration. The variable will therefore be difference once instead of 
subtracting the mean. To test for the quadratic relationship, a related squared term is included.  
𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = '1(
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
) (7.5) 
As we can observe from figure 20, the process of urbanization reflects an uninterrupted and 
considerable migration flow from 1985 to 2015. In this period, the urban population rose from 
23% to 55%. Whereby the decline in overall income inequality coincides with the urban 
population exceeding the 50% mark. However, the aggregation of rural and urban population 
may not equal the total population, which I will come back to in the limitations of the dataset.  
Figure 20: Urban population as % of total population 
 
 
10 Urban areas as defined by national statistical offices 
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Technological progress 
In accordance with Milanovic’s theory of Kuznets waves, technological progress under the 
conditions of globalization and endogenous policy changes represents one of the key drivers 
of the upward motion of a cycle. A premise that is widely supported by empirical work and 
impacts both capital income through creation of technological rents and labor income through 
raising demand for high-skilled labor and substitution of labor in manufacturing processes. 
Measuring such technological progress directly is however a cumbersome endeavor. An 
indirect approach commonly applied by economist is to measure total factor productivity 
growth (TFP), giving the relative efficiency of an economy in producing goods and service 
for given aggregate input of capital and labor. In this, measuring technological change through 
attributing income growth which is not explained by increased labor supply or investment to 
the technological progress (World Bank, 2008). The link has been disputed in the academic 
sphere, which I will come back to in the limitations of the dataset. Still, given data limitations, 
this function of TFP offers as a reasonable proxy for technological change in China. The proxy 
will be modelled from total factor productivity estimates at constant national prices (Index 
2011=1) by Feenstra et al. (2015). Following the ADF-results given in Appendix E.5 and the 
previously described rationale, the process will be logarithmically transformed and 
differenced once in to achieve a stationarity process. This gives the following formulation:  
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 = '1𝑙𝑛 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦) (7.6) 
From figure 21 below, we can observe that the productivity growth in China has risen 
significantly from the mid 1980s to 2015, especially from late 90s onwards. The productivity 
performance in China from 1990 to 2008 ranked on top of the international TFP growth 
ranking (The Economist, 2009). Interestingly the productivity growth show signs of slowing 
down from 2010 onward, a break that coincides with the turning point in the development of 
overall income inequality. Across the whole period, the covariance between the two structural 
variables is notable. At the same time, the forthcoming regression results should be interpreted 
with great caution, given the variable construction, which merely gives a proxy of the process. 
It is difficult to estimate how much of the productivity growth that can be attributed to 
technological progress and technical efficiency. However, by becoming the largest telephone 
market in the world in 2003 with the largest number of internet users and representing the 
largest supplier of IT goods by 2008, there is no doubt that China has undergone a 
transformative technological revolution in the last decades (Zheng & Zheng, 2009).  
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Figure 21: Total factor productivity at constant national prices 
 
Openness 
In accordance with Milanovic’s hypothesis, openness represents an indispensable amplifier 
for the effects of technological progress on domestic income inequality, but also a factor that 
could induce single-handed effects through weakening the position of labor and trade unions. 
In literature, the notion of openness is discussed primarily along two dimensions; trade 
liberalization and financial integration. Herein, empirical evidence gives a dubious and mixed 
picture in regard to the long-term impact on within-nation inequality. This is especially true 
for trade openness, whereas there seems to be more consensus among researchers that 
increased financial integration has a significant effect in raising domestic income dispersion.  
 
In order to test Milanovic’s predictions in accordance with his hypothesis, I will construct an 
openness indicator composed of a non-weighted average between the representative variables 
for trade liberalization and financial integration. In addition to this specification, separate 
regression models will test for these compositional factors discretely, to account for potential 
diverging effect between the two processes. Trade openness will be measured as the relative 
trade dependence, which gives the aggregate value of total imports and exports as a percentage 
of the total gross domestic product. Herein, export FOB (Freight on board prices) and import 
CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight prices) is sourced from CEIC (2019a; b) and reported by 
General Administration of Customs. Data for nominal GDP is collected from the World Bank 
(2019c) whereas all subcategory variables are measured in US dollars. 
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Financial integration or openness will be measured as total external assets and liabilities 
outstanding as a percentage of GDP. Herein, data for net foreign assets and gross domestic 
products is sourced from the World Bank (2019d; b), while the data on external debt is 
provided by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange and sourced from CEIC (2019c). 
This gives the following measures of openness, trade dependence and financial integration, 
which has been logarithmically transformed and differenced once (See Appendix E6, E7, E8): 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 = '1𝑙𝑛 (
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
2
) 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = '1𝑙𝑛 (
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐹𝑂𝐵 + 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐶𝐼𝐹
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃
) 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = '1𝑙𝑛 (
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃
) 
(7.7) 
(7.8) 
(7.9) 
As illustrated in figure 22, we can observe the considerable change in ‘openness’ as the 
Chinese economy broke into the global market following the market-oriented reforms over the 
last couple of decades. In the period between 1985 and 2015, foreign direct investment 
increased by around 182 times (World Bank, 2019e; f), while the scale of foreign trade 
increased by about 119 times in the same period (CEIC, 2019a; b). At the same time, we can 
see that the constructed openness indicator closely covaries with the Palma ratio over time, 
with a corresponding a structural break in the process around the mid- to late 00s.  
 
Figure 22: Openness indicator 
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Looking further at the two components of the openness indicator in figure 23, we see that the 
trade dependence given on the left has markedly more fluctuant over time than the process of 
financial integration. Herein, we find two periods of considerable increase in the relative 
importance of international trade and correspondingly two periods of significant decline. 
Without going into detail changes to the trade policies, it is important to note that these relative 
cycles are determined by the relative development in GDP, and that absolute value of 
aggregate imports and exports only declined for observation years 2009, 2014 and 2015. As 
for financial integration, we can observe a steady growth in both external assets and liabilities 
outstanding relative to the economic growth. At the same time, we observe a similar structural 
break in the series, which is far less distinct for financial integration than for trade dependence.   
 
Figure 23: Openness ind. Composition (Trade dependence & financial integration) 
 
 
Redistributive policies  
In order to measure the effect and efficiency of redistributive policies on the levels of disparity 
in income distributions, there is numerous dimensions that needs to be accounted including 
public spending, social transfer, taxation etc. Because of data limitations, I will employ a proxy 
that embodies these mechanisms by measuring the efficiency of redistributive policies in 
reducing inequality. This proxy variable will be constructed as the difference between the 
market Gini, measure before transfers and taxes, and the net Gini. The data employed for the 
variable construction is sourced from SWIID (Solt, 2009; 2016). The process is similarly 
found to entail a stochastic trend component and will therefore be transformed logarithmically, 
and first order differenced (See Appendix E.9), giving following variable measurement:  
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠 = '1ln (𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  
= '1ln (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖) 
(7.10) 
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From figure 24, we can clearly observe the dramatic increase in efficiency of redistributive 
policies from 1985 to 2015, with a notable break in the trend around 2002. From 1992 
onwards, there has been radical changes to the role of the Chinese government in providing 
welfare, collecting and distribution of tax revenues (Li, 2012). Since the late 90s, several 
rounds of social policy reforms have seen the introduction of unemployment insurance, 
medical insurance, workers compensation insurance, maternity benefits, communal pension 
funds, individual pension accounts and universal health care among others. Redistribution 
through taxation has also been gone changed dramatically over the last couple of decades. 
Even though the Chinese tax system has existed since 1949, individual income tax was not 
introduced until 1980 and a tax assignment system as late as 1994 (Jianxiong, 1998). A 
refinement process that has continued ever since with various other tax reforms.  
 
Without having sufficient data to estimate the specific effect of these policy changes 
discretely, we can firmly conclude that the redistributive efficiency of social policies has 
improved significantly following these initiatives. Interestingly, we can also find that the 
structural break coincides with the implementation of the previously mentioned ‘Western 
Development Strategy’, which has been suggested to have contributed to a decline in income 
dispersion between western and coastal regions from the mid-00s onwards (Li et al, 2014).  
 
Figure 24: Proxy for absolute redistribution 
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Educational attainment 
In accordance with the theoretical standpoint and empirical evidence, educational attainment 
plays a decisive role in determining the level of disparity in income distribution. Following 
Kuznets original hypothesis, we would expect educational attainment to have a parabolic 
relationship with income inequality over time. To measure the effect of changes in educational 
attainment, it would be desirable to test for cumulated mean or average years of schooling. 
Seeing that this data is unavailable for the entire period, the most appropriate open-source 
measure is given by the gross enrollment rations at various educational levels. Considering 
that China has maintained a notably high enrollment ratio in junior middle and secondary 
schools (National Bureau of Statistics, 2006; 2019), tertiary enrollment is found to be the most 
effective representation of changes to overall educational attainment. The measure will 
describe the ratio of total enrollment to the age group of the population corresponding to the 
tertiary levels of education, whereas tertiary education denotes levels of education that require 
completion of secondary level of education as a minimum. The data employed for this variable 
construction is sourced from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2019a). In line with previous 
findings from the ADF-test presented in Appendix E.10, the process will be transformed in 
accordance with the previously described procedure, giving the following formulation:   
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = '1 𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) (7.10) 
From figure 25 below, we can observe that educational attainment has increased dramatically 
since 1985, and especially from the late 90s onwards. Gross enrolment in tertiary education in 
1985 was around 2,42%, increasing to more than 45% by the end of 2015. The new upward 
trajectory around the millennium coincides with growth in educational investment following 
the educational reform from 1998; ‘Action plan for Invigorating Education for the 21st 
century’ – which saw a dramatic rise in the enrolment of new students in higher education. In 
a more holistic perspective, we find that mean years of schooling has increased from 3,97 
years in 1982 to 7,33 by 2010 (UNESCO, 2019b). Consequently, policies aimed at promoting 
education has been remarkably efficient in increasing the general educational attainment. At 
the same time, inequality in opportunities for education remain a significant problem in China, 
as institutional barriers, unequal quality of education and distribution of resources has put 
certain groups at a disadvantage (Yang et al. 2014). In line with this finding, it would 
reasonable to assume that changes to the difference in educational opportunities could induce 
an effect on income dispersion. However, despite this prevailing gap, Yang et al. (2014) found 
that the policy reforms been effective in reducing the related dispersion in such opportunities.  
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Figure 25: Gross enrollment ratio in tertiary levels of education 
  
Population aging 
Following Milanovic’s hypothesis, we would expect an aging population to increase the 
demand for social services and redistribution in developing nations, which would induce a 
negative effect on income disparity. At the same time, the empirical review has found 
population aging could have significant positive effect on inequalities in developing countries. 
To account for the impact of China’s rapidly aging population on income inequality, I will test 
for an estimated old-age dependency ratio. This variable describes the ratio of so-called old-
age dependents to the working-age population, giving the proportion of the population older 
than 64 years per 100 of the working-age population aged 15 to 64.  The data is sourced from 
the World Bank database (2019g) and based on age distribution estimates United Nations 
Population Division’s World Population Prospect. The process is further found to be 
difference stationary (See Appendix E.11) and will be transformed accordingly:  
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔 = '1ln (𝑂𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)
= '1ln (
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑 64 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟
𝑃𝑒𝑟 100 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
) 
(7.11) 
China is facing one of the most rapid aging populations in the world, whereas the population 
older than 60 is expected to double from 2010 to 2040 (UN DESA, 2013a). Furthermore, the 
elderly population in China is expected to live far longer than previous generations, with 
estimates projecting the number of people older than 80 years to quadruple from 2013 to 2050 
to over 90 million - to become the largest most-elderly population segment in the world (UN 
DESA, 2013b). These demographic trends can be seen as a result of improved life expectancy, 
low fertility rates, but also the cumulative effect of previous changes to birth and death rates.  
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In the period between 1979 and 2015 when the one-child policy has been in effect, life 
expectancy in China has improved from 67 to 75 years, following considerable improvements 
in health care (World Bank, 2019h). Simultaneously, the estimated birth rate has dropped from 
around 2.8 to about 1.7 under the strict family planning policy regime (World Bank, 2019i). 
As a consequence, the relative share of dependents is expected to skyrocket in the forthcoming 
decades. As illustrated in Figure 26 below, the old-age dependency ratio has been rising 
continually over the period under investigation, from around 8,34 in 1985 to more than 13,3 
by 2015. A relative growth in the proportion of old-age dependents that has remained relatively 
stable below 2% up until around 2010, from where we can observe an exponential growth 
rising to nearly 5% annually by 2015. Consequently, the effect of population aging needs to 
be understood in accordance with the stage of the demographic transition over the period, 
which has just recently seen the peak in the growth of the working-age population.  
Figure 26: Old-age dependency ratio 
 
Privatization 
In accordance with the empirical review, the distributional effect of privatization programs is 
ambiguous and dependent on various other structural conditions. At the same time, there is 
empirical support for hypothesizing that increased privatization can lead to increased income 
inequality if we assume that political institutions are not effectively consolidated, at least in 
the short term. In order to test the distributional effect of the considerable privatization process 
in China over the last decades, an explanatory variable will be constructed based on estimates 
of the share of private property in national wealth. The data is sourced from Piketty et al. 
(2017) and is calculated using both official and non-official estimates. The process is further 
found to have a stochastic mean trend (Appendix E.12) and will be stationarized accordingly:  
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𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = '1ln (
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
) (7.12) 
From figure 27 below, we can observe that the share of private property relative to that of 
public property has increased markedly from around 46% in 1985 to 69% by 2015. From 1985 
to 1991 the private wealth share remained relatively stable, followed by a significant growth 
up until the global financial crisis, from where the public share of wealth surprisingly 
strengthened. In breaking down the process of privatizing the national wealth, we find that the 
private share of the housing stock was at 98% in 2015 compared to around 53% in 1985, with 
a clear structural break in the early 90s. Even though Chinese equity remain predominantly 
public properties, the private share of domestic corporate equity has followed a similar growth 
trajectory from 3% to around 34% in the same period, with the structural break occurring a 
few years later. Interestingly, the trend for the share of private property in other domestic 
capital and net financial assets gives a diverging pattern with a slower and steadier growth 
over the whole period from 42% in 1985 to around 52% in 2015 (Piketty et al., 2017).  
Figure 27: Share of private property in total national wealth 
 
Financial deepening 
Following the empirical review of the research by Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) and others, we 
hypothesize that improved provision of financial services has a significant distributional effect 
on income. Despite the lack of empirical consensus in regard to impact specificity, relevant 
literature supports the notion of a distributional impact of financial deepening. In order to test 
for this effect, I will regress income inequality against the domestic financial market 
development proxied by the ratio of private credit to GDP in accordance with measurement 
specification employed by Dabla-Norris et al. (2015).  
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In this, I will measure the domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP sourced 
from the World Bank database (2019j). A measure that refers to the financial resources 
provided by financial corporations to the private sector. Following the ADF-test results 
(Appendix E.13), the process has been stationarized accordingly and will be as formulated: 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 = '1𝑙𝑛 (
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
𝐺𝐷𝑃
∗ 100) (7.13) 
From figure 28 below, we can see that the depth of financial intermediation has increased 
markedly over the period, domestic credit to the private sector rose from 66% of GDP in 1985 
to more than 152% by 2015. From the graph we can observe two distinct shocks in the mid-
90s and the late 00s. Breaks that coincide with periods of particularly strong growth in GDP, 
which naturally effects the process given the described measurement technique. Albeit some 
methodological contention, both provision, access and inclusion of financial services has 
undoubtably improved considerable over the last decades. Especially in terms of access to 
internet- and mobile-based services in most recent years (World Bank and the People’s Bank 
of China, 2018). While nearly half the population saves at financial institution, only 17% 
employ accounts for receiving wages and 10% borrow from financial institutions. Although 
China still lags major advanced economies in several dimensions of financial inclusion, the 
last 15 years has seen the introduction of a myriad of policy reforms to narrow the inclusion 
gap. Comprehensive efforts that has bolstered financial inclusion significantly, demonstrated 
by the objective of the China Banking Regulatory Commission to ensure coverage of basic 
financial services in all villages by 2019 (Jain-Chandra et al., 2018).   
Figure 28: Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
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7.2 Preliminary regression specifications 
From the variable- identification and constructions presented above, I have established the 
preliminary regression model specifications based on relevant economic theory and existing 
empirical work, which is summarized in table 3. These specifications will function as the base 
models for the regression analysis, before the necessary adjustments identified by diagnostics.  
Table 3: Preliminary regression model specification 
Compiled 
openness 
indicator  
'1ln(𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑎)𝑡 = β0 + β1'1ln (𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐)𝑡  + β2'1ln(𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐)2𝑡 + β3'1ln(𝑠𝑒𝑐)𝑡
+ β4'1 ln(𝑠𝑒𝑐)2𝑡 +β5'1ln (𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡)𝑡+β6'1ln(𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡)2𝑡 + β7'1𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑡
+ β8'1𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑡2 + β9'1ln (𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ)𝑡 + β10'1ln (𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛)𝑡 + β11'1ln (𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡)𝑡
+ β12'1ln (𝑒𝑑𝑢)𝑡 + β13'1 ln(𝑒𝑑𝑢)𝑡2 + β14'1ln (𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡
+ β15'1 ln(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡)𝑡 + β16'1ln (𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 
Decomposed 
openness 
indicator 
'1ln(𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑎)𝑡 = β0 + β1'1ln (𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐)𝑡  + β2'1ln(𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐)2𝑡 + β3'1ln(𝑠𝑒𝑐)𝑡
+ β4'1 ln(𝑠𝑒𝑐)2𝑡 +β5'1ln (𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡)𝑡+β6'1ln(𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡)2𝑡 + β7'1𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑡
+ β8'1𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑡2 + β9'1ln (𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ)𝑡+β10'1ln (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒)𝑡 + β11'1ln (𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡)𝑡
+ β12'1ln (𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡)𝑡 + β13'1ln (𝑒𝑑𝑢)𝑡 + β14'1 ln(𝑒𝑑𝑢)𝑡2
+ β15'1ln (𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡 + β16'1 ln(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡)𝑡 + β17'1ln (𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 
In accordance with this regression model specification, we are facing two opposing objectives. 
Firstly, the model should be realistic and complete as possible, therefore we want to include 
all relevant regressors. On the other hand, a larger set of regressors we increase the complexity 
of the model. Additionally, by including statistically irrelevant regressors, we reduce the 
precision of the coefficient estimates and predicted values. Accordingly, the large set of 
regressors presented in the preliminary specification could challenge the balance between 
simplicity and fit, also known as parsimony.  
In order to address these problems, I will additionally construct two stepwise regression 
models based on variable selection strategies to select subsets of significant regressors for the 
final models. Herein, there is several selection procedures which can be employed, including 
forward selection (step-up), backward selection (step-down) and stepwise selection which is 
a combination of the two techniques. The former method starts with no candidates and selects 
the variable with the highest coefficient of determination (𝑅2) at each step until it no longer 
increases the significance (NCSS, 2007). Given the dataset employed for the empirical 
analysis for this dissertation and the theoretically prediction of conditional causality for some 
of the variables, this forwards selection (step-up) strategy will be the preferred mode employed 
for the relevant stepwise regression procedure.  
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7.3 Limitations of variable measurement techniques  
In this section, I will account for the relevant weaknesses in the measurement techniques 
applied in the variable construction described above. By doing so, I hope to account for some 
of the ambiguity related to the ability and precision in capturing the actual development of the 
process it is intended to measure. Potential limitations and weaknesses of the empirical 
analysis and the methodological approach will be discussed further in section 8.4.2.  
 
Palma ratio 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the principal methodological limitation of the Palma ratio as a 
measure of income inequality is the omittance of distributional changes to middle-income 
earners. More specifically, between the 10th and the 60th percentile of the income distribution. 
Contrary to the proposed oversensitivity of the Gini coefficient to changes for middle-income 
earners, the Palma ration does not account for changes to this segment of the distribution. In 
accordance with this limitation, the empirical analysis will only account for determinants of 
distributional changes to the 40% lowest and the 10% highest income earners over the period.  
 
Technological progress 
The measurement methodology applied to quantify technological development in China is a 
conventional approach, but still a very ambiguous indicator of technological progress both 
conceptually and empirically. According to the OECD manual on productivity measurement 
(2001), technological change does not necessarily translate into growth in total factor 
productivity. Additionally, TFP growth is not necessarily derive from technological change. 
The first principal measurement error can be explained by the distinction between embodied 
and disembodied technological changes, and the related difference in diffusion. While the 
former of which is dependent on markets transaction, this is not necessarily the case for the 
latter. The second weakness derives from the presence of various non-technology factors in 
the TFP residual, including adjustment costs, changes in efficiency and economies of scale.   
 
Educational attainment 
The primary weakness of employing tertiary education enrolment ratio as a measure for 
educational attainment is that the indicator does not directly reflect increased educational 
attainment for primary and secondary levels of education. Furthermore, the enrolment ratio 
that is applied in the model is based on annual school surveys that does not necessarily reflect 
the actual attendance of any given year, given that dropout rates are not accounted for.  
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Population aging 
The old-age dependency ratio that is applied to quantify the process of population aging in 
China is based on the World Banks estimations of five-year period data and cohort units of 
five-year age groups from United Nations Populations Division’s World Population Prospect. 
In accordance with this original data structure, annual observations are produced through 
interpolations that may not correspond to the actual age compositions of a given year.  
 
Financial deepening 
Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP has been commonly applied as 
an indicator of the depth of financial intermediation in China for different empirical purposes 
(e.g. Liang, 2005; Lu and Yao, 2004; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). A methodological argument 
for this approach would be that total credit as a percentage of GDP would overestimate the 
financial depth because of policy-directed lending and non-performing loans in the Chinese 
banking sector. On the other hand, by limiting the provision of credit to the private sector, 
there is a risk of underestimating the depth of financial intermediation. The principal reason 
for this is that other ownership structures besides state-owned enterprises is excluded from the 
measure. This includes join-venture enterprises (JVEs) which has been a common requirement 
for foreign companies to establish in China, but also township and village enterprises (TVEs) 
which accounted for nearly a third of the Chinese economy in 2007 (Zhang et al., 2007).  
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8. Empirical analysis  
In this section, I will present the regression results from the empirical analysis on structural 
determinants of the development in income inequality in China between 1985 and 2015. The 
chapter consist of four subsections. This includes an elaboration of the regression procedure 
and rationale, relevant diagnostics and transformations of the preliminary modelling and the 
presentation of the final regression results for all model specifications. Lastly, I will 
summarize and discuss the results from the analysis in light of theoretical predictions, but also 
shed more light on some of the key limitations of the analysis and methodological approach.  
8.1 Modelling procedure and rationale 
In accordance with the preliminary regression modelling specification given in the previous 
chapter, I will test 4 regression models based on two different variable selection strategies and 
two distinct model specifications. This will include two models based on the all-possible 
regression approach and two stepwise procedures, specifically two forward (step-up) selection 
processes. A distinction is further made between two model specifications, whereas the first 
will include a compiled openness indicator in accordance with Milanovic’s conceptual 
framework. The second specification will test for changes to trade dependence and financial 
integration discretely, to control for diverging effects between the two openness indicators.   
 
The reasoning behind the segregated variable selection approach is two-fold, whereas the first 
facet relates to parsimony, the variable selection problem and overfitting. A complication that 
is underlined by the conceptual complexity in determining drivers of change to national 
income inequality at an aggregate level and the small sample size. Especially considering the 
broad-based variable selection approach adopted for this thesis, which is based on a 
comprehensive theoretical and empirical review with a great variety of research sources. 
Secondly, as highlighted in the theoretical review, some of the dynamics represented by the 
predictor variables could potentially be interrelated - in that the effect of some of the variables 
on inequality could be seen conditional or dependent on another variable. Such causal 
heterogeneity deriving from ambiguous causal constellations cannot be easily accounted for 
in meaningful way. However, by a structured process of elimination, I will attempt to mitigate 
some of the ambiguity related to the interpretation of the results, following the potential 
conditional relationships or multiple causal pathways. A process that is likely to have 
implications for the final results, an issue that will be discussed further in chapter 8.4.  
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8.2 Diagnostics and necessary transformations 
1st Assumption – Linear in parameters 
To check for the central mathematical assumption of linearity in parameters, the effect of the 
predictor variable on the response variable should first be assessed theoretically to account for 
the predicted nature of the relationship, but also be controlled technically for non-linearity. 
The theoretical assessment follows the predicted effect of the theoretical and empirical review, 
from which we have established that economic growth, urbanization, educational attainment 
and transfer of labor from one sector to another are suggested to have a parabolic relationship 
with income inequality and will be tested accordingly. Theory also suggest that the 
relationship between financial deepening and income inequality might be curvilinear, but 
relevant empirical findings suggest that this premise was ambiguous and inconclusive at best.  
 
To detect potential non-linearities technically, I have performed a graphical diagnostic through 
an augmented component residual plot with a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (lowess 
curve) given in Appendix F. As we can observe from the from the deviations of the lowess 
curve to the regression lines in the ACPR-plots, there is technical support for the theoretically 
predicted parabolic relationship with economic growth, industrialization, servicization and 
educational attainment. For the process of urbanization, we can only observe minor 
discrepancies between the lowess curve and the regression line for a linear functional form. 
However, given the theoretical notion, we cannot assume a linear relationship between 
urbanization and income inequality over time, and a squared term will therefore be included. 
We can further observe that the augmented partial residual plots for technological progress, 
redistributive policies and privatization is approximating linearity in parameters, which 
satisfies the necessary assumption. For the compiled openness indicator, trade dependence, 
financial integration, population aging and financial deepening there is clear indications of 
nonlinearity. To confirm the validity of these observations, we can further look at the 
standardized residual plot against each of the relevant predictor variables given in Appendix 
G. This alternative technique supports the findings from the initial ACPR-plot, indicating that 
the non-linear relationship for the above-mentioned variables. Even though there is a risk of 
magnification of errors following the small sample size, the theoretical and empirical 
ambiguity related to the predicted relationship leads me to address these findings accordingly.   
In order to attend to the issue of nonlinearity, I will include a squared term for each of the 
relevant predictors, which accounts for potential quadratic relationships with the regressand.  
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2nd Assumption – No perfect collinearity 
In order to control for multicollinearity among the regressors and satisfy the 2nd assumption 
of no perfect collinearity, I have analyzed the correlation between the explanatory variables 
through a correlation matrix and a variance inflation factor (VIF) test. As given from the 
correlation matrix in Appendix H, the necessary assumption of no perfect collinearity is 
satisfied as every correlation coefficient gives a value lower than 1 or higher than -1. However, 
even though the minimum assumption is satisfied, high degree of multicollinearity reduces the 
efficiency of the models. This could lead to inflated coefficient of determination, elevated 
standard errors and unreliable coefficient estimates as the effect of the correlated variables 
becomes difficult to distinguish. Following the rule of thumb by Hinkle et al. (2003), 
coefficients with values exceeding 0.7 or -0.7 is regarded as high correlation, while 
Mehmetoglu and Jacobsen (2016) suggests that correlations above 0.8 could be problematic.   
 
Based on this premise, we find that the structural collinearity between some of the variables 
that are predicted to have a parabolic relationship and the related squared terms is high. This 
elevated correlation is an expected and accepted byproduct, as the specification leads to a 
better prediction model in accordance with the assumption of linearity. By differencing the 
variables, we have also reduced this structural multicollinearity markedly. However, even 
though the quadratic dependency does not necessarily pose a serious concern for the models, 
it reduces the precision of estimating the separate effects of the variables and polynomials. We 
can further observe that the dataset does not entail a high degree of data multicollinearity, but 
several variables are moderately correlated in accordance with theoretical predictions. This 
can be shown by the correlation between GDP per capita and the share of employment in 
secondary and tertiary industries, at 0.49 and 0.55 respectively. Even though this correlation 
does not exceed the above-mentioned thresholds, this could potentially affect the efficiency of 
the models, which favors the mitigative stepwise regression procedure for model 3 and 4. To 
support these evaluations, we turn to the variance inflated factors tests given in Appendix I. 
The tolerance level for the VIF-test has been subject to debate, but the conventional rule of 
thumb suggests that VIF>10 could be problematic (Hair et al., 1995). The results from these 
tests confirm the quadratic dependencies identified in the correlation matrix and underlines 
the potential consequences of inflated standard errors for model 1 and 2, with a mean VIF of 
155 and 198. Even though the overall fit of the regression is not likely to be affected, the 
confidence intervals of the coefficients will be wide and the t-statistics for the all-possible 
regression models could be deflated, which again could make it difficult to reject the null.  
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3rd Assumption – Zero conditional mean 
As described in Chapter 6, the assumption of zero conditional mean is satisfied if the 
regressors included in the model are strictly exogenous and uncorrelated with the error term 
for each period. In other words, that the error term has an expected value of zero for any 
combination of the independent variables. There are several ways in which this assumption 
can be violated, including misspecification of the functional form by either not including a 
predictor variable in the correct way or by including the regressors incorrectly. To test for 
potential functional form misspecifications, I have performed a Ramsey’s regression 
specification error test (RESET). The assumption would also fail if an important factor that is 
correlating with both the dependent and one or more of the explanatory variables is omitted 
from the model. This type of potential omitted variable bias will be addressed qualitatively. 
Functional form misspecification 
In accordance with the test result from the RESET test given in Table 4 below, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis for each of the models saying that the models are correctly specified. This 
indicates that the functional form is correctly specified.   
Table 4: RESET-test for non-linearity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
F 
Prob > F 
(3, 7) = 0.13 
0.9367 
(3, 5) = 0.02 
0.9942 
(3, 23) = 0.77 
0.5225 
(3, 23) = 0.43 
0.7330 
Note: Significance at the *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01 level. 
Omitted variable bias 
In consideration of the complex and holistic nature in the phenomena of income inequality, it 
is likely that there are relevant factors which are not included in the final regression models. 
However, to induce an omitted variable bias, the factor must be both a determinant of the 
dependent variable and correlated with one of the included predictor variables. In this, it is 
appropriate to address the potential effect of changes to skill premium and spatial disparity, 
which is factors that has been included in similar research previously. These factors have 
purposely been excluded, as they arguably reflect facets of inequality and represent exogenous 
transmission channels for the effect structural determinants such as for example education 
attainment, which violates the assumption of zero conditional mean. Beyond these factors, I 
argue the that comprehensive theoretical- and empirical review conducted for this thesis 
adequately accounts for theoretical predictions and empirical evidence related to the relevant 
research question, which has sufficiently mitigated the risk of potential omitted variables bias.  
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4th Assumption – Homoskedasticity  
 In order to control for heterogeneity of variance in the residuals, I have performed a 
conventional Breusch-Pagan test in addition to a graphical analysis to supplement the test 
diagnostics. The results from the Breusch-Pagan test is presented in Table 5 below.  
Table 5: Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
chi2(1) 
Prob > chi2 
0.01 
0.9346 
0.01 
0.9193 
0.31 
0.5754 
0.68 
0.4096 
Note: Significance at the *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01 level. 
From the test results given in Table 5, we accept the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity for 
all of the given regression models presented above, and thereby conclude that the assumption 
of homogenous variance of the residuals is satisfied. To support this conclusion, a graphical 
plot of the residuals versus fitted (predicted) value for each model is presented in Appendix J. 
In accordance with the statistical non-graphical test results, we cannot observe any clear 
pattern to the rvf-plot for either of the models that would indicate heteroscedastic residuals. 
Based on these findings, we conclude that the assumption of homoscedasticity is satisfied.  
5th Assumption – No autocorrelation 
The diagnostics procedure employed for detecting potential presence of autocorrelation 
consist of the conventional Durbin-Watson test in addition to supplementary graphical 
diagnostics conducted by analyzing the relevant correlograms of the lagged residuals. The 
Durbin-Watson test results for first-order positive (d) and negative (4-d) for each model are 
presented in Table 6 below, whereas the upper and lower critical values (𝑑𝐿 and 𝑑𝑈) from 
Savin and White (1977) are listed in the lower bracket following a 5% significance level.   
Table 6: Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Durbin-Watson  
d-statistic  
(20, 30) 
= 2.228575 
(22, 30) 
= 2.912568 
(4, 30) 
= 2.325405 
(4, 30) 
= 2.351361 
4-d = 1.771425 = 1.087432 = 1.674595 = 1.648639 
𝑑𝐿 0.195 0.156 1.214 1.214 
𝑑𝑈 3.368 3.564 1.650 1.650 
Note: 5% significance points of dL and dU 
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In accordance with the results from Table 6, we find that 𝑑𝐿 < 𝑑 < 𝑑𝑈 and 𝑑𝐿 < (4 − 𝑑)  < 𝑑𝑈 
for model 1 and 2. This means that both tests remain inconclusive, and the presence of either 
positive and negative first-order autocorrelation cannot be determined. For model 3 and 4 on 
the other hand, 𝑑 is higher than the upper critical value, which means that we reject the 
alternative hypothesis and conclude that errors are not positively first order autocorrelated. For 
model 3, we can further find that (4 − 𝑑) > 𝑑𝑈, which means that there is not statistical 
evidence for negatively autocorrelated error terms in the model. Whereas for model 4, we are 
unable to determine whether there is a presence of negative autocorrelation because the test 
statics for (4 − 𝑑) lies within the zone of indecision between 𝑑𝑈 and 𝑑𝐿.  
Looking further at the estimated correlogram for the residuals in Appendix K, we can observe 
that there is no distinct pattern in the plot for either of the final models. Still, we find a 
statistically significant evidence against pure randomness for lag one of model 2 residuals, as 
the estimated correlation lies beyond Bartlett’s formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands. In 
this, the probability of obtaining a single significant observation increases with the number of 
coefficients plotted, especially with a small sample size and a higher risk of sampling errors. 
However, even though this is an individually significant observation that is barely beyond the 
confidence band with no noticeable pattern, it is still suggestive of negative autocorrelation 
that cannot be rejected by the formal Durbin-Watson test. Consequently, the test for first-order 
negative autocorrelation in model 2 remains inconclusive. Thus, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the efficiency of model 2 is reduced by inflated variance of the residuals and 
estimated coefficients, which again potentially could lead to inflated F- and t-statistics values. 
For remaining models on the other hand, we find no statistically significant evidences for 
negative autocorrelation in the correlogram. Supplemented by the results from the formal 
Durbin-Watson test, we can firmly conclude that the residuals for model 3 and 4 are not 
autocorrelated and we find no statistical evidence for first-order autocorrelation in model 1.  
6th Assumption – Normality  
To test for normality in each regression model, I have performed a Skewness/Kurtosis test in 
addition to a supplementary graphical test by investigating a histogram plot of the residuals. 
The former consists of a skewness measure of asymmetry in the probability distribution, and 
a kurtosis measure that indicates the height and sharpness of distribution peak relative to a 
standard bell curve. The results of the statistical normality test is given in Table 7 below, 
whereas Pr(Skewness) and Pr(Kurtosis) gives the probability of skewness and kurtosis. 
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Table 7: Skewness/Kurtosis test for normality 
 --------------joint -------------- 
Variable Obs Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
resid_mod1 30 0.9984       0.6460 0.21          0.8999 
resid_mod2 30 0.9153        0.9377 0.02          0.9913 
resid_mod3 30 0.5015         0.6789  0.65          0.7221 
resid_mod4 30 0.4177       0.8501 0.73       0.6953 
Note: Significance at the *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01 level. 
From the results presented in Table 7 above, the null hypothesis stating that the residuals 
follow a normal distribution cannot be rejected and consequently the assumption is satisfied. 
To support this conclusion, a histogram plot of the predicted residuals for each model is given 
in Appendix L. From the graphical analysis, we can observe that residuals for model 1 and 2 
are approximating a bell-shape distribution, despite of a moderately sharp and narrow peak for 
model 1, and a marginal skewness in model 2.  For model 3 and 4, we find more asymmetry 
in the distribution, which is an expected observation given the selection procedure and the 
number of predictors included in these models. However, despite the lack of a distinct peak in 
the histogram for model 2 and the noticeable skewness in distribution for model 3, these 
asymmetries are subjective and not statistically significant. It is also important to note that the 
assumption is satisfied as long as the residuals are approximating a normal distribution and 
the probability of underestimating and overestimating a given value is approximately equal. 
Based on this premise and the relevant findings described above, there is not enough statistical 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis and I therefore conclude that the assumption is satisfied.  
8.3 Regression estimation results 
In table 8 below, the regression results for the four above-mentioned models are presented. 
Model 1 and 2 follows an all-possible regression, whereas model 1 includes a compiled 
openness indicator and model 2 segregates the effect of trade openness and financial 
integration. Model 3 and 4 follow a stepwise (step-up) regression, with the corresponding 
modelling specifications as those given for model 1 and 3. Following the table of the results, 
the estimated beta coefficients of each explanatory variable is given with standard errors listed 
in parentheses. The F-test results and adjusted coefficient of determination for each model is 
given in the bracket below. Statistical significance from the tests is indicated by number of 
stars (*) in accordance with standard levels of significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10.  
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Table 8: Regression estimation results 
 Dependent variable: Palma ratio 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Economic growth 
    '1ln (𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐)𝑡 
1.000 
(1.787) 
1.200 
(1.395) - - 
Economic growth^2 
   '1ln(𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑐)2𝑡 
-2.342 
(5.232) 
-3.763 
(4.155) - - 
Industrialization 
    '1ln(𝑠𝑒𝑐)𝑡 
-1.884* 
(0.963) 
-1.965** 
(0.826) - - 
Industrialization^2 
    '1 ln(𝑠𝑒𝑐)2 
16.101 
(18.415) 
11.990 
(16.637) 
- - 
Servicization 
    '1ln (𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡)𝑡 
0.771 
(3.107) 
-0.473 
(2.966) 
- - 
Servicization^2 
    '1ln(𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡)2𝑡 
-13.324 
(41.789) 
0.620 
(41.811) 
- - 
Urbanization 
    '1𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑡 
0.885 
(1.056) 
1.447 
(1.041) - - 
Urbanization^2 
    '1𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑡2 
-0.421 
(0.493) 
-0.688 
(0.489) - - 
Technological progress 
    '1ln (𝑡𝑓𝑝)𝑡 
0.978 
(0.841) 
1.365 
(0.863) - - 
Openness 
    '1ln (𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛)𝑡 
0.371 
(0.232) 
- 0.245** 
(0.103) 
- 
Openness^2 
    '1ln (𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛)2𝑡 
-2.227 
(1.380) 
- -1.292 
(0.761) 
- 
Trade openness 
    '1ln (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒)𝑡 
- 0.360** (0.128) - 
0.209*** 
(0.061) 
Trade openness^2 
    '1ln (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒)2𝑡 
- 
-1.705 
(1.203) - 
0.377 
(0.437) 
Financial integration 
    '1ln (𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡)𝑡 
- 
0.010 
(0.143) - - 
Financial integration^2 
    '1ln (𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡)2𝑡 
- 
-0.293 
(0.403) - - 
Absolute redistribution 
    '1ln (𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡)𝑡 
-0.013 
(0.110) 
0.049 
(0.105) 
-0.132*** 
(0.043) 
-0.131*** 
(0.039) 
Educational attainment 
    '1ln (𝑒𝑑𝑢)𝑡 
0.278 
(0.437) 
-0.075 
(0.423) - - 
Educational attainment^2 
    '1 ln(𝑒𝑑𝑢)𝑡2 
-1.365 
(1.771) 
0.113 
(1.481) - - 
Population aging 
    '1ln (𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑡 
-6.522 
(8.348) 
-6.472 
(8.602) - - 
Population aging^2 
    '1ln (𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔)2𝑡 
120.759 
(156.782) 
116.154 
(146.726) 
- - 
Privatization 
    '1 ln(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡)𝑡 
-0.188 
(0.793) 
-0.124 
(0.759) 
- - 
Financial deepening 
    '1ln (𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑡 
0.086 
(0.265) 
-0.148 
(0.292) 
- - 
Financial deepening^2 
    '1ln (𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑝)2𝑡 
2.691 
(2.501) 
7.309** 
(2.815) - - 
#. of Observations 30 30 30 30 
Prob>F 0.2499 0.0987* 0.0018*** 0.0001*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2561 0.5089 0.3680 0.4823 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, significance at *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01.  
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8.3.1 Model 1 – All-possible regression compiled openness indicator 
In accordance with the results presented in Table 8 above, we find that the F-statistic is smaller 
than the critical F value for all common levels of significance as the probability value (p-value) 
is larger than all common levels of 𝛼. This means that we fail to reject the joint null hypothesis 
that all model parameters are equal to zero (𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = ⋯ = 𝛽19 = 0), even if one of the 
explanatory variables is individually significant and has a partial effect on the dependent 
variable. In other words, the fit of regression model 1 and consequently the regression results 
are found to be insignificant, and this suggests that the overall model has no statistically 
significant explanatory power in describing the variation in income inequality. Following the 
non-rejection of the null hypothesis, it is worth emphasizing that an F-test is relatively 
sensitive to non-normality, and this could have an effect on the test result (Box, 1953). Even 
though we did not find any significant kurtosis or skewness in the residuals, the distribution 
of the errors terms for model 1 is comparatively heavy tailed. This could potentially lead to 
deflated P-values and a higher probability of a type 111 error in the interpretation of the results. 
8.3.2 Model 2 – All-possible regression decomposed openness indicator 
Correspondingly to the presentation of the test results for regression model 1 presented above, 
we start by addressing the relevant F-test for model 2 to test the global significance of the 
model and how it compares to an intercept-only model without any predictor variables. For 
this test, we find that the p-value for model 2 is jointly significant at a 10% significance level 
(𝛼 = 0.10), as 𝑝 < 0.10, which means that we mistakenly reject 𝐻0 10% of the time. In this, 
the guiding level of significance should be determined based on important factors including 
the sample size and the expected loss from both type 1 and type 212 errors (Leamer, 1978; 
Skipper at al., 1967). Given the small sample size (N=30) and the notion that level of 
significance should be a decreasing function of the sample size, there is compelling arguments 
for opting for lower level of confidence than the conventional 95% (𝛼 = 0.05). However, 
given the purpose and limitations of this analysis, the consequences of a type 2 error would be 
regarded as far less consequential than that of a type 1 error. Based on this evaluation, I have 
opted for a conventional level of significance at 5%. This consequently leads to a non-rejection 
of the null hypothesis for the F-test of the second all-possible regression model as well. 
Accordingly, we are unable to find sufficient statistical evidence to suggest that the 
explanatory variables in model 2 has a joint significant influence on the endogenous variable.  
 
11 Type 1 error gives the rejection of a true null hypothesis 
12 Type 2 error gives the non-rejection of a false null hypothesis 
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8.3.3 Model 3 – Stepwise regression compiled openness indicator 
In accordance with the variable selection procedure described in chapter 7.2, the final 
regression modelling for model 3 is determined by a process of regressing predictors discretely 
with their related polynomials, and then nominating them by the coefficient of determination 
(𝑅2). The selection process is concluded when none of the remaining variables are significant. 
Following this screening, the first candidate variable to be included in the model is absolute 
redistribution, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.2788. Thereafter, the compiled openness 
indicator is included with an increase in the adjusted coefficient of multiple determination to 
0.3680. The screening is then finalized, as none of the outstanding predictors are found to be 
significant. Resultantly, the adjusted coefficient of determination suggests that model 3 can 
account for 36,8% of the total variation in the income inequality measure by the Palma ratio 
in China over the relevant period from 1985 to 2015. From this model specification and 
regression, we find that the F-test for model 3 gives a globally significant model at all common 
levels of significance (1%, 5% and 10%). This means that we reject 𝐻0, accept the alternative 
hypothesis and conclude that model 3 fits the data better than an intercept-only model.  
 
Based on these results, we turn to the relevant test on individual regression coefficients (t-test) 
to check for the individual significance of the predictor variables. From this t-test we find that 
absolute redistribution has a significant effect on the Palma ratio at all common levels of 
significance. As model 3 is specified as a log-log model in conjunction with first differencing, 
the coefficient estimate of the regressors represents the percentage change in the Palma ration 
from one year to another. Accordingly, we find that a 1% increase in the difference between 
the market and net Gini reduces income inequality by a Palma ratio by 0,132 percentage points. 
This is a highly interesting finding, which indicates that social policy through taxation and 
transfers has had a significant negative impact on the level of income dispersion in China in 
the post-reform era. Secondly, we find that compiled openness indicator is significant at a 95% 
confidence levels. Given the previously described significance level setting, we find 
statistically significant evidence suggesting that the process of globalization in terms of trade 
and financial integration accounts for parts of the upward portion of the rise in income 
inequality. More specifically, the effect of a 1% increase in the non-weighted average between 
trade dependence and total external assets and liabilities outstanding as a share of GDP is 
suggested to give a 0.245% increase in the Palma ratio. At the same time, we do not find any 
statistical evidence to suggest that the relationship between income inequality and openness 
in terms of trade and financial integration follows a parabolic relationship in the period. 
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8.3.4 Model 4 – Stepwise regression decomposed openness indicator 
The variable selection procedure for model 4 follows the same nomination strategy as 
described for model 3. Following this screening process, we find that trade dependence and 
the related polynomial with an adjusted coefficient of determination of 0.287 is the first 
candidate variable to be included. Subsequently, absolute distribution is added to the model 
with an increase in the adjusted 𝑅2 to 0.4823. This is the final candidate variable to be included 
in the model, as none of the remaining variables are found to be statistically significant. In 
accordance with these findings, we find that trade dependence and absolute redistribution is 
suggested to account for 48,2% of the variation in the estimated Palma ratio for the period that 
is being analyzed. This observation further indicates that model 4 explains the variability of 
the response data around its mean better than model 3, which again suggest that trade 
dependence separately accounts for more of the variation in the income dispersion than the 
compiled openness indicator. A finding that gives a preference for a model specification with 
a decomposed indicator for openness. The related F-test for model 4 further tell us that trade 
dependence and absolute redistribution are jointly significant in explaining the variation in 
income dispersion at all common levels of significance as the p-value of F (0.0001) < 1%. 
Even though the p-value of model 4 provides stronger evidence for a rejection of 𝐻0 than that 
of model 3, application of this parameter is limited to binary decision-making of significance. 
Withal, the regression results and related diagnostics indicates an improved goodness of fit.  
 
From the individual hypothesis tests given by the relevant t-tests, we find that absolute 
redistribution has had statistically significant effect on the disparity between the top 10% and 
bottom 40% income earners in China in the period at all common confidence levels (90%, 
95% and 99%). Comparatively to the individual regression coefficient test in model 3, the t-
test indicate that 1% increase in the difference between the Gini coefficient before and after 
taxation and transfer reduces the Palma ratio by 0,131 percentage points. The t-test for the 
predictor variable of trade dependence is correspondingly found to have a significant effect at 
all conventional levels of significance as estimated p-value < 𝛼 = 0.01. Accordingly, we reject 
the null hypothesis and conclude that openness to trade has a significant linear relationship 
with the Palma ratio from 1985 to 2015. In this, the regression results suggest that a 1% 
increase in the share of total imports and exports over GDP increases income dispersion 
between p0p10 and p60p100 by 0,209 percentage points. At the same time, we do not find any 
statistical evidence to suggest that the relationship between the Palma ratio and trade 
dependence has been of a parabolic nature in the relevant period.  
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8.4 Discussion and interpretation 
In the following section, I will summarize and discuss the key findings from the empirical 
analysis. A discussion that will include interpretations in relation to the theoretical predictions 
and material observations from the descriptive analysis given in Chapter 3 and 7. Lastly, I will 
account for potential limitations and weaknesses in the methodological approach and dataset.  
 
In accordance with the empirical analysis and regression results presented in the previous 
section, we fail to find any statistical evidence to suggest that model 1 and 2 has any significant 
explanatory power in describing the variation of the Palma ratio. A finding that consequently 
leads us to disregard the relevant estimation results of the model specifications. For model 3 
and 4 on the other hand, we established a global significance which leads us to reject the null 
hypothesis and validate an interpretation of the individual regression coefficient estimates. At 
the same time, we give preference to the specification of model 4, as it is found to provide a 
greater fit to the observations than model 3. This again suggest that the predictor variables for 
trade dependence and financial integration should be analyzed discretely, and not conjointly.  
 
From the relevant individual hypothesis tests, we have found statistical evidence to suggest 
that redistributive policies and openness to trade has had a significant impact on the 
development of income inequality in China from 1985 to 2015. This is a noteworthy finding 
considering the political intention of the Communist Party expressed by Deng Xiaoping in his 
famous dictum at the offset of the economic reforms. The consequences of the market-oriented 
reforms and process of ‘opening up’ the economy to the global market certainly led to some 
people getting rich first, as the Palma ratio increased by around 2,4 times from 1978 up until 
2010. Coincidingly, the relative dependence of foreign trade increase by around 4 times, which 
suggest that the process of trade liberalization should account for around 1/3 of the rise in 
income disparity between the tails of the distribution according to the regression estimations. 
At the same time, the political pledge of gradually achieving common prosperity seem to have 
started to come into fruition, as the Palma ratio dropped by around 7,4% from 2010 to 2015. 
This recent decline needs to be seen as a function of the substantial decline in trade dependence 
and the marked efficiency improvement in redistributive policies - if we assume the regression 
estimation results to hold true. Nevertheless, we find evidence to suggest that the political 
agenda in pursuing a “harmonious society” through a wide-range of social welfare transfers, 
targeted taxation and other social policies, as described in Chapter 3 and 7, has had a 
significant impact in reducing the level of disparity between top and bottom income earners.  
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The Kuznets curve hypothesis 
In light of the theoretical prediction from the renowned Kuznets curve hypothesis, we would 
except income inequality in post-reform China to follow an inverted U-curve relationship with 
economic growth. As illustrated in Chapter 3, we identified a corresponding pattern in the 
development of income dispersion to that of Simon Kuznets observations in Germany, United 
Kingdom and United States in the first half of the 20th century. Herein, the level of within-
nation income inequality increased in the early phases of economic development, before the 
degree of income disparity leveled off and started to decline as the economic growth 
proceeded. Albeit these broad symmetries, we do not find any statistical evidence to suggest 
that economic growth has had any significant effect on the change in income disparity between 
the top 10% and bottom 40% income earners in China from 1985 to 2015. Despite the lack of 
any statistical support for the relationship proposed by Simon Kuznets, this does not 
conclusively refute his hypothesis, as the premise describes a tendency rather than a condition. 
 
Looking further at the key mechanisms from the proposed dynamics of Kuznets theorem, we 
would expect the nation-wide process of industrialization, servicization and urbanization to 
interdependently give rise to income inequality as sectorial and geographic migration 
progressively increases. Followingly, the theoretical prediction suggests that once the high-
productivity sectors become dominant and the urban areas arise as the center of economic 
activity the national income dispersion will start to decline. This as a consequence of 
democratization, greater demand for social transfers and reduced educational premium 
following educational attainment to the masses. As given by the data description in Chapter 7, 
these dynamics correspond to the development observed in China between 1985 and 2015. 
Around the change of the decade from 00s to 10s, we find that tertiary industries overtook 
primary industries as the dominant sector in terms of employment, and the process of 
urbanization in China reached a juncture as the share of urban population surpassed 50%. 
These circumstances coincide with a marked increase in tertiary educational attainment and 
an elevated difference between the market and net Gini coefficients, but most importantly with 
a turning point in the degree of disparity in income distribution as the Palma began to decrease. 
Regardless of the noteworthy consonance between these observations and the theoretically 
predicted dynamics, we are still not able to find any statistical evidence to support Kuznets 
hypothesis beyond the effect of social transfers in the period. Consequently, we are unable to 
accept Kuznets hypothesis for the determinants of variation in inequality in post-reform China.  
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Milanovic’s hypothesis of Kuznets waves 
According to Milanovic’s hypothesis of Kuznets waves, we would expect the level of national 
income inequality to fluctuate in long-term cyclical motions that is being driven by an 
interplay between economic, social and political factors. Given that the thesis studies the 
development of inequality over a limited period of 30 years, we cannot make any assessment 
as to the validity of this proposed motion in the case of China. The facets to this hypothesis 
that is of interested to the research purpose of this thesis is the suggested drivers of this cyclical 
development in inequality, specifically related to modern societies with rising mean income.  
Herein, we would expect the upward portion of a cycle to be driven by technological 
revolutions and structural transitions under the condition of globalization, whereas policy 
would be considered exogenous to openness and economic preconditions. These so-called 
‘TOP elements’ are denoted as mutually dependent and cannot be disentangled in any 
meaningful way, as the removal of an element is suggested to discourage the greater portion 
of the effect. This condition complicates the interpretation of the results given the 
methodological approach of the analysis. If we assume that this premise holds true, this would 
imply that the explanatory power of our model in explaining these causal mechanisms is 
curtailed, as we are unable to account for the majority of these effects.  
 
Given the limitations of the methodological approach, we can address the fundamental logic 
of these elements and interpret the results in light of this condition. Herein, we have previously 
established that technological revolutions are denoted as a trigger for structural 
transformations such as the process of industrialization and servicization. The effect of the 
technological progress on inequality would derive from technological rents on the capital 
income side, which our model is unable to account for. On the labor side, we would expect an 
increased skill premium from the mass sectorial migration, which we do not find any statistical 
evidence to support. By testing for a direct effect of technological progress through growth in 
total factor productivity, we are still not able to identify any significant effect of technological 
change on income inequality in the period. On the other hand, the empirical analysis finds 
evidence to support the premise of increased inequality under the condition of globalization, 
which would imply that political factors and economic preconditions has been a significant 
factor. Accordingly, we are unable to conclusively accept Milanovic’s hypothesis in terms of 
drivers for the upward portion of a cycle. At the same time, if the premise of his hypothesis 
holds true, then our results could lend support to his notion, but that would also imply that our 
model proves inadequate in accounting for the majority of the proposed effect.  
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In terms of the forces suggested to offset the rising level of within-nation income inequality 
in Milanovic’s hypothesis, we would expect the downward portion of a cycle to be driven by 
both malign and benign forces. The former of which includes wars through destruction and 
higher taxation in addition to civil conflict through state breakdown. Following our empirical 
analysis, we are unable to account for these factors. However, beyond the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflicts in the immediate years after the economic reforms, no apparent historical events in 
the period is likely to have induced an effect of the described magnitude.  
 
Looking further at the benign economic and demographic forces, there is a greater consonance 
to Kuznets original hypothesis, by a negative effect of widespread education and social 
pressure through politics. In this, the empirical analysis cannot find any statistical evidence to 
suggest that the former has had a significant on reducing inequality, despite the extraordinary 
achievements in educational attainment. For the latter, we find that increased efficiency in 
redistributive policies has had a significant negative impact on inequality for the tails of the 
distribution. However, whether this efficiency improvement derives from social pressure 
cannot be determined based on our analysis. An aspect that further connects to the proposed 
effect of population aging, which is expected to reduce inequality through increased demand 
for social protection. Here again, we are unable to find any significant direct effect from the 
process of an aging populai, and possible effects of population aging on redistributive policy 
efficiency cannot be determined from our analysis. The effect of low-skill-biased 
technological change will not be addressed further, as the notion is rather unsubstantiated. 
Resultantly, we cannot accept the Milanovic’s hypothesis of determinants for the downward 
portion of a cycle to any further degree than what has been concluded for Kuznets hypothesis. 
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8.4.2 Limitations of analysis and methodological approach  
One of the primary weaknesses of the empirical analysis is the limited number of observations 
for each regressors, and thus the small sample size of the dataset. On a general note, Roscoe 
(1975) suggests that a minimum sample size of 30 observations for each variable is appropriate 
for most research purposes and necessary for each category of samples that are decomposed 
into subsamples. This follows the central limit theorem in that sample means follows a normal 
distribution (Pinder, 2017). Following this premise, the number of observations in the sample 
would satisfy the rule of thumb. However, even though the small sample size does not 
necessarily make the dataset ineligible for research purposes, it will naturally affect the power 
of the statistical tests, lead to a magnification of error and undermined the validity of the study. 
Consequently, the results of the empirical analysis should be interpreted with great caution. 
 
Beyond the weakness of the sample size, there are also certain conceptual limitations in the 
methodological approach applied for the empirical analysis that should be addressed. By 
employing a multiple regression analysis, we can merely determine relationships between 
variables by correlation coefficients, which does not strictly prove causation. Accordingly, 
Shalev (2007) argues that multiple regression is an unconvincing instrument if the purpose of 
the research is to conclusively determine causal mechanisms. An important facet to his 
criticism relates to possible causal configurations that produce the phenomenon we are 
interested in studying through multiple, additive or conditional pathways. The issue of causal 
heterogeneity is highly relevant for the empirical analysis of this thesis, given the theoretical 
prediction of interrelated and codependent dynamics. A way to mitigate this issue technically 
would be to introduce an interactive model. However, given the ambiguity in specifying these 
dynamics and interpreting the results in a meaningful way, this is deemed an unfavored option. 
Still, by segregating these effects, there is a marked risk of diluting the real effect of the 
relevant conditional processes. The discrete specification would also imply that we are 
inadequately capturing the proposed dynamics of the relevant predictors according to theory. 
At the same time, given the dataset and the purpose of this research, we have already 
established that the cost of type 2 errors is perceived to be lower than for type 1 errors. Based 
on this evaluation, we accept the methodological limitations with caution rather than attempt 
to construct ambiguous interactive predictors that cannot be interpreted in a meaningful way. 
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9. Conclusion 
As given by the research purpose for the thesis, this paper has attempted to explain how 
aggregate disparity in the income distribution has evolved in China for the period between 
1985 to 2015, but also to shed light on some of the most significant drivers of this evolution.  
 
In accordance with the descriptive analysis of the development and composition of aggregate 
income inequality, it seems as if the political intention given by Deng Xiaoping in his 
renowned dictum has begun to come to fruition. From estimates by previous empirical work, 
there is a firm consensus of a marked increase in income inequality between 1978 and 2010, 
with a stagnation and moderate decline from 2010 to 2015. Based on data from Piketty et al. 
(2017), we found an increase of 21 Gini points from 1978 to 2010, equivalent to an increase 
of 60%. From 2010 to 2015, the Gini coefficient decreased by around 2%, compared to a drop 
of 4 % in official estimates. In terms of disparity between the tails of the distribution, we find 
an increase in the Palma ratio of nearly 140% from 1978 to 2010, with a comparable decline 
of 7% up until 2015. This aligns with the development in spatial disparity, whereas the urban-
rural earning dispersion and contribution to overall inequality peaked in the late 00s and since 
declined. A corresponding pattern was found in intergroup regional- and educational disparity, 
while the contribution of inter-sectorial inequality has been declining ever since the mid-90s.  
 
In terms of determinants for this development, the empirical analysis finds statistical evidence 
to suggest that increased trade dependence has had a positive impact on disparity between top 
and bottom income earners. Additionally, that increased efficiency of redistributive policies 
has had a significant negative impact on income inequality. If we assume these results to hold 
true, this would imply that the economic benefits from integrating China into the world market 
has not been equally distributed. Moreover, that the political agenda in pursuing a ‘harmonious 
society’ through targeted taxation, transfers and other social policies has reduce the elevated 
level of inequality. Nevertheless, there is not sufficient evidence to support Kuznets hypothesis 
of an inverted U-curve relationship between inequality and economic growth, sectorial 
migration, urbanization or educational attainment. Based on the same premise, we are unable 
to accept Milanovic’s predicted effect of technological revolutions and population aging. Yet, 
Milanovic suggest that determinants of inequality entail dependency and causal heterogeneity 
that this analysis is unable to account for - which could lead to diluted results. The small 
sample size further induces a nonnegligible magnification of error - reducing the power of the 
tests. On the basis thereof, more data and dynamic models is needed to validate the hypotheses.  
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11. Appendix  
A. Pre-tax national income share to decile 5-9 in post-reform China  
 
Illustration by author based on data from Piketty, Thomas; Yang, Li and Zucman, Gabriel (2016).  
 
B. Regions (Eastern, Central, Western) 
 
Appx. B: Du et al. (2015). “Tuberculosis Hospitalization Fees and Bed Utilization in China from 
1999 to 2009: The Results of a National Survey of Tuberculosis Specialized Hospitals”. PLoS ONE.  
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C. Theil Estimation Results based on China Family Panel Study 
Educational 
attainment 2010 2012 2014 2016 
 
Theil’s 
T index Share% 
Theil’s 
T index Share% 
Theil’s 
T index Share% 
Theil’s 
T index Share% 
Less than 
primary 
school 
0,07015 0,15024 0,07464 0,14995 0,05184 0,13271 0,07439 0,157289 
Primary 
school 
0,06011 0,12873 0,06807 0,13675 0,04568 0,11695 0,07399 0,156440 
Junior high 
school 
0,07337 0,15713 0,08649 0,17376 0,05436 0,13914 0,07743 0,163723 
Senior high 
school 
0,07079 0,15161 0,06500 0,13058 0,04455 0,11403 0,06135 0,129709 
3-year 
college 
0,07153 0,15319 0,09579 0,19243 0,05250 0,13440 0,07959 0,168270 
4-year 
college 
0,00011 0,00023 0,00009 0,00017 0,00006 0,00015 0,00009 0,000194 
Master's 
degree 
0,00013 0,00028 0,00018 0,00036 0,00020 0,00051 0,00007 0,000148 
Doctoral 
degree 
0,00002 0,00004 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00001 0,00009 0,000182 
Within 0.46692 0.83315 0.49777 0.87029 0.39065 0.87185 0.47296 0.87720 
Between 0.09351 0.16685 0.07419 0.12971 0.05742 0.12815 0.06621 0.12280 
Total 0.56043 100 0.57196 100 0.44807 100 0.53917 100 
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D.1 Contribution to overall income inequality by source (%) 
 
 
D.2 Contribution to change in overall income inequality by source (%) 
 
 
1995 2002 2007 2010 2012 2014
Other income 4.61 6.5 3.25 5.17 3.44 2.63
Transfer income 14.38 23.34 16.06 14.33 13.7 17.43
Property income 2.44 1.43 11.26 6.24 4.84 3.77
Operational income -22.77 -20.02 -2.56 7.82 0.05 -0.81
Wage income 101.35 88.75 71.99 66.45 77.86 76.99
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E. Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
E.1 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for Palma ration 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =        29 
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Statistic Value Value Value 
 Z(t)             -1.178 -4.343            -3.584          -3.230 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9150 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. One lag included based on 
Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with more lags in the augmented regression yield 
same conclusion. A trend component is also included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
E.2 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for GDP per capita 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =        27 
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t)  -2.189 -4.362 -3.592 -3.235 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.4962 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. Three lags included based 
on Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with fewer or more lags in the augmented 
regression yield same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
 
log_palma Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.1384715 .1175853      -1.18     0.250      -.3806429       .1036998 
LD.  .3706619    .2110293      1.76    0.091      -.063961     .8052849 
_trend .0044302    .0048449      0.91     0.369     -.0055481     .0144086 
_cons .1023822    .0567997      1.80    0.084      -.014599     .2193633 
log_gdp_pc Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.1904934    .0870349     -2.19    0.040     -.3714924    -.0094945 
LD.  .9312941    .1933281      4.82    0.000      .5292462     1.333342 
L2D. -.3690704    .2502945     -1.47    0.155     -.8895863     .1514454 
L3D. .2729692    .2104549      1.30    0.209     -.1646958     .7106342 
_trend .0254189    .0120666      2.11    0.047       .000325     .0505127 
_cons 1.318473    .5708831      2.31    0.031       .131257      2.50569 
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E.3 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for Secondary industry employment 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =      28 
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t) -2.833 -4.352 -3.588 -3.233 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.1849 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. Two lags included based 
on Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with fewer or more lags in the augmented 
regression yield same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
E.4 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for Tertiary industry employment 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =     26    
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t)  -2.042 -4.371 -3.596 -3.238 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.5785 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. Four lags included based 
on Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with fewer or more lags in the augmented 
regression yield same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
log_secondary Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.1835173     .064767     -2.83    0.009        -.3174981    -.0495364 
LD.   .6707621 .1839185      3.65    0.001      .2902977     1.051227 
L2D.  .1270994    .2021016      0.63    0.536     -.2909797     .5451785 
_trend  .0022648    .0008715      2.60    0.016       .000462     .0040677 
_cons  .5480163    .1931982      2.84    0.009      .1483553     .9476772 
log_tertiary Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.1936435    .0948439     -2.04     0.055     -.3921541     .0048672 
LD.  .6030622    .1911316      3.16    0.005       .2030193     1.003105 
L2D. .3549538    .1961068      1.81    0.086     -.0555025     .7654101 
L3D. -.4347519    .2309144     -1.88    0.075     -.9180612     .0485574 
L4D. .0960856    .2346152      0.41    0.687     -.3949696     .5871408 
_trend .0053227    .0029081      1.83    0.083      -.000764     .0114094 
_cons .5642315    .2594202      2.17    0.042      .0212587     1.107204 
 132
E.5 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for Technological progress 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =      27 
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t)  -2.437 -4.362 -3.592 -3.235 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.3603 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. Three lags included based 
on Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with fewer or more lags in the augmented 
regression yield same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
E.6 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for Compiled openness indicator   
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =       29 
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t)   -1.042 -4.343 -3.584 -3.230 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9382 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. One lag included based on 
Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with fewer or more lags in the augmented 
regression yield same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
 
 
log_tfp Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.1925666 .0790287  -2.44  0.024     -.3569157 -.0282175 
LD.  .8409379 .1957581  4.30  0.000  .4338367 1.248039 
L2D. -.4048545 .2294959  -1.76  0.092  -.8821173 .0724083 
L3D.  .22353 .1948681  1.15 0.264 -.1817203  .6287803 
_trend  .0039742 .0015758  2.52 0.020 .0006972 .0072513 
_cons  -.111958 .0480796  -2.33 0.030 -.2119449 -.0119711 
log_openness Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.1144671 .1098921 -1.04  0.308  -.3407942 .1118599 
LD.  .2248018 .2091073  1.08 0.293 -.2058627 .6554662 
_trend .0005501 .0046991 0.12 0.908 -.0091279 .0102282 
_cons .4308631 .3313112 1.30 0.205 -.251485 1.113211 
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E.7 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for Trade openness  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =       28 
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t)   -1.301 -4.351 -3.588 -3.233 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.8876 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. Two lags included based 
on Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with fewer or more lags in the augmented 
regression yield same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
E.8 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for Financial integration 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs =       29 
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t) -1.774 -4.343 -3.584 -3.230 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7171 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. One lag included based on 
Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with more lags in the augmented regression yield 
same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
 
 
 
log_trade Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.1750928 .1345508 -1.30  0.206  -.4534322 .1032466 
LD.  .341055 .2027082  1.68 0.106 -.0782788 .7603888 
L2D. .0746314 .2174411 0.34 0.735 -.3751797 .5244425 
_trend .0011438 .0039436 0.29 0.774 -.0070141 .0093017 
_cons .6325888 .4520954 1.40 0.175 -.3026417 1.567819 
log_fin_~n Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.3047669 .1717885  -1.77  0.088     -.6585719 .0490381 
LD.  -.0786853 .2036303  -0.39  0.702  -.4980697 .3406991 
_trend .0124278 .0109015  1.14 0.265 -.0100242 .0348798 
_cons .9370083 .4375818  2.14 0.042 .0357916 1.838225 
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E.9 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for Redistributive policies 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =       27  
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t)  -0.962 -4.362 -3.592 -3.235 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9490 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. Three lags included based 
on Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with fewer or more lags in the augmented 
regression yield same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
E.10 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for Educational attainment 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =        28 
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t)  -2.978 -4.352 -3.588 -3.233 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.1383 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. Two lags included based 
on Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with fewer or more lags in the augmented 
regression yield same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
 
log_abs_~n Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.1126663 .117128  -0.96  0.347     -.3562474 .1309148 
LD.  .3245038 .216138  1.50  0.148  -.1249796 .7739873 
L2D. .0195257 .2412453  0.08  0.936  -.4821715 .5212228 
L3D. -.1343248  .2395515  -0.56 0.581 -.6324995  .3638499 
_trend .0083438  .0052293  1.60 0.126 -.0025311 .0192188 
_cons -.0255327  .1177619 -0.22 0.830 -.2704319 .2193665 
log_edu_~y Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.2244315 .0753633  -2.98 0.007     -.3803323 -.0685307 
LD.  .5881169 .1953619  3.01  0.006  .1839801 .9922537 
L2D. .0694803 .2185286  0.32  0.753  -.3825805 .521541 
_trend .0252554 .0083486  3.03 0.006 .0079849 .0425258 
_cons .1130489 .0376287  3.00 0.006 .0352079 .1908898 
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E.11 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for Population aging 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =        27 
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t)   1.209 -4.362 -3.592 -3.235 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 1.0000 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. Three lags included based 
on Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with fewer or more lags in the augmented 
regression yield same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
E.12 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for Privatization 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =        29 
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t)  -0.652 -4.343 -3.584 -3.230 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9761 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. One lag included based on 
Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with more lags in the augmented regression yield 
same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.   
 
 
 
log_age_~p Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. .0623157 .0515322  1.21 0.240 -.0448513 .1694827 
LD.  1.564032 .2239817  6.98  0.000  1.098237 2.029828 
L2D. -.4221131 .4069136  -1.04  0.311  -1.268336 .4241101 
L3D. -.3103115 .3015797 -1.03 0.315 -.937481  .3168579 
_trend -.0007774 .0007073  -1.10 0.284 -.0022482 .0006935 
_cons -.1282011  .1057308  -1.21 0.239 -.3480803 .0916782 
log_privat Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.061068 .0936273  -0.65  0.520     -.253897 .131761 
LD.  .2056004  .2148479  0.96 0.348  -.236887 .6480879 
_trend .000796 .0020079  0.40 0.695 -.0033394 .0049314 
_cons .2462769  .3460483  0.71 0.483 -.4664229 .9589766 
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E.13 Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for Financial deepening 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root          Number of obs   =        29 
----------------Interpolated Dickey-Fuller---------------- 
     Test Statistic 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
          Value Value Value Value 
 Z(t)   -2.713 -4.343 -3.584 -3.230 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.2305 
ADF test accepts the null hypothesis of a unit root at all common significance levels. One lag included based on 
Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), experiments with more lags in the augmented regression yield 
same conclusion. Trend component included based on the observed upward trend in the process.  
F. Augmented component-plus-residual plot with lowess smoothing bandwidth of 0.8 
F.1 Economic growth  
(GDP per capita) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F.2 Industrialization 
(Share of employment in secondary industries) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
log_fin_~g Coef.    Std. Err.       t P > t     [95% Conf. Interval] 
L1. -.4912913 .1810549  -2.71  0.012     -.8641809 -.1184017 
LD.  .2049901  .1876611  1.09  0.285  -.1815053 .5914854 
_trend .0106267 .0039654  2.68 0.013 .0024598 .0187936 
_cons 2.123345  .777018  2.73 0.011 .5230466 3.723644 
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F.3 Servicization 
(Share of employment in tertiary industries) 
 
F.4 Urbanization 
(Share of urban population) 
 
 
F.5 Technological progress 
(Total factor productivity) 
 
F.6 Openness 
(Compiled openness indicator) 
  
 
F.7 Trade openness 
(Trade dependence ratio (% of GDP)) 
 
 
F.8 Financial integration 
(Total external A/L. outstanding (% of GDP)) 
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F.9 Absolute redistribution 
(Difference between net and market Gini) 
 
F.10 Educational attainment 
(School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 
 
 
F.11 Population aging 
(Old-age dependency ratio) 
 
F.12 Privatization 
(Private share of national wealth (% of NI)) 
 
 
F.13 Financial deepening 
(Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)) 
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G. Standardized residual plot against relevant predictor variables 
G.1 Openness 
(Compiled openness indicator) 
 
G.2 Trade openness 
(Trade dependence ratio (% of GDP)) 
 
G.3 Financial integration 
(Total external A/L. outstanding (% of GDP))
 
G.4 Population aging 
(Old-age dependency ratio) 
 
G.5 Financial deepening 
(Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H. Correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1)  1.00                     
(2)  0.98 1.00                    
(3)  0.49 0.40 1.00                   
(4)  0.16 0.08 0.63 1.00                  
(5)  0.55 0.60 0.08 -0.21 1.00                 
(6)  0.59 0.68 0.04 -0.22 0.96 1.00                
(7) -0.16 -0.20 0.25 0.33 -0.05 -0.12 1.00               
(8)  -0.16 -0.20 0.27 0.36 -0.08 -0.15 0.99 1.00              
(9)  0.56 0.48 0.63 0.52 0.37 0.30 0.40 0.41 1.00             
(10) 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.12 -0.08 -0.14 -0.20 -0.18 0.25 1.00            
(11)  -0.09 -0.11 0.02 -0.17 0.08 -0.04 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.07 1.00           
(12)  -0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.15 -0.11 -0.24 -0.22 -0.15 0.12 -0.10 1.00          
(13)  0.10 0.16 -0.09 -0.18 0.07 0.14 -0.40 -0.39 -0.22 0.08 -0.08 0.72 1.00         
(14)  0.02 -0.04 0.44 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.37 0.37 -0.01 -0.22 0.13 -0.04 -0.09 1.00        
(15)  -0.16 -0.08 -0.16 -0.06 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.25 0.13 -0.02 0.06 0.11 -0.09 -0.17 1.00       
(16)  -0.10 -0.03 -0.27 -0.11 0.30 0.31 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.02 -0.05 0.17 -0.02 -0.35 0.94 1.00      
(17)  -0.30 -0.21 -0.22 -0.30 0.30 0.27 0.33 0.29 -0.13 -0.50 -0.12 -0.36 -0.17 0.17 0.25 0.17 1.00     
(18)  -0.33 -0.25 -0.25 -0.26 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.25 -0.15 -0.44 -0.07 -0.33 -0.13 0.11 0.22 0.16 0.96 1.00    
(19) -0.14 -0.08 -0.22 -0.31 0.18 0.11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.18 -0.02 0.34 0.00 0.03 -0.11 0.38 0.30 -0.11 -0.14 1.00   
(20) -0.57 -0.52 -0.24 -0.17 -0.20 -0.24 -0.15 -0.15 -0.35 -0.20 0.41 -0.15 0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.19 0.19 0.31 1.00  
(21) -0.05 0.04 0.11 -0.02 0.11 0.10 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.38 0.50 0.08 0.22 0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.37 0.60 1.00 
Note: (1) Economic Growth, (2) Economic growth^2, (3) Industrialization, (4) Industrialization^2, (5) Servicization, (6) Servicization^2, (7) Urbanization, (8) Urbanization^2, 
(9) Technological progress, (10) Trade openness, (11) Trade openness^2 (12) Financial integration, (13) Financial integration^2 (14) Absolute redistribution, (15) Educational 
attainment, (16) Educational attainmentt^2, (17) Population aging, (18) Population aging^2, (19) Privatization, (20) Financial deepening (21) Financial deepening^2
I. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test results 
 VIF 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economic growth 
    d1.log_gdp_pc 195.96 180.99 - - 
Economic growth^2 
    d1.log_gdp_pc_sq 183.83 174.27 - - 
Industrialization 
    d1.log_share_secondary 10.92 12.18 - - 
Industrialization^2 
    d1.log_share_secondary_sq 6.26 7.74 - - 
Servicization 
    d1.log_share_tertiary 72.36 99.87 - - 
Servicization^2 
    d1.log_share_tertiary_sq 89.01 7.74 - - 
Urbanization 
    d1.urban_pop 1086.99 1599.45 - - 
Urbanization^2 
    d1.urban_pop_sq 1059.20 1575.24 - - 
Technological progress 
    d1.log_tfp 8.01 12.78 - - 
Openness 
    d1.log_open 6.26 - 1.44 - 
Openness^2 
    d1.log_open_sq 3.86 - 1.38 - 
Trade openness 
    d1.log_trade - 4.89 - 1.06 
Trade openness^2 
    d1.log_trade^2 - 8.20 - 1.03 
Financial integration 
    d1.log_fin_intgr - 9.57 - - 
Financial integration^2 
    d1.log_fin_intgr_sq - 6.92 - - 
Absolute redistribution 
    d1.log_abs_redist 5.82 8.02 1.06 1.07 
Educational attainment 
    d1.log_edu 24.24 34.30 - - 
Educational attainment^2 
    d1.log_edu _sq 24.21 25.68 - - 
Population aging 
    d1.log_age_dep 88.85 142.90 - - 
Population aging^2 
    d1.log_age_dep^2 66.19 87.82 - - 
Privatization 
    d1.log_privat 5.09 7.05 - - 
Financial deepening 
    d1.log_fin_deep 5.39 9.93 - - 
Financial deepening^2 
    d1.log_fin_deep_sq 6.66 12.78 - - 
Mean VIF 155.22 197.88 1.29 1.05 
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J. Graphical test for heteroscedasticity of residuals: Residuals-versus-fitted plot 
I.1 Model 1: All-possible regression  
compiled openness indicator 
 
I.2 Model 2: All-possible regression  
decomposed openness indicator 
 
 
I.3 Model 3: Stepwise regression  
compiled openness indicator 
 
 
I.4 Model 4: Stepwise regression  
decomposed openness indicator 
 
 
K. Graphical test for autocorrelation of residuals: Correlogram 
J.1 Model 1: All-possible regression  
compiled openness indicator 
 
J.1 Model 2: All-possible regression  
decomposed openness indicator  
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J.3 Model 3: Stepwise regression  
compiled openness indicator 
 
J.4 Model 4: Stepwise regression  
decomposed openness indicator 
 
 
L. Graphical test for normality: Histogram plot of residuals 
K.1 Model 1: All-possible regression  
compiled openness indicator 
 
K.2 Model 2: All-possible regression  
decomposed openness indicator 
 
 
K.3 Model 3: Stepwise regression 
 compiled openness indicator 
 
 
K.4 Model 4: Stepwise regression  
decomposed openness indicator 
 
 
 
